

Vol. IX, No. 4

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# CURIOUS

*A QUARTERLY REVIEW  
to explore the implications  
of Christianity for our times*

TEILHARD DE CHARDIN • STURZO • POLLOCK

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DANIÉLOU • SLEEPER • STEPHANOU • PEPPER • DI LASCIA

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## AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ISSUE

THE HUNDRED YEARS between 1859 and 1959 have witnessed a number of "explosions" of the human mind. The first of these, whose implications we still are learning to understand, occurred with the publication of Charles Darwin's *Origin of Species*. The fact that there had been numerous anticipations and foreshadowings of Darwin's insight in no way diminishes the fact that in 1859 a new idea was born in the consciousness of man. It is in part because of this new idea that man during the last century has gained an awareness of the processive universe in which he lives, an awareness unparalleled in any previous age.

There is something quite fitting about the fact that the year 1859 also saw the birth of Henri Bergson and John Dewey, both of whom created evolutionary philosophies of the first order. Bergson's philosophical achievement is relatively secure and in no need of defense. Yet less than a decade after the end of a long life dedicated to the struggle for human enlightenment and betterment, Dewey and his thought are the center of extensive controversy. When this controversy is undertaken by responsible and serious minds familiar with Dewey's thought and the problems in which he engaged himself, *CROSS CURRENTS* can only encourage it. Unfortunately, however, this is all too infrequently the situation; today we hear John Dewey blamed for everything from our present-day ills in education to those in foreign policy.

In such an atmosphere, *CROSS CURRENTS* is especially glad in this Dewey centennial year to join with those who recognize his great contribution to modern thought. We believe that the two studies of Dewey which we are publish-

ing in this issue give us fresh insight into his work. Robert Pollock and Ralph Sleeper make some statements concerning Dewey's ideas which will surely be viewed as audacious by those who approach him in a partisan spirit. Whether a particular interpretation is legitimate can be resolved only by referring it to the fuller context of his collected writings. What is immediately apparent, however, is that both Pollock and Sleeper are working from within Dewey's thought without being enclosed by it. Both these essays should be considered creative interpretations which also maintain a deep fidelity to the text.

Readers of *CROSS CURRENTS* are aware that we do not strive for a tightly unified issue in our selection of articles. In part this stems from the realization that the deeper unities are often missed if we try to impose a pattern too quickly and too simply. Paradoxically, a rich pluralism is a prerequisite if we are to approximate true unity. We have occasionally suggested certain unifying strains in a particular issue, but have for the most part preferred to let the lines of diverse human expression slowly reveal their tendency to converge. It is obvious that the major portion of this issue is devoted to articles by or about three thinkers who share, despite their many differences, the common vision of reality as process: John Dewey, Luigi Sturzo, and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Their national and intellectual backgrounds are quite diverse, but a deep sense of process permeates their entire work. Similarly, Robert Pollock's interpretation of Dewey flows from his own awareness of man as a historical being, and the history of thought as a manifestation of his historical and processive nature.

In reading these various articles, one is struck by the fact that numerous statements by and about Dewey, Sturzo and Teilhard, are interchangeable. For example, Alfred DiLascia writes: "For Sturzo human nature is not a vanishing formal essence but a nature that is radically processive and operational." Allowing for the different nuances it would have within each thinker's framework, this remark could be made with equal justice about both Dewey and Teilhard.

In accordance with their concern for process, Dewey, Sturzo and Teilhard all strive to deal with concrete reality, and employ an empirical method in their attempt to understand it. They share a belief in the ability of man to involve himself vitally in the task of directing that process which is at the heart of reality. They are thus led to a guarded hope that man will progress to a fuller realization of his latent potentialities.

Naturally, when dealing with creative minds like these, similarity can never mean identity, and even serious differences need not be understood as irreconcilable opposition. Dewey, for example, would seem to part company with Sturzo and Teilhard concerning the presence of a transcendent within processive reality. It must be admitted that, in one sense, Dewey and the other two men are

far apart on this question, but Sleeper's association of Dewey with Augustine's notion of experience is extremely suggestive, and in insisting that "Dewey was taken up with totality as well as with individuals," Pollock cites Dewey's own statement that "We are never wholly free from the sense of something that lies beyond."

It is not the function of this brief introduction to suggest the full meaning of this issue's central concern. What is important, however, is that we try to follow the implications of this processive dimension in reality as far as we can, and not simply give lip-service to a fashionable cliché. Men like Dewey, Sturzo, Teilhard and Pollock may lead us into unfamiliar territory, and force us to re-think—in some cases, to discard—those categories of thought and opinion with which we are most familiar, but this kind of risk is characteristic of all genuinely creative thinking. We must take care that the insight which sees reality as process does not become another example of what Emanuel Mounier refers to when he speaks of "the paradoxical adventure of an idea which Christianity first inaugurated and has apparently spent the last 200 years in discrediting."

EUGENE FONTINELL

# BUILDING THE EARTH

PIERRE TEILHARD DE CHARDIN

## Introduction

The publication this fall of a book by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (*THE PHENOMENON OF MAN*, with a preface by Sir Julian Huxley, Harper & Bros., \$5) should be one of the events of the intellectual year in America. Although his role in the discovery of Peking man and his work as paleontologist were widely celebrated, his attempt to see the spiritual implications of evolution were previously almost exclusively known by means of scattered scientific writings, summaries of lecture notes (often misunderstood and held in suspicion), and the vagaries of rumor. Père Teilhard was a Jesuit priest who had been professor of geology at the Institut Catholique, a director of research in the CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE, and an elected MEMBRE DE L'INSTITUT.

After his death in 1955, the publication of his works by the Editions du Seuil was begun in Paris under the sponsorship of a distinguished scientific committee, and the response to the volumes published thus far (*LE PHÉNOMÈNE HUMAIN*—the book now translated—*L'APPARITION DE L'HOMME*, *LA VISION DU PASSÉ*, *LE MILIEU DIVIN*) has been remarkable. Other scattered books of Père Teilhard have emerged, including *LE GROUPE ZOOLOGIQUE HUMAIN* (Albin Michel), *LETTRES DE VOYAGE*, and *NOUVELLES LETTRES DE VOYAGE* (Grasset). Helicon Press is now bringing out the first study of Père Teilhard in English, by Claude Tresmontant.

CROSS CURRENTS had the honor to present in 1951 an essay by Msgr. Bruno de Solages (Vol. I, no. 4) which sketched

an outline of Père Teilhard's understanding of evolution, and remains a useful introduction to his thought. The Fall 1952 issue contained a brief, but suggestive, essay by Père Teilhard, "The Psychological Conditions of Human Unification."

Late last year the ASSOCIATION DES AMIS DE PIERRE TEILHARD DE CHARDIN (18, rue Guynemer, Paris VI) published their initial CAHIER, *CONSTRUIRE LA TERRE*, made up of extracts from as-yet-unedited works, and with the text reproduced in French, German, Arabic, Russian, and English. The ASSOCIATION and the Editions du Seuil have graciously permitted us to reprint the English version of these five short articles.

These extracts are tantalizingly brief, but it is to be hoped that their suggestiveness will lead readers on to *THE HUMAN PHENOMENON*, and to the other works in French, or in English as they appear. As Max Bégouën wrote, introducing *BUILDING THE EARTH* on behalf of the ASSOCIATION: "The gravity of the present hour induces us to make these extracts known immediately, pending the full publication at a later date of the whole corpus of his (Père Teilhard's) writings on the Future of Man and on Human Energy."

There are difficulties in Père Teilhard's style, such as his use of initial capitals for all abstract nouns like 'life,' 'thought,' etc. He also needed to coin words to express his thought, but as Bernard Wall (translator of *THE PHENOMENON OF MAN*) says, the meaning of words like 'noosphere' and 'hominisation' "should become apparent as his thought unfolds." Whatever the effort required, the reader will be rewarded

in following Père Teilhard's thought to the end.

To quote M. Bégouën again:

*The peoples of the Earth, "the natural units of humanity" (LA VISION DU PASSÉ, p. 271), must, he (Père Teilhard) said, achieve terrestrial harmony through the variety of their racial characteristics—characteristics which reciprocally enrich each other. He gave each of them this watchword: "Remain on your own line, but move ever upwards towards greater consciousness and greater love. At the summit you will find yourselves united with all those who, from every direction, have made the same ascent. For everything that rises must converge."*

*Just as the various cells and members of the body grow and develop to form a single living being and find their ultimate perfection only by constituting that being, so the constant goal of individual and national development should be the unity of mankind, which individuals and nations are called upon to achieve if they are to live to the full.*

*In all countries a new ferment is working towards this end, still largely unperceived. May the countries be delivered from the fatal temptation of building for themselves alone; for the sap which is rising in them is destined for the total achievement:*

*"The Age of Nations is past. The task before us now, if we would not perish, is to build the Earth."*

## THOUGHTS ON PROGRESS<sup>1</sup>

**I**T HAS BECOME fashionable today to mock or to treat with suspicion, anything which looks like faith in the Future.

If we are not careful this scepticism will be fatal, for its direct result is to destroy both the love of living and the momentum of Mankind.

Firmly based on the general history

<sup>1</sup> Extracts from a lecture given at the Embassy in Peking, 30th March 1941.

of the World, as revealed to us over a period of 300 million years by Palaeontology, we can, without losing our foothold in dreams, make these two assertions:

a) First and foremost, Mankind still shows signs of a *reserve*, a formidable potential of concentration, that is, of progress. Think of the immensity of the powers, ideas and persons not yet discovered or harnessed or born or synthesized.... In terms of "energy" and biology, the human race is still very young and very fresh.

b) The Earth is still far from having completed its sidereal evolution. True, we can imagine all sorts of catastrophes which might intervene to cut short this great development. But for 300 million years now, Life has been going on paradoxically in the midst of improbability. Does that not indicate that it is marching forward, sustained by some complicity in the motive forces of the Universe?

The real difficulty which faces Man is not the certainty that he is the seat of constant progress; it is rather the conception of how this progress can go on for a long time yet at its present rate, *without Life exploding of itself* or blowing up the Earth on which it was born. Our modern world was created in less than ten thousand years, and in the last two hundred years it has changed faster than in all the previous milleniums.

### *The March Forward*

Progress, if it is to continue, will not happen by itself. Evolution, by the very mechanism of its syntheses, is constantly acquiring greater freedom.

In practice, what steps must we take in relation to this forward march?

I see two, which can be summarized in five words: *a great hope, in common.*

a) First, *a great hope.* This must be

born spontaneously in every generous soul in face of the anticipated work, and it also represents the essential *impetus* without which nothing will be done. A passionate love of growth, of being, that is what we need. Down with the cowards and the sceptics, the pessimists and the unhappy, the weary and the stagnant.

b) *In common*. On this point also the history of Life is decisive. There is only one way which leads upwards; the one which, through greater organization, leads to greater synthesis and unity. Here again, then, down with the pure individualists, the egoists, who expect to grow by excluding or diminishing their brothers—individually, nationally or racially. Life is moving towards unification. Our hope will only be operative if it is expressed in greater cohesion and human solidarity.

The future of the Earth is in our hands. How shall we decide?

A common Science merely brings the geometric point of different intelligences nearer together. A common interest, however passionate, merely brings beings into indirect touch, through an Impersonal which destroys personality.

It is not our heads or our bodies which we must bring together, but our hearts.

The generating principle of our unification is not finally to be found in the single contemplation of the same Truth or in the single desire awakened by *Something*, but in the single attraction exercised by the same *Someone*.

### ON THE POSSIBLE BASIS OF A COMMON CREDO<sup>2</sup>

ONCE THE REALITY of a Noogenesis is admitted (the concentration and collective march forward of human Thought) *the believer in the World*

finds himself obliged to give a growing place in his thoughts on the future to the values of personality and transcendence. Of personality, since a Universe on the road of psychic concentration is identically a Universe which is becoming personalized. And of transcendence, because a last pole of "cosmic" personalization, if it is to be supremely consistent and unifying, can hardly be conceived except as emerging from elements which it super-personalizes by uniting them.

Still in the same perspective, assuming it is admitted that there is a cosmic genesis of the spirit, *the believer in Heaven* realizes that the mystic transformation of which he dreams presupposes and confirms all the tangible realities and laborious conditions of human Progress. To be super-spiritualized in God, must not Mankind first be born and grow in conformity with the whole system of what we call evolution?

The sense of Earth opening and flowering upwards in the sense of God, and the sense of God rooted and nourished from below in the sense of Earth. The transcendent personal God and the Universe in evolution, no longer forming two antagonistic poles of attraction, but entering into a hierarchic conjunction to uplift the human mass in a single tide. Such is the notable transformation which the idea of the spiritual evolution of the Universe implies *in theory* and which is beginning to come about *in practice* in a growing number of minds, free-thinkers as well as believers. The very transformation we are seeking.

#### *The new spirit for a new world*

To unify the vital human forces, so lamentably disunited at this moment, the direct and effective way would simply be to sound the alarm and to form a block of all those who, either on the

<sup>2</sup> Peking, 30th March 1941.

right or the left, believe that the great affair for modern Mankind is to break its way out by *forcing some threshold of greater consciousness*. Whether Christians or not, the men who are animated by this conviction form a *homogeneous category*. Although in the march of Mankind they take their stations on opposing wings, they can advance hand in hand, because their attitudes, far from being exclusive, virtually prolong each other, and ask only to be completed. What are they waiting for, in order to set up the common front of all those who believe that the Universe is moving forward, and that it is our task to make it move forward? Would not this be the solid nucleus around which tomorrow's unanimity must develop?

In spite of the wave of scepticism which seems to have swept away the hopes (over-simplified and over-materialist) upon which the nineteenth century lived, faith in the future is not dead in our hearts. Better still, it is this hope, deepened and purified, which seems bound to save us. It is not only that the idea of a possible awakening of our consciousness to a super-consciousness becomes daily scientifically better based on experience and psychologically more necessary to keep alive in man the zest for action; in addition, pushed to its logical conclusion, this very idea seems the only one capable of making ready for the great event which we are awaiting; the discovery of a synthetic act of adoration in which are allied and mutually exalted the passionate desire to conquer the World, and the passionate desire to unite ourselves with God; *the vital act, specifically new, corresponding to a new age of the Earth.*\*

\* These thoughts, written on the occasion of the New York Congress on SCIENCE AND RELIGION, were designed to map out the ground on which all men who desired progress might begin to understand and help each other to attain

## WE MUST SAVE MANKIND<sup>3</sup>

THERE IS NOW incontrovertible evidence that Mankind has just entered upon what is probably the greatest period of change that has ever been known. The ills from which we are suffering have their seat in the very foundations of terrestrial thought. Something is happening to the whole structure of human consciousness. A fresh kind of life is starting.

In the face of such an upheaval, and actually shaken by it, no one can remain indifferent.

Swept along the tide of affairs, what can we do to see *clearly* and to act *decisively*?

The foundation of all the reactions which current events awaken in our inner selves must be a robust faith in the destiny of Man. Even if that faith is already there, it must be fortified.

It is too easy to find an excuse for inaction by pleading the decadence of civilization, or even the imminent end of the world.

This defeatism, whether it be innate or acquired, or a mere affectation, seems to me the besetting temptation of our time. Defeatism is invariably unhealthy and impotent; can we also prove that it is unjustified? I think so.

For anyone who can read the chart of facts recorded by modern science, it is now clear that mankind is not an accidental phenomenon occurring by chance on one of the smallest stars in the sky. Mankind represents the culmination of the whole movement of matter and life, so far as it is within the range of our experience. Is there any need to emphasize what wealth the be-

<sup>3</sup> Peking, 11 November 1936. (Extracts from a work to be published shortly.)

*the highest truth which full co-operation would bring within their reach.*



liever derives from this recognition that the work of creation is being wilfully continued? The finished prototype, whose perfection owes a debt to the earlier experimental forms, the key-stone of the dome, in which all the architectonic lines of the edifice converge, Man has, in these new perspectives, a better understanding of his title-deeds to the sovereignty of the Universe.

Entirely different from the old anthropocentric view, under which Man was the static geometric centre of the Universe, this view that the "human phenomenon" is a supremely characteristic form of the cosmic phenomenon has an incalculable moral range; it transforms our values, and guarantees the permanence of the work which we are doing, or rather of the work which is being done through our agency.

The critical events of today must be a turning-point of progress. That we can and must believe; we are progressing.

In what direction are we moving?

And, above all, what exactly is happening in the profundities of the human mass? We are progressing, agreed, but why is there so much disorder around us?

There are three major influences confronting each other and struggling for possession of the Earth.

Democracy, Communism, Fascism.<sup>4</sup> Whence do these three forces derive their strength, and why is the warfare between them interminable?

In the three conflicting masses it is possible to recognise clearly, though in imperfect and sketchy form, *the three aspirations* which are characteristic of a faith in the future; a passion for the future, a passion for the universal and a passion for the individual; all three of them misunderstood, or imperfectly com-

prehended; these are the three-fold mainsprings which keep human energies in a state of tension and conflict all around us.

The case of Democracy is clear enough; two faults of perspective, logically linked with each other, have enfeebled and vitiated the democratic vision of the World, one affecting its personalism, and the other in consequence affecting its universality. The social element cannot attain full originality and full value, except in a whole within which it is differentiated. Because this has not been realized, democracy has emancipated instead of liberating. With emancipation each cell has thought itself free to set up a centre of its own. Hence the dispersion of false intellectual and social liberalisms, contrary to the genius of events. Hence, also, the disastrous equalitarianism which constitutes a threat to any serious construction of a new Earth. Democracy, by giving the people control over progress, seems to satisfy the idea of totality. In fact, it only presents a counterfeit. True universality rightly claims to bring into synthesis all initiatives, all values, all potentialities, however obscure. But it is essentially organic and hierarchic. By confounding individualism and personalism, crowd and totality, by fragmenting and levelling the human mass, democracy has run the risk of jeopardizing the hopes for the future of mankind that were born with it. For that reason it has seen Communism break away from it to the left, and all the forms of Fascism rise against it on the right.

In Communism, at any rate in its origins, faith in a universal human organism reached a magnificent state of exaltation. The temptation of Russian neo-Marxism for the elite consists far less in its humanitarian gospel than in its vision of a totalitarian civilization strongly linked with the cosmic powers of mat-

<sup>4</sup> The expression *Fascism* is used throughout to indicate all forms of authoritarian nationalism.

ter. The true name of communism would be "terrenism." Unfortunately, on this side also, the human ideal is defective or deformed. On the one hand, in an excessive reaction against the anarchic liberalism of democracy, communism has arrived at the virtual suppression of the individual, and has turned man into a termite. On the other hand, in its unbalanced admiration for the tangible powers of the Universe, it has systematically excluded from its hopes the possibility of a spiritual metamorphosis of the Universe. The human phenomenon (essentially defined by the development of thought) was thenceforth reduced to the mechanical development of a soulless collectivity. The matter has veiled the spirit. Pseudo-determinism has killed love. The lack of personalism, involving a limitation or even a perversion of the future, and as an inevitable result undermining the possibility and the very conception of universalism; these, rather than any economic overthrow, are the real dangers of Bolshevism.

There can be no doubt that the Fascist movement was largely born out of reaction to the so-called "ideas of the Revolution." This origin explains the compromising support which it has always found among the numerous elements who, for different reasons of intellectual or social conservatism, are interested in disbelieving in a human future. But passion is not inspired by stagnation, and there is no lack of ardour in Fascism. It is open to the future. Its ambition is to embrace vast entities within its empire. The sad thing is that the sphere which it contemplates is restricted. Fascism seems wilfully to overlook the critical human transformation and the irresistible material bonds which, here and now, have already brought civilization into the international phase. Fascism is obstinately

determined to conceive and fabricate the modern world which lives within it in the dimensions of a by-gone age. It gives preference to the race over mankind; it wishes to restore a soul to its own people, but it is indifferent to a soulless world. It charts a course into the future in the search for forms of civilization which have for ever vanished.

The forces which confront each other all around us are not purely destructive; each of them includes some positive constituents. By virtue of these very constituents, they are unwittingly converging towards a common conception of the future. In each of them it is the world itself which is struggling for survival and turning towards the light. Birth-pangs, and not the signs of death. Essential affinities, not ultimate hatred.

Once we have distinguished this, under the currents and in the turmoil, we can realize the manoeuvre which will save us.

How can we unite all the positive values of civilization in a whole which will enhance individual values? How can we achieve that higher passion, where we shall find simultaneously combined and consummated, in a new synthesis, both the democratic sense of individual rights, the communist vision of the potentialities contained in matter, and the Fascist ideal of an organized élite?

Fundamentally, and in spite of the comparative enthusiasm which carries large sections of mankind along with the political and social currents of the day, the mass of mankind remains unsatisfied. It is impossible to find, either on the right or the left, a truly progressive mind which does not confess to a partial disillusionment with all existing movements. A man joins one party or

the other, because if he wishes to act he must make a choice. But, having taken his stand, everyone feels to some extent hampered, amputated, revolted. Everyone wants something larger, finer, more comprehensive.

Scattered throughout the apparently hostile masses which are fighting each other, there are elements everywhere which are only waiting for a shock in order to orientate themselves and unite. All that is needed is that the right ray of light should fall upon this cloud of particles, that the appeal should be sounded which responds to their internal structure, and across all denominations, and across all the conventional barriers which still exist, we shall see the living atoms of the universe seek each other out, find each other and organize themselves. In the old days our fathers set out on the great adventure in the name of justice and the rights of man. Modern science has opened up to us space and time of which our fathers had no inkling, and we can no longer confine our efforts to such a limited scale, however exalting it was to them.

That is why our age is weary of the sectionalism which confines human sympathies in watertight compartments. The party turmoil soon drags us into an atmosphere where it is no longer possible to breathe. We must have air. We must unite. No more political fronts, but one great crusade for human advancement . . . .

The democrat, the communist and the fascist must jettison the deviations and limitations of their systems and pursue to the full the positive aspirations which inspire their enthusiasm, and then, quite naturally, the new spirit will burst the exclusive bonds which still imprison it; the three currents will find themselves merging in the conception of a common task; namely, to promote the spiritual future of the World.

Only relative unanimity to start with; but real unity, to the extent to which all the world is finally at one in recognising that the function of man is to build and direct the whole of the *Earth*. Having lived for milleniums in self-contradiction, Mankind has now reached a stage of development from which it can, with all its forces, advance *forward*.

It will be objected that, in order finally to constitute a Crusade of Man, there must be an "antagonist" to oppose. For my part, I do not believe in the supreme effectiveness of the instinct of preservation and fear. It is not the fear of perishing, but the ambition to live which has thrown Man into the exploration of nature, into the conquest of the ethereal and on to the skyways. The lodestone which must magnetize and purify the energies in us, whose growing surplus is presently dissipated in useless shocks and perverse refinements, I would place, in the last analysis, in the gradual manifestation of some essential object, whose total wealth, more precious than gold, more seductive than any beauty, would be for Man grown adult, the Grail and the Eldorado in which the ancient conquerors believed; something tangible, for the possession of which it would be infinitely good to lay down one's life.

For that reason, if a spiritual Human Front began to come about, it would need, alongside the engineers occupied in organizing the resources and liaisons of the Earth, other "technicians" solely concerned with defining and propagating the concrete goals, ever more lofty, upon which the efforts of human activities should be concentrated. Up to now, we have rightly been passionate in seeking to unveil the mysteries concealed in matter infinitely great and infinitesimally small. But an inquiry of much greater importance to the future will be the study of *psychic* currents and attrac-

tions; a science of spiritual energy. Perhaps, impelled by the necessity to build the unity of the World, we shall end by perceiving that the great object unconsciously pursued by science is nothing else than the discovery of God.

In the face of Mankind in danger of allowing that fraction of consciousness already awakened in it by the progress of life to become absorbed in the "secondary matter" of philosophic determinism and social mechanism, Christianity maintains the primacy of reflective, that is to say, personalized, thought. This it does in the most effective of all ways, not only by the speculative doctrinal defence of the possibility of a centred, but still universal consciousness, but even more by transmitting and developing through its mysticism the meaning and, in some sense, the direct intuition of this centre of total convergence. The least that an unbeliever can admit today, if he understands the biological situation of the World, is that the figure of Christ (not only as described in a book, but as realized in the concrete in the Christian consciousness) is, so far, the most perfect approximation to a final and total object towards which the universal human effort can tend without becoming wearied or deformed.

NOTE: Father Teilhard de Chardin did not exclude from Christianity any one who expressly or implicitly believes in Love. He knew that to different men are given different hours in which to realize that this Essential Love, cause and purpose of the Universe, is to be found at the very heart of the Universe.

### THE SPIRIT OF EARTH<sup>5</sup>

THE PHRASE "Sense of Earth" should be understood to mean the passionate sense of common destiny which draws the thinking part of Life ever further onwards. In principle there is

<sup>5</sup> Pacific, 1931. (Extracts from a work to be published shortly.)

no feeling which has a firmer foundation in nature, or greater power. But in fact there is also no feeling which awakens so belatedly, since it can only become explicit when our consciousness has expanded beyond the broadening, but still far too restricted, circles of family, country and race, and has finally discovered that *the only truly natural and real human Unity* is the Spirit of Earth.

Stimulated by consecutive discoveries, which in the space of a hundred years, have successively revealed to our generation, first the profundities and significance of duration, then the limitless spiritual resources of Matter, and lastly the power of living beings acting in association, it seems that our psychology is in the process of changing. A conquering passion begins to show itself, which will sweep away or transform what has hitherto been the immaturity of the Earth. And its salutary action comes just at the right moment to "control," awaken, or order the emancipated forces of Love, the dormant forces of human Unity, and the hesitant forces of Research.

#### a) Love

Love is the most universal, formidable and mysterious of cosmic energies.

From the point of view of spiritual Evolution, it seems that we might be able to give a name and a value to this strange energy of Love. Could it not be, in essence, quite simply that very attraction which is exercised upon each conscious element by the Centre of the Universe? The call towards the great Union, whose realization is the only Business now afoot in Nature....—On this hypothesis, under which (in conformity with the findings of psycho-analysis) Love is the primitive and universal psychic energy, does not everything around

us become clear to the intelligence and obvious in action?

It is really the Universe which, through Woman, is advancing towards Man.

If Man fails to recognize the true nature and the true object of his love, the disorder which follows is profound and irremediable. Desperately striving to appease upon something too small a passion which is addressed to All, he inevitably tries to cure a fundamental disequilibrium by constantly increasing the number of his experiences, or making them more material in character. Vain attempts, and, in the eyes of anyone who partly perceives the inestimable value of the "spiritual quantum" of mankind, a frightening waste.

Look quite coldly, as a biologist or an engineer, at the reddening sky over a great city at night. There, and indeed everywhere else, the Earth is continuously dissipating, in pure loss, its most miraculous power. The Earth is burning "in free air." How much energy do you think is lost to the Spirit of Earth in one night? . . .

Man must, instead, perceive the universal Reality which shines spiritually through the flesh. He will then discover the reason which has so far frustrated and perverted his power to love. Woman is put before him as the attraction and the symbol of the World. He can only unite with her by enlarging himself in turn to the scale of the World. And because the World is always larger, and always unfinished and always in advance of us, Man finds himself embarked, in order to achieve his love, upon a limitless conquest of the Universe. In this sense, Man can only reach Woman through the consummation of the universal Union.

Love is a sacred reserve of energy, and the very bloodstream of spiritual

Evolution; that is the first discovery we make from the Sense of Earth.

#### b) Human Unity

In singular opposition to the irresistible attraction manifested in Love is the instinctive repulsion which, as a general rule, drives the human molecules away from each other. This repulsion can in fact result only from the timidity or cowardice of an individual confronting an effort of expansion which would ensure his liberation.

What an increase there is in his powers when, in research or in battle, Man catches the breath of affection or comradeship; what fulfilment when, in the instant of danger or enthusiasm, he finds in a flash that he has attained *the marvels of a common soul*. These faint brief glimmerings should make us realize what a formidable power for joy and action still slumbers in the human layer. In isolation, men suffer and stagnate without fully realizing it; they have need of a higher impulse from without to force them from the immobility of their dead point and bring them on to the beam of their profound affinity. The Sense of Earth is the irresistible pressure which will come at the right moment to unite them in a common passion.

The love of interaction, above the love of attraction—elements which merge, to undergo Union. Who can speak of the still almost unknown fulfilment of quality, the immense exhilaration of fraternal love which, in the Noosphere, would accompany the conquest of its residue of internal multiplicity, that is to say the achievement of ultimate consciousness of human Unity for advancement?

#### c) Research

The Spirit of Earth comes to explain to Men the reason for their superfluity



of love, and the way in which it might be put to use. In the same stroke, it reveals itself as the force which is destined to set under way and organize the overwhelming mass of human production and discovery.

Is the World condemned, in growing, to perish, automatically stifled by the excess of its own weight?

By no means; but it is in the process of gathering the elements of a new and better body. The whole question, in this crisis of birth, is the rapid emergence of the soul which by its appearance will organize, lighten and vitalize this mass of stagnant and confused material. This soul can only be a "conspiracy" of individuals associated in order to *add another story* to the edifice of Life. The resources now available to us, the powers we have unleashed, *cannot be absorbed* into the narrow system of individual and national compartments which has so far served the architects of the human earth. *The Age of Nations is past. The task before us now, if we would not perish, is to shake off our ancient prejudices, and to build the Earth.*

The more I look at the World as a scientist *the less I see any other possible biological issue except the active consciousness of its unity.* Life can only progress on our planet in future (and *nothing* will prevent it from progressing, not even its own internal servitudes) by throwing down the barriers which still wall off human activity, and by giving itself up without hesitation to Faith in the Future.

We must put *in the forefront* of our concrete preoccupations the systematic arrangement and exploration of our Universe, understood as the true country of Mankind. Then material energy will circulate, and, more important still, spiritual energy, corrupted by the petty

jealousies of modern society, will find its natural outlet in the attack launched against the mysteries of the World. The time has come to realize that Research is the highest human function, embracing the spirit of War and bright with the splendour of Religion. To keep up a constant pressure on the surface of the Real, is not that the supreme gesture of faith in Being, and therefore of adoration? All that is ours, if we understand how to avoid stifling within us the Spirit of Earth.

Whoever wishes to be part of this spirit must die and be born again, for others and for himself. In order to reach this higher plane of humanity he must bring about a complete transformation in his whole sense of values and his whole action.

Yet a little while and the Spirit of Earth will emerge with its specific individuality and its own character and physiognomy. And then, on the surface of the Noosphere, gradually sublimated in thought and passion, ever striving to solve more lofty problems, to possess greater objects, *the tension towards being will be at its maximum.*

What will happen at this critical stage in the maturation of terrestrial Life? Shall we be able at that moment to link up with other centres of cosmic life, to continue the labor of universal synthesis on a higher scale? More probably, something else will happen, something which can only be glimpsed when the influence of God is brought into the reckoning.

It would be nursing a great illusion if the Man of our times were to think that, having attained a fuller understanding of himself and of the World, he had no further need of Religion. There has been a multiplication of systems in which the existence of religion has been interpreted as a psychological



phenomenon associated with the childhood of Mankind. At its maximum when Civilization is beginning, it should gradually fade away, giving place to more positive constructions, from which God (particularly a personal and transcendent God) would be found to be excluded. In reality, for anyone who has eyes, the great conflict from which we shall have emerged will merely have consolidated in the World the need to believe. Having reached a higher degree of self-mastery, the Spirit of Earth will experience an increasingly vital need to adore; *out of universal evolution God emerges* in our consciousness as greater and more necessary than ever.

The only possible Motive Power of a life which has reached the stage of Reflection is an Absolute, or in other words a Divine, Term. Religion has sometimes been understood as a mere antidote to our evils, an "opiate." *Its true purpose is to sustain and spur on the progress of life.* It is the profound need of an Absolute, sought from the start through every progressive form of religion. Once this starting point is realized, it becomes evident that the "religious function" born of Hominization and linked thereto is bound to grow continuously with Man himself. The more Man is Man, the more he will feel the need to devote himself to something which is bigger than he is. Is it not that which we can ascertain around us? At what moment in the Noosphere has there been a more urgent need to find a Faith, a Hope to give meaning and soul to the immense organism we are building?

By the capital event of *Hominization* the most "advanced" part of the Cosmos found itself *personalized*. This simple change in a variable introduced for the future a two-fold condition of existence which cannot be escaped.

Since everything in the Universe, starting from Man, takes place in the *personalized being*, the ultimate Term of the universal Convergence must also possess (in a supreme degree) the quality of a Person. *To super-animate, without destroying*, a Universe made up of personal elements, he must himself be a special Centre. Thus re-appears, no longer instinctive, but closely linked with contemporary ideas on evolution, the traditional conception of a God exerting an intellectual influence upon immortal monads, distinct from himself.

The current which raises Matter should be conceived less as a simple internal impulse than as a *tide*. The Multiple rises, attracted and incorporated by the "Already One."

In the first phase—before Man—the attraction was vitally, but blindly, felt by the World. Since Man, it is awakened, at least partially, in reflective liberty, and it sustains Religion. Religion, which is not an option, or a strictly individual intuition, but represents the long unfolding, through the collective experience of all Mankind, of the existence of God—God reflecting himself personally on the organized sum of thinking monads, to guarantee a sure issue, and to lay down exact laws for their hesitant activities.

## HUMAN ENERGY<sup>6</sup>

**H**UMAN ENERGY presents itself to our view as the term of a vast process in which the whole mass of the Universe is involved.

In us the evolution of the World towards the spirit becomes conscious. From that moment, our perfection, our interest, our salvation as elements, can only be to press on with this evolution

<sup>6</sup> Peking, 1937. (Extracts from a work to be published shortly.)

with all our strength. We cannot yet understand exactly where it will lead us, but it would be absurd for us to doubt that it will lead us towards some end of supreme value.

From this there finally emerges in our twentieth century human consciousness, *for the first time* since the awakening of Life on Earth, the fundamental problem of Action. No longer only, as in the past, for our small selves, for our small family, our small country, but for the salvation and the success of the Universe, how must we, modern men, organize for the best around us, the maintenance, distribution and progress of Human Energy?

The first object that should attract the attention of the technician of Human Energy is to ensure to the human nuclei taken in isolation, their maximum of consistency and efficiency as elements. To perfect individuals so as to confer upon the whole the maximum of power, that is the obvious line to follow for the final success of the operation.

The organization of the Human Energy of the element, whatever its general methods may be, must culminate in forming at the heart of each element, *the greatest possible amount of personality.*

But today, while the mass formation of the human layer is taking place under our eyes and in our consciousness, Man, assuming him to be henceforward fixed in his individual nature, can see a new and boundless field of evolution opened up before him; the field of *collective* creations, associations, representations and emotions.

How can we lay down any limits to the effects of expansion, penetration and spiritual fusion which would flow from the coherent ordering of the human multitude? To dominate and canalize the powers of the air and the sea is all very

well. But what is this triumph, compared with the world-wide mastery of human thought and love? In truth, no more magnificent opportunity than this has ever been presented to the hopes and efforts of the Earth.

We are very ready to pride ourselves on living in a century of enlightenment and science. And yet the truth is quite the reverse; we are still lingering among rudimentary and infantile forms of intellectual conquest. What proportion of activity in the world today, in money, manpower and effort, is devoted to exploring and conquering the still unknown areas of the world?

At present most men still merely understand Strength, the key and symbol of super-being, in its most primitive and savage form of War.

But let the time come, as come it will, when the masses will realize that the true human successes are those which triumph over the mysteries of Matter and of Life. At that moment a decisive hour will sound for Mankind, when the Spirit of Discovery absorbs all the momentum contained in the Spirit of War. A capital phase of History, when all the transformed power of fleets and armies will come in to reinforce that other power which the machine will have rendered idle, and an irresistible tide of liberated energies will mount towards the most progressive circles of the Noosphere.

A substantial part of this tide of available energy will be immediately absorbed in the expansion of Man in Matter. But another part, and that the most precious, will inevitably flow back to the levels of spiritualized energy.

Spiritualized Energy is the flower of Cosmic Energy. It represents in consequence that part of human strength which there is the greatest interest in organizing. What are the main direc-

tions in which we can imagine it tending and in which we can help it to develop, starting in the heart of our individual natures?—No doubt in the direction of a decisive flourishing of some of our old powers, accompanied by the acquisition of some additional faculties, and some extended consciousness.

Love, as well as thought, is always in full growth in the Noosphere. The excess of its expanding energy over the daily diminishing needs of human propagation is daily becoming more evident. This means that love is tending, in its fully hominized form, to fulfil a much larger function than the mere call to reproduction. Between Man and Woman, a specific and reciprocal power of sensitization and spiritual fertilization seems in truth to be slumbering still, and calling to be released in an irresistible upsurge towards everything which is truth and beauty. Beyond a certain degree of sublimation, by the unlimited possibilities of intuition and inter-relation which it brings, spiritualized love penetrates into the unknown.

In every field we are beginning to live constantly in the presence and with the thought of the Whole. There is nothing more capital, from the point of view of human Energy, than the spontaneous appearance, and, ultimately, the systematic cultivation, of a "cosmic sense" of this kind. Through such a sense, Men cease to be self-contained individuals, and make common cause. In them, thenceforth, the spiritual energy of the element is finally ready to integrate itself in the total Energy of the Noosphere. But we must not fail to bring out an important point; the perfection and usefulness of each nucleus of human Energy in relation to the whole depend in the last resort upon whatever is unique and incommunicable in each of them. The great point to which the technician

of the Spirit should direct his attention in dealing with human units is to leave them, in the transformation which he is seeking to bring about in them, the possibility of finding themselves, and the freedom to differentiate themselves ever more and more.

The first lineaments of a common consciousness contain in themselves a vital need to make themselves clear and to prolong themselves internally. *Intellectually*, the progress of science is proceeding to construct a synthesis of the laws of Matter and Life, which, fundamentally, is nothing else but a collective act of perception; the World seen in the same coherent perspective by the whole of Mankind. *Socially*, the fusion and intermingling of races are leading directly to the establishment of an equally common form, not merely of language, but of morality and ideals.

The organization of Human Energy, taken in its entirety, directs itself and impels us towards the ultimate formation, above each personal element, of a *common human soul*.

The *conjunction* of activities out of which comes the collective human soul, supposes as its principle, a common *aspiration*, actuated by hope. To set in motion and sustain human Energy, there can only be at the origin, the internal attraction to a desired Object.

Since there is neither fusion nor dissolution of elementary persons, the Centre, which they aspire to rejoin, *must necessarily be distinct from them*, that is, *it must have its own personality*, its autonomous reality.

For its maintenance and operation the Noosphere *physically* requires the existence in the Universe of a real Pole of psychic convergence; a Centre different from all other centres, which it "super-centres" by assimilating them; a Person distinct from all other persons, whom it

fulfils by uniting them to itself. The World would not function, if there were not, somewhere outside time and space, a cosmic point of total synthesis.

We have just recognized it: by Hom-inization the Universe has reached a higher level, where its physico-moral powers gradually assume the form of a fundamental affinity which links individuals to each other and to their transcendent Centre. In us and around us the elements of the World go on unceasingly personalizing themselves more and more, by acceding to a Term, itself personal, of unification; so much so, that from this Term of ultimate confluence there radiates and to this Term in the last resort there flows back all the essential Energy of the World—that energy which, having confusedly agitated the cosmic mass, emerges from it to form the Noosphere.

What name must be given to such an influence?

One only—Love; Love, the supreme form and the totalizing principle of human Energy.

Picture a man who has become conscious of his personal relations with a supreme Personal, with whom he is led to merge by the whole interplay of cosmic activity. In such a man, and starting from him, a process of unification is launched, marked by the following stages:

- the totalization of every operation in relation to the individual;
- the totalization of the individual in relation to himself;
- and lastly, the totalization of the individual in the collective Man.

All these "Impossibilities" come about under the influence of Love.

Omega, He towards whom all converges, is concurrently He from whom all radiates. Impossible to place him as a focus at the summit of the Universe,

without at the same time diffusing his presence in the intimate heart of the smallest movement of Evolution. What does that mean, except that, *for anyone who has seen it*, everything, however humble, *provided it is placed in the line of progress*, warms, enlightens and animates itself, and in consequence becomes the subject of *total* adhesion.

The fact that under the animating influence of Omega every one of our individual actions may become *total* is in itself a marvellous use of human Energy.

But it transpires that, barely launched, the first transfiguration of our activities tends to prolong itself in another even more profound metamorphosis. By the very fact that they become *total*, each one individually, our actions logically find themselves induced to totalize themselves, taken all together in a single act.

It is a veritable synthesis which the love of Omega operates on the combined cluster of our faculties.

In the superficial course of our existences, there is a difference between seeing and thinking, understanding and loving, giving and receiving, growing and shrinking, living and dying. But what will happen to all these oppositions when, in Omega, their diversity is revealed as the infinitely varied operation of the same universal contact? Without radically disappearing in the least in the world, they will tend to combine in a common resultant, where their plurality, still recognizable, will flourish in ineffable richness. Why should this astonish us? Are we not familiar in a less intense degree with a perfectly parallel phenomenon in our own experience? When a man loves a woman nobly, the result of this overmastering passion, which exalts the being above itself, is that the life of that man, his power to create and to feel, his whole Universe, become specifically contained, as well as

sublimated, in his love of that woman. And yet, Woman, however necessary to Man, in order to reflect, reveal, communicate and "personalize" the World to him, is still not the Centre of the World!

If, therefore, the love of one element for another shows itself powerful enough to fuse (without confusing) into a single impression the multitude of our perceptions and our emotions, what vibration would not be drawn by our beings from their encounter with Omega?

When, by the progress in our hearts of this love of the Whole, we come to feel, extending above the diversity of our efforts and our desires, the exuberant simplicity of an urge in which are mixed and exalted, without loss, the innumerable gradations of passion and action, then in the heart of the mass formed by Human Energy, we shall each be approaching the plenitude of our effectiveness and our personality.

To totalize without de-personalizing; to save at the same time the whole and the parts. Everyone agrees on this twofold aim. But how do existing social groups grade the values which in theory they are agreed on wishing to preserve? Always by regarding the person as secondary and transitory, and in placing at the head of their program the primacy of pure totality. In all the systems of human organization which confront each other before our eyes, the underlying assumption is that the final state towards which the Noosphere is tending is a body without an individualized soul, an organism without a face, diffused Humanity, an Impersonal.

But this starting-point, once admitted, vitiates the whole subsequent course of the operation to the extent of making it impracticable. How, if the Universe finally tends to become a *Thing* can it still find a place for a *Person*? If the summit of human evolution is regarded

as impersonal in character, the elements which read it will inevitably, in spite of all efforts to the contrary, see their personality shrinking under its influence. And that is exactly what is happening. The servitors of material progress or racial entities strive in vain to emerge into freedom; they are fated to be drawn in and assimilated by the determinisms they are constructing. Their own machinery mechanizes them. And from that moment there is nothing left to control the operations of human Energy but brute force—the force which, quite logically, some people today would again like to make us worship.

Not superior force, but Love, and therefore, *as a start*, the recognized existence of a Transcendent which makes universal Love possible.

What will happen on the day when, in place of the *impersonal* Humanity put forward by modern social doctrines as the goal of human effort, we recognize the presence of a conscious Centre of total convergence? At that time, the individualities caught up in the irresistible current of human totalization will feel themselves strengthened by the very movement which is bringing them closer together. The more they are grouped under a Personal, the more personal they will themselves become. And that effortlessly, by virtue of the properties of Love.

Picture an Earth where human beings were primarily concerned to realize their global accession to a passionately desired Being, a lively participation in whom each of them would recognize what is most incommunicable in his neighbor. In such a World coercion would become unnecessary for the purpose of retaining individuals in the most favorable order for action, of orienting them in the full play of free will towards the best combinations, making them accept



the restrictions and sacrifices imposed by a certain human selection and deciding them in the end not to squander their capacity for love, but to sublimate it jealously to the end of ultimate union.

*We have reached a crossroads in human evolution* where the only road which leads forward is towards a common passion.

To continue to place our hopes in a social order achieved by external violence would simply amount to our giving up all hope of carrying the Spirit of Earth to its limits.

But Human Energy, like the Universe itself the expression of an irresistible and infallible movement, could not be prevented by any obstacle from attaining freely the natural term of its evolution.

Therefore, in spite of all the apparent improbabilities, we are inevitably approaching a new age in which the World will cast off its chains, to give itself up at last to the power of its internal affinities.

We must believe without reservation in the possibility and the necessary consequences of universal Love.

The theory and practice of total Love have never ceased, since Christ, to become more precise, to transmit and propagate themselves; so that with two thousand years of mystic experience behind us, the contact which we can make with the personal Focus of the Universe has gained just as much explicit richness as the contact we can make, after two thousand years of Science, with the natural spheres of the World. Regarded as a "phylum" of love, Christianity is so living that, at this very moment, we can see it undergoing an extraordinary mutation by elevating itself to a firmer consciousness of its universal value.

Is there not now under way one further metamorphosis, the ultimate, the realization of God at the heart of the Noosphere, the passage of the circles to their common Centre, the apparition of the "Theosphere"?

*Translated by NOEL LINDSAY*

## THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW

Baron von Hügel once wrote to a young friend: 'ne lisez jamais les petits journaux religieux.' *The Downside Review* agrees with this stricture and hopes to evade it. In an age of digests, it attends to the needs of digestion. For while it is possible, with little effort on the part of either writer or reader, to set up a panoramic vision of philosophy, or theology, or history, this is really to take a further step in the flight from understanding. There is no profit in arranging already too familiar concepts in a novel pattern. They must be conceived again and anew. New readers must be invited to assist in the dynamic act of intelligence wherein they were forged. There is no other way to intelligence, and intelligence is the only way of escape from anger and continued misunderstanding. And as the billiard cue striking the ball does not communicate motion to it but actualizes its own inherent potency for motion, so, in an infinitely higher degree, the teacher or writer does not communicate his ideas but solicits in the reader an act purely his own. In practice, this means, generally, long unhurried articles that will repay more than one reading. We try not to fall too far below this programme and its implied standard.

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# HISTORICIST SOCIOLOGY

LUIGI STURZO

## Introduction

In the death of Don Luigi Sturzo on August 9th of this year, the world mourned one of the most luminous figures of modern Christian life and thought. Obituary notices praising him as the Founder of the Popular Party in Italy in 1919,<sup>1</sup> and emphasizing his post-war disagreements with influential leaders of the ruling Christian Democratic Party (which led some commentators to make him into a Man of the Right), were inevitably one-sided in their journalistic emphasis.

CROSS CURRENTS has the honor to present an essay which will help to illuminate the central contribution of this priest-philosopher-statesman: his theory of society. In its original form it was the opening lecture, delivered by Don Sturzo on November 11, 1958, at the inauguration of the Course in Historicist Sociology for the academic year 1958-59, at the Institute in Rome that bears his name. It was printed in *SOCIOLOGIA*, the bulletin of the Institute, No. 4, 1958 (via delle Coppelle 35, Rome; annual subscription outside of Italy, 2000L).

The theory Don Sturzo describes here was at the heart of his work as Secretary of Catholic Action for a quarter of a century, of his activities in forming cooperatives and workers' associations which brought him into direct contact with the Italian people, and of his political life as Mayor of Caltagirone. After the founding of the Popular Party and his work as its Secretary until his exile from Fascist Italy in 1924, it was the same spirit that led him to carry on the struggle to foster the principles of

Christian Democracy in other countries, including France and Germany. It was in France that he first gave expression to this theory in his *ESSAI DE SOCIOLOGIE* (1935), and composed his monumental *CHURCH AND STATE* (first published in France in 1938; in London and New York, 1939, out of print). Despite severe illness, he courageously continued his efforts, while living in the United States during the last war<sup>2</sup> and wrote *ITALY AND THE COMING WORLD* (1945) as an aid to the comprehension of the post-war problems that would beset his beloved Italy, and the world as a whole. It was in this period, too, that he published *THE INNER LAWS OF SOCIETY* (1944), an attempt at developing "the sociology of the supernatural."

The post-war situation only increased the relevance of his earlier study of *THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE RIGHT OF WAR* (1930); he now continued to diagnose the requirements for an enduring peace, based on justice and moral principles, in his *NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM* (1946), and campaigned for a democratic, international association of nations that would not be hamstrung by the undemocratic veto. After his return to Italy he exerted himself as Senator of the Republic, trying to guide his country along its difficult path, without swerving either to right or left.

In Don Sturzo we find a rare and happy union of consistent social theory and life-long fidelity in action to his original generous insights.

[Cf. also the extended review of "Recent Sturzo Studies," by Alfred DiLaschia, in "Notes on Other Publications," this issue, p. 400.]

THE FIRST TIME a work in sociology was termed "historicist" was with the appearance of my *Essai de Sociologie*, published in Paris in 1935.<sup>3</sup> It came as a surprise even for my friends, a surprise which aroused their curiosity and their doubts. Was not Hegel the father of modern historicism? Had it not given Karl Marx the means of transforming Hegelian idealism into dialectical materialism? Were not the various forms of nineteenth century nationalism based on a particular historicism, limited by barriers of language, race and interests? When first applied to sociology, the qualification of "historicist" was not properly interpreted and evaluated; some saw there an attempt to Christianize the historicism of Benedetto Croce. Two years later, however, in 1937, when I published *l'Église et l'État* in Paris, with the subtitle *Étude de sociologie historique*, lovers of sociology, including those of my friends who two years earlier had received the theory with hesitation, realized the novelty and importance of a historicist sociology. They stressed, however, the distance between Croce's thought and mine and pointed out that while I disagreed with it on the whole as a substantially immanentist doctrine, they found in my writings that appreciation which Croce's thought merited, insofar as it could interest a foreign public.

With reference to the historicist orientation of my sociology, certain fields of thought and scientific speculation still retain diffidence, however attenuated, for the following motives: 1) the tendency to reduce sociology to facts and data of inter-individual behavior, leaving to other disciplines the study of the structure of society as a whole and in its evolution in time; 2) the preoccupation that the study of history, difficult to dissociate from the structural dynamism of society, may distract from the

problems of social cohabitation or may show them from distorted angles; 3) the conviction that from historical evaluation one may fall into the philosophy of history, which to many seems (and perhaps not mistakenly) neither philosophy nor history.

To the above three problems of system we may add two more of purely cultural orientation: 1) that of the immanentists, and they are in the majority, who consider extraneous to human history any leap into transcendence, as well as 2) that of the transcendentalists themselves who, believing that historicism is based on pure immanence, consider that it can never contain either the assumption of or the possibility of coming to the idea of transcendence.

From the very beginning, with the publication of the *Essai de sociologie*, I took care to describe precisely the characteristics and limits of the historicism which was the basis of my studies in terms of a systematic concept of history as human process realizing itself through immanent forces unified in rationality, from an absolute, transcendental beginning towards an absolute, transcendental end. In addition, besides having tried in the same *Essai* to give an account of the intimate transcendent quality of historicism in the various degrees of thought and action in the volume *l'Église et l'État* I presented the historical picture, already mentioned in the first work, of a duality which is resolved either in dualism or diarchy in terms and values of transcendence. Not content with that, I wanted to confront the problem in its religious-Christian aspect and I published in English (and subsequently in Spanish and Italian) the volume, *The True Life*, giving to it the subtitle *Sociology of the Supernatural*, a truly historicist sociology in which I made the most ample and open expo-

sition, confronting the problems that the arduous theme imposed.

THE CENTRAL POINT of the problem is that posited by present-day humanists themselves; can one accept an historicism that admits transcendence? We Italians cannot recognize Hegel as the progenitor of historicism; we link this method instead to the thought of G. B. Vico. I also owe to Vico, from the very beginnings of my studies in philosophy and law, my orientation towards the historical concrete, because first of all, I was saturated with history; history was my youthful passion; the *Decads* of Titus Livy with the commentary by Machiavelli I had read and reread; Fustel de Coulanges attracted me as much and more than the genial, vibrant books of the Benedictine Luigi Tosti, and so did all the history books I could read at that time, reliving the past as present before my eyes.

Benedetto Croce and his followers, even philologists of repute such as Nicolini, tend to present to us an almost immanentist Vico, a Vico to their liking, presenting hypothetically a second Vico, Christian by tradition, Catholic in form, tied to monarchy for convenience, and a jurist by profession. Such an interpretation, making Vico a split personality, is justified neither by the facts nor by Vico's writings, which are not at all reticent and do not show a double conscience nor a deliberately incomplete thought. Perhaps Vico does not always succeed in creating a completely communicative vocabulary, but whoever masters his language and enters into his system, understands his thought, whether he accepts it or dissents, provided he relives its spirit, which is historicist without being immanentist and without pretending to be otherwise.

The point which neither Vico nor others since Vico have adequately con-

fronted, and which Blondel<sup>4</sup> himself as a philosopher observed but did not develop in the field of concrete history (since he did not make that the object of his speculations), the very point that strongly influenced my historical orientation, was the study of society in the concrete, a study based on history and animated by history. For me sociology corresponds to just such a conception and no other: it is an historicist sociology which is also scientific sociology. Society in the concrete (the object of sociological research) is nothing but society in its own dimensions: the structural dimension and the temporal. Society is not a constant, always the same, fixed and immobile; the structure of society is mobile, it is a process, with evolutions and involutions, with developments of civilizations and periods of immobility, an uneven process not determined but self-determining, conditioned but precisely because of that, energetic; the conditioning of each individual operating in society is at the same time stimulus and check.

This is history, natural and human history; natural because climate, telluric conditions, the ease or difficulty of life and communication form a conditioning that is only partially surmountable; human because only man has the rational, volitive and active power to create for himself his own life and develop it through the centuries.<sup>5</sup>

Structural society without a future would be a non-existent society or a society that has existed but is unknown. Society, if it did not have a structure, would not be able to move and live; but if it did not move, if it did not develop its own energies, it would not be able to exist. Sociology, the science of society in the concrete, is therefore the study of society as structure and process, that is to say, in its synthesis of existence and history.

Why history? Man knows insofar as he remembers; he is linked to the past insofar as he forms a tradition; this tradition lives insofar as he feels himself bound to it by affection, by a sense of obligation, by what is believed to be an advantage, by ethical and religious motives. History is all this: to understand, to remember, to appraise, to realize, repeating and making innovations; process and progress; process and evolution; regression and involution; *corsi* and *ricorsi*, Vico would say, not certainly as mere repetition, because in a changing world repetition has no place, but in the sense that all the causes of progress and regression are contained within the character of man and in the conditioning of nature, including human nature itself.

Natural history is distinguished from human history for objective and didactic reasons; not certainly for the reality of the human concrete, because the nature and history of the complex we call nature are perceived and appraised only insofar as they are perceived and realized by man. Everything which does not enter into the human sphere is for us as if non-existent; the day that it enters into that sphere, either through observation or possession and transformation, it becomes history, our history. This history is not extraneous to our life, but like land transformed from stumps into flowering gardens and fertile fields, it is our life. Our history is the search into the bowels of the earth for materials that are transformable and transformed by the hand of man; it is the study of the stars, towards which today we reach out as towards zones to be explored, by drawing near to them. This life, insofar as it is realized and remembered, is history, and insofar as it is fixed in our culture, in our institutions, in our industries and activities, it is the life of society.

What is life but the instant that succeeds itself and passes? For example, I am speaking, you are listening; in a little while my voice will be gone, and perhaps you will not hear it again or remember it; but the written copy remains; it becomes a set of footprints on the road which others will travel over, erasing them, or else a station at which others, passing, will stop. It matters not. The human life of each one of us is made up of these moments; the life of the generations that succeed one another is made up of these lines; the history that will note it down is the very action of man to produce and fix in laws, to create and destroy; to search and invent, repeat and innovate. Nothing perfect and all perfectible; nothing concrete and all capable of becoming so; part realized, part lost; what is lost is found again, a witness of other times, object of reflection, element of satisfaction or censure, which as such reenters into the circulation of thought and human culture and is historicized or, better, is represented from another point of view with the vital freshness that man's work infuses into it.

**H**ISTORY REPRESENTS the course of humanity as the co-existence and struggle of good and evil which the human conscience learns to distinguish; but the exact determination of the theoretical boundaries and practical limits of good and evil in all social relations is the constant task of human reason, not as mere speculation but also as a practical rule, because associated life, life in society, by creating interindividual relationships imposes an evaluation of them; this evaluation passes from the consciousness of each one to the conviction of nuclei and groupings, in their articulation towards a superior reason; the common good, good that transcends and surpasses individual advantage and

interest; sociality as such is responsible for the passage of the idea of good from the individualist concept to the associated one.

One step further: all that which society realizes, even if it isn't a good, is realized with the motive of doing good; the very push towards an ever wider association is a good. If it were not a good, it could not realize itself in society. An association organized for criminal purposes is not society; it does not create rights and duties either within itself or towards others; it is not capable of building, of producing; it only destroys; it is outside of the rational social cycle, denying sociality and denying the good.

What is this common, insistent, imperious aspiration towards the good? Man aspires to a possession without danger of losing it, to a life without the fear of a fatal end, to a lasting and complete well being. Is this a dream, an escape into the realm of the impossible, or is it rather the consciousness of an extramundane reality?

History answers our desires with the insertion of a supernatural concept into thought, into consciousness, into life. Moses on Mount Sinai is alone with the Supreme Being who has called him in order to speak to him; it is an act of communication between the Creator and the creature that individually would remain in the innermost depths of his conscious personality. But Moses descends from the mountain with the tables of the Law, he finds the people adoring the golden calf, feasting and making merry around the idol; then in his rage he breaks the tablets and confronts the crowd, destroying the idol. Here is the symbol of the religious struggle that becomes history. The Hebrews are still living this history, between the divine law and the golden calf; we Christians are living the same history, quickened by the Gospel. Human inven-

tion or mysterious reality? And this reality has been lived through the centuries by people differing in origin, race, culture, customs, development; always aspiring to a transcendent passage from evil to good, from the idol to the law, from the law to the Gospel, from a transitory life to an unending life; always believing or seeking to believe in an extra- or ultra-terrestrial reality, in a principle and a divine presence.

In order to be able to understand and analyze society in the concrete, the sociologist cannot ignore the insertion or, better, the historicization of the divine in life. While admitting that this fact, of exceptional as well as perennial importance in the history of humanity, has been and may be interpreted in diverse and even opposite ways, yet if those who treat of society in the concrete in its morphological complex and in its becoming omit or undervalue the religious factor in its historic worth, they fail in the task they have set themselves and distort human reality.

True, the historical realization of the religious influence varies in time and space; it can be and is invalidated by superstitions, falsified traditions, erroneous infiltrations, aberrant theories, political complications and passions—all threads in the historical weave of human religiosity, which are registered in the history of Christianity in the constant struggle of the Church against the deviations and corruptions of human frailty and perversity.

Many today in the world of speculation, technique, politics, economics, and even in the family structure itself, are accustomed to look at religion as something past, which is on the road to extinction, or else as a social formality deprived of life, the last residue of a concept already surpassed first by rationalism, then by positivism, and finally by Marxism. Today it is not easy to restore



to its place in culture (and hence also in the educational disciplines) a religious concept of life. There is resistance to the principle of the historicization of the divine; that is to say, the real contribution in society of a transcendental concept does not adapt itself to the common education even of a certain category of believers. And yet history, real history, well studied and objectively evaluated, presents to us the historicization of the divine as a constant datum; sociology cannot but take it into account.

**I** FEEL BOUND to point out that the historicization of the religious fact cannot be examined by the sociologist as a unilateral or particularist vision of society, nor in a polemical position allied with those who deny the supernatural or those who assert a natural religiosity. Sociology is not a discipline designed to confront the problem of whether human reason may or may not be able to transcend the mystery, or whether supernatural religion may or may not violate the rights of reason. Society in the concrete historicizes such problems, too, with all their various consequences, be they in the scientific, cultural, ethical or religious fields, or in the coexistence of an autonomous Church, such as the Catholic Church, in a state officially separate from it or even in open strife with it.

However much certain historians may seek to minimize the terms of the relation between Church and State and however much certain states, such as Russia and its satellites today, may seek to eliminate the organization of the Christian religion, yet the sociologist who studies society in the concrete cannot undervalue or ignore the existence, influence and conflicts of the religious factor in the life of communities. And if the efforts of the persecutors of established religion are directed to transfer-

ring the values, symbols and meanings, even the religious discipline itself into the political sphere as a substitute for the absolute *quid* which man seeks in religion or attempts to find in philosophy, science and art, historicist sociology cannot but point out their effects and evaluate them.

Let not students of sociology believe that they will have completed their task merely by studying relations between individuals and the value meanings of small everyday activity. The theme of society in the concrete is not exhausted unless one goes to the very bottom in all sectors of associated life and in its very completeness of functions, activities, and human aspirations, in the complex themes of the rational and volitive, sensitive and emotive, constructive and destructive activity of man. And if among the most notable aspects of life there exists the need of the absolute as orientation, as an element of stability, the need of certainty, surmounting of difficulties and daily miseries, the sociologist cannot ignore nor neglect the examination or investigation of them, as though it were an inaccessible area for research and scientific study.

For if that were so, the sociologist ought to explain (and this he has already attempted for some time) how there could have come to insert itself into the human process the concept of a non-existent life which, however, is believed to be a reality; a nothing transformed into an everything which, in one way or another, has taken possession of the thoughts and hearts of many, indeed, a great many, in the past and present. And he ought to know and get a clear idea of how this alleged non-existent was historicized and operates in society.

There has been no lack of great sociologists, among the most noted the Frenchman Lévy-Bruhl, who have occupied themselves with the religious



phenomenon; but for many of them it is a question of an ethnographical study, the research and study of primitive forms, of a humanity ignorant of itself, of backward, isolated, immobile societies, outside of the rhythm of sociality. And it is difficult to find among modern sociologists adequate, systematic studies regarding two fundamental points of sociality: 1) the social function of rationality in its affirmation as well as in its deficient aspects, such as pseudo-rationality and irrational sensitivity; 2) the social function of conscience as a complex of human rationality and volition stretching out towards an end which transcends the present reality for a good perceived by intuition under the aspect of absolute.

These ideas expressed by me twenty-five years ago in the *Révue internationale de sociologie* and in other writings caused, in certain French circles, downright scandal, since it was thought that I was introducing philosophical theses into the closed field of sociology. An American critic wrote that my sociology was simply Thomism. It would have been an honor for me to have been propounding Thomism, but sociology does not theorize philosophical theses, nor does it surreptitiously introduce therein philosophy and theology; if these sciences have had an influence in the reality of the human process, the sociologist cannot fail to take them into account, just as he takes into account every other cultural element that gives value to and characterizes any phase whatsoever of society in the concrete.

The sociologist today studies Marxism as it has been inserted into modern thought and activity for the past century just as he studies the sociology of Comte and Durkheim as aspects of a concept that has had important developments in France and elsewhere. Why should he not then study the imposing

phenomenon of the search for the absolute as a vital need of man not only in the depth of his consciousness but in that very society in which the individual realizes and expresses himself? It is true that the absolute *quid* has not always been symbolized by an invisible God, infinite and personal. No need to speak of the pagan gods who had, yes, a Jove—God the Father—but with all the human passions, as well as the fetishes of native tribes (it is important to note that even primitive peoples arrive at a concept of a Supreme Being); in the modern world the absolute has been sought in Reason (the failure of the rationalists was noteworthy); or else in Matter as the only infinite reality (today on the decline); or else in Society itself, deifying the State as ultimate and completitive realization of the Idea (today's Hegelians do not care for the theology of their founder). From the "Idea" that realizes itself, these Hegelians, dissatisfied, have turned to Existence that is shattered, to Reality that vanishes; to Relativity that repeats itself in a closed circle. In such a great diversity of currents they become solipsist, yet are unable to conceive of human existence without society; they become evanescent, yet feel that a life pulsates within us with infinite desires; they wish to reduce everything to matter in order that matter in its blind force may succeed in being the pantheistic reality of the visible existent. Society in the concrete also has these aspects, which philosophy will call aberrant and which the sociologists who occupy themselves with them present as pseudo-rational or irrational elements of the historical process which tends towards an absolute.

Benedetto Croce qualified his last historical, but not sociological, concept as "absolute historicism." According to Carlo Antoni, what divides Crocean historicism from German historicism is

precisely "the concept of the spirit as universal human nature, constant in its structure and forms at all times and all places. This is the historicist form of the Stoic and Christian concept of the common nature of man. It is the idea of the universal *ratio* which not only renders men equal, but recognizes in each individual a universal dignity, whence was later derived the idea of a natural right, the concept of a divine spark inherent in the soul of man, according to the Christian tradition, endowing it with beauty and dignity." (Antoni, C., *Lo Storicismo*, p. 191.)

Antoni goes on to examine in Crocean thought, in the light of absolute historicism, the problem of the useful, and after having ascertained its autonomy he points out Croce's affirmation that the useful cannot be subjected to moral evaluation. According to Croce, even the character of power politics is to be subjected to the limitation set by liberty as a necessary element of civil cohabitation. In putting the accent of the absolute on the Spirit, says Antoni, Croce "felt himself to be the servant, minister and debtor of this Spirit—this was his religion," and he adds: "One can object that this feeling oneself to be a servant and minister of the lord, indeed, this invoking and awaiting of his grace, the very sense of the responsibility of office, is a consciousness and affirmation of personality." In any case, it can be observed that in the negation of the concept of the individual, one runs the risk of "once again separating man from history and taking away the foundation of liberty. The works, in fact, through which individuals insert themselves into the course of history and perpetuate themselves in it, if assigned to the one Spirit Creator, cease to function as co-efficient in the relation between man and history, and the individual from whom is taken away the dignity of a creator

of values risks losing in the mere vitality in which he is confined, the right to liberty." Carlo Antoni had already observed earlier in his book that "not all of the Hegelian theology of history can be said to have disappeared in Crocean thought."

Croce's absolute historicism may seem to a philosopher to be corroded within by a concept of liberty that derives more from Christianity than from Hegel, but on the whole idealism prevails, with that pantheistic element that cannot be removed. That is why relativist Croceans cannot accept absolute historicism without accepting also Hegelian pantheism. The principal difficulty in overcoming both relativism and historical absolutism is demonstrated in the conflict between individual liberty and the transcendental absolute that we call God.

Such a dualism emerges from all human history and is condensed in the two Biblical phrases "*Non serviam*" and "*Fiat voluntas tua*," words of the free man whether he refuses or whether he accepts absolute values.

Historicist sociology points out the permanent historical fact of the co-existence of the need for the absolute with the vindication of personal and associative liberty; it is the human drama of thousands of years of a past that presses upon the present and projects itself into the future.

Philosophy, theology, humanistic sciences, poetry, art, all the most noble efforts of man reveal to us the drama of history and give us, insofar as is possible, a demonstration and explanation of it; only the historicized Christian faith reveals to us the existence of the mystery.

It is up to the individual man, in his daily activity, in his joys and in his sorrows, to find that tranquillizing truth and that intimate communion of souls that gives to each one of us the sense

of our personality and the satisfaction of the thirst that transcends the today for the tomorrow, the tormented present for a future of peace, the relative that cannot suffice for an absolute in which we can rest.

It is up to young men and women of good will in sociology and in the allied subjects that complement it and give it value, to seek that historical reality which is like a precious treasure hidden underground, under a heap of errors and prejudices, under the incrustation of centuries, that treasure to be made one's own with patience, method, objectivity and perseverance by verifying it, purifying it and giving it the place that belongs to it in the harmonious plane of truth.

Only with the intention of seeking the truth, of loving it, shall we be able to obtain the cultural and spiritual amelioration of society, that amelioration to which each of us, through his own efforts and opportunities, must contribute with fidelity and humility.

*Translated by ANGELINO LOGRASSO*

<sup>1</sup> i.e., *Partito Popolare Italiano*, not to be confused with the present Italian Christian Democratic party, *Democrazia Christiana*. Cf. Don Sturzo's statement, "... a comparison between the Popular Party and Christian Democracy must not be made. The Christian Democratic Party (of Italy) has quite a different origin..."—in the Italian post-World War II situation. (*Una data storica*, 18 gennaio 1919, Torino, Centrol Studi Luigi Sturzo, Jan. 18, 1958).

<sup>2</sup> This period can be well studied by reading Sturzo's *La mia battaglia da New York*, Rome, 1949, in which he brings together some of his American articles, written between 1940 and 1946.

<sup>3</sup> As was the case of other exiles from Fascist Italy, all of Don Sturzo's books and articles written in exile—with the exception of his poem, *Il Circolo della Creazione*, published in Paris in 1932 (called by Paul Hazard the greatest long poem of the 20th century)—were first published in a foreign language. Now the *Opera omnia* are being published in the original Italian by Zanichelli of Bologna.

<sup>4</sup> Sturzo is an admirer of Blondel, and has written an article, "Maurice Blondel's *La Pensée*: the philosophy of 'L'elan spirituel'," *Hibbert Journal*, April 1936.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Sturzo's *Inner Laws of Society*, Paterson, N.J., 1943; also *La Societa: sua natura e leggi*, Bergamo, 1949-50, and *Del metodo sociologico*, *Riposta ai critici*, Bergamo, 1949.

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# PROCESS AND EXPERIENCE: DEWEY AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY

ROBERT C. POLLOCK

## I

### AN INCOMPLETE UNIVERSE

JOHN DEWEY has written of "the ineptitude of the method of pigeonholing classification of philosophical writings when one compares it with the method of placing them in the setting of a new and vital movement in culture which extends far beyond the confines of technical philosophy."<sup>1</sup> What he had specifically in mind is the cultural matrix of Pragmatism itself.

The cultural movement which gave birth to Pragmatism was a Western rather than a merely American phenomenon, but in America it exhibited specific characteristics in line with distinctively American attitudes and tendencies. Any study of Pragmatism in depth must be one which sees behind it this revolution in the world of consciousness, feeling and action.

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*Dr. Pollock, Professor of Philosophy in Fordham University Graduate School, has long pursued special interests in both medieval and American philosophy; his concern is ultimately with philosophical anthropology rather than with any academic restriction of the subject.*

*Dr. Pollock's articles in THOUGHT on the nature of history have earned widespread interest; his study of Emerson was the key essay in AMERICAN CLASSICS RECONSIDERED (ed. H. C. Gardiner, Scribner's). First president of the Luigi Sturzo Foundation, he has completed a full-length study of the latter's work which Helicon hopes to publish later this year.*

Although a presentation of the cultural setting is beyond the scope of this study, we can focus attention on the dominant motifs which lead far beyond the domain of technical philosophy, and place Dewey in a larger philosophical picture. Here we can only draw to a limited extent upon such thinkers as Peirce, James and Mead, whereas a fuller investigation of Pragmatism would involve study of relevant matter from Royce and Whitehead.

The very convergence of such differentiated minds as those of Peirce, James, Dewey and Mead bears witness to a rich experience shared in common, as well as to a common sensitivity to new facts and values which called for a fresh appraisal of things.

Consider James and Dewey. No two men could be further apart in essential genius and temperament, and yet they experienced no difficulty making common cause philosophically. Or take Peirce. His scientific, metaphysical and historical interests put the stamp of universality on his thought. Here, surely, was a bold soaring spirit who was not only in the vanguard of the modern discovery of the value of medieval Catholic thought, but who adhered to a metaphysics of a Platonic character. Yet it was he whom Dewey singled out as more than anyone else "the begetter in philosophy of an attitude and outlook distinctively American."<sup>2</sup>

What, above all, motivated these thinkers to inaugurate a fresh approach to philosophical matters? We can hardly do better than point to the new image of the universe which was taking shape in men's minds. In late medieval and

early modern times, man passed "from the closed world to the infinite universe."<sup>3</sup> Such a transition was crucial and fateful, and its repercussions within the very depths of the human soul were immense. But we, too, are passing through a similarly crucial and fateful moment in history, for our picture of the universe is also undergoing a drastic transformation. Essentially, our own transition can be described as a passage from a complete to an incomplete universe, that is, to a universe in which the temporal dimension has come into its own, and with it, the reality of growth and development.

When Peirce spoke of creation as a continuing process, while relating to a personal God, creator of all, he was expressing in his own characteristic fashion a conviction of temporal process which dominated the very imagination and feelings of the greatest of the pragmatist thinkers. Take James. Santayana puts it concisely when he says that for James, "The universe is an experiment, it is unfinished."<sup>4</sup> As for Dewey, his mind is also filled with the same theme: "As against this common identification of reality with what is sure, regular and finished, experience in unsophisticated forms gives evidence of a different world and points to a different metaphysics. We live in a world which is an impressive and irresistible mixture of sufficiencies, tight completenesses, order, recurrences which make possible prediction and control, singularities, ambiguities, uncertain possibilities, processes going on to consequences as yet indeterminate."<sup>5</sup>

So deep is Dewey's response to the new shift in cosmic awareness, that he can enter sympathetically into the earlier experience when man passed from a closed world to the infinite universe: "One has only to read the authors of the transition period, say Giordano Bru-

no, to realize what a pent-in suffocating sensation they associated with a closed, finite world, and what a feeling of exhilaration, expansion and boundless possibility was roused in them by the thought of a world infinite in stretch of space and time. . . . That which the Greeks withdrew from with repulsion, they welcome with an intoxicated sense of adventure."<sup>6</sup>

It is important to note here that Dewey seemed unaware of the fact that Christianity changed the atmosphere of speculation with respect to infinity through its doctrine of an infinite creative God. The boundless universe of the Renaissance aroused deep emotion for the reason that men saw in it a more appropriate image of an infinite God. That is why the new picture of the universe was fashioned as much by poets, mystics and philosophers as by scientists. The old Christian vision of the world as a theophanic projection of divinity, a vision cherished in Augustinian and Pseudo-Dionysian currents of thought, was given a new cosmic shape. Hence it is not surprising to find a philosopher and poet like Henry More celebrating the new universe as the production of a God of plenitude, Who creates with a lavish hand.<sup>7</sup>

If Dewey can describe with deep feeling an earlier change in cosmic outlook, it is surely because he himself knew what it means to find one's picture of the universe altered in a direction which leads into a new cosmic experience, and the world he gazed upon was "an open world, an infinitely variegated one, a world which in the old sense can hardly be called a universe at all; so multiplex and far-reaching that it cannot be summed up in any one formula."<sup>8</sup>

"What we say about reality," says James, "... depends on the perspective into which we throw it."<sup>9</sup> And what a drastic alteration in perspective occurs



when men can envisage a wide open world in which development, spontaneity and novelty are fully at home. Here at last is a universe which no longer cramps man's style, a universe which makes it impossible for man to regard himself as "an unnaturalized and unnaturalizable alien in the world."<sup>10</sup>

Given this new image of the universe, experimentation and creativity are endowed with a new dignity, for they have gained a status within nature itself. Now looked on as essential aspects of a growing world, they speak with an authority to which man gladly responds. And indeed there are many today who feel a binding obligation to move along new and unexplored paths and to keep their minds open to new possibilities. Where the older imagination had been mastered by images conjured up by such notions as immobility, form and equilibrium, the new imagination is filled with images engendered by such notions as vital creative act, indefinite expansion, new horizons and breakthrough.

Thus was accomplished one of those decisive leaps which have marked human history, and which today we so easily visualize in thinking of jet-propulsion and nuclear fission. But the changes in man's life go deeper than these developments might indicate, for there has taken place a kind of 'nuclear fission' within the human soul itself. For if it can be said of earlier modern man that "The more imagination strove to grasp the astounding new universe, the more truly man realized his own potentialities...."<sup>11</sup> how much more can it be said of the man of our own time!

In tracing the formation of the new image of the universe, we must give precedence, not to evolutionary theories, but rather to the burgeoning belief in linear and progressive history. True, this belief fostered a naive optimism con-

cerning progress, but when this optimism is viewed in historical perspective, that is, when seen in connection with man's liberation from an ancient and depressing way of looking at things, it can be regarded with some indulgence.

Evolutionary theories gave to the notion of development a new standing in man's thought, in bringing him face to face with the most radical sort of change imaginable, since, as Dewey says, potentiality now means "the possibility of novelty, of invention, or radical deviation...."<sup>12</sup> Hence, even if evolutionary theories seemed at first to favor a naturalistic philosophy, they nevertheless assured victory to a developmental point of view as against an outlook which regarded the movement of things as "only the monotonous traversing of a previously plotted cycle of change."<sup>13</sup>

Due to evolutionary theories, the sense of an irreversible time was immeasurably deepened, and human history was viewed against the background of a process which includes the entire universe. In this way, there was formed a consciousness dominated by the idea of patterns and processes within an all-enveloping scheme. Correctly, we now feel so deeply implicated in a vast process that it is almost second-nature to situate every human act, including the act of knowledge, within a temporal dimension.

Dewey observes that the first marked cultural shift in the attitude toward change took place in the late eighteenth and in the nineteenth centuries. "Under the names of indefinite perfectibility, progress, and evolution, the movement of things in the universe itself and of the universe as a whole began to take on a beneficent instead of a hateful aspect."<sup>14</sup> Where in early modern times only a mere handful of individuals could envisage a future different from the past, now great numbers of people were fo-

curring their energies on a future viewed with expectancy and passion.

Change, Dewey tells us, was installed at the very heart of things by Bergson and William James, although they were animated by different motives and followed different methods.<sup>15</sup> But it is with the name of James that Dewey associates the idea of an open and incomplete universe. As he says, "And long after 'pragmatism' in any sense save as an application of his *Weltanschauung* shall have passed into a not unhappy oblivion, the fundamental idea of an open universe in which uncertainty, choice, hypotheses, novelties and possibilities are naturalized will remain associated with the name of James; the more he is studied in his historical setting the more original and daring will the idea appear."<sup>16</sup>

Elsewhere, writing of James, Dewey says this: "It may perhaps seem strange to the layman to learn that a new and vital movement could be launched in philosophy by insisting upon novelty, plasticity, indeterminateness, variety, and change as genuine traits of the world in which we live." Yet it looked as though men were not quite ready for so thoroughgoing a shift in viewpoint, for, according to Dewey, it took all of twenty years before James found an audience who responded to what Dewey describes a few lines farther on as "his spirit of adventure into the unknown."<sup>17</sup>

How much James's world-view meant to Dewey himself can be seen in his vigorous defense of James against the rather strange accusation that he lacked a *Weltanschauung*. Dewey might have called attention to the fact that James himself had declared that the most important thing about a man is his view of the universe. However, he insisted that a *Weltanschauung* was present in "the idea of a universe which is not all closed and settled, which is still in some

respects indeterminate and in the making, which is adventurous and which implicates all who share in it, whether by acting or believing, in its own perils. . . ." Moreover, he adds, it was not only "a *Weltanschauung*, but a revolutionary one."<sup>18</sup>

Dewey then goes on to say that even James's literary style was influenced by his leading idea. And, let us add, not only his literary style, but the very quality and range of his perceptiveness, to which his style is so strikingly adapted. For James's spontaneity of spirit could thrive to the uttermost in a universe which involves "a muddle and a struggle, with an 'ever not quite' to all our formulas, and novelty and possibility forever leaking in."<sup>19</sup> If he experienced a release of the spirit, it was because he faced a universe in which his most personal feelings were no longer alien presences. As Dewey puts it: "Are judgments in terms of the redistribution of matter alone valid? Or are accounts of the universe in terms of possibility and desirability, of initiative and responsibility, also valid?"<sup>20</sup>

In writing about the modern shift in attitude toward change, Dewey also tells us that a systematic assertion that reality is process had to wait until the twentieth century. Here, of course, it is Whitehead who is the chief figure. However, it is well to keep in mind that in his great work, *Process and Reality*, Whitehead expresses his great indebtedness to Dewey as well as to Bergson and James.<sup>21</sup>

In view of this new image of the universe, nothing could prevent a radical reconstitution of man's conscious and unconscious relations to his world. We can be sure a new turning point in history has been reached when a philosopher can affirm that genuine time is all one "with the creative, with the occurrence of unpredictable novelties,"<sup>22</sup> and

when, again, he rejects the view that Reality is "neatly and finally tied up in a packet without loose ends, unfinished issues, new departures..."<sup>23</sup>

The more we widen our perspective on history, the more certain we become that Dewey was speaking with an authoritative voice on behalf of something new that was bursting forth within human consciousness, namely, the conviction that nature has its revolutionary as well as its conservative aspect. Dewey gave expression to this in a conception of nature which validates to the limit man's impulse to venture into the unknown. "Man," it is said, "has introduced the theme of a destiny which is open, ahead of him, directed toward the unforeseeable and the infinite, to replace a concept of a destiny already fixed, which he had, as it were, only to copy with application."<sup>24</sup> But it was Dewey along with others in the pragmatist movement who made a truly philosophical and disciplined response to this new theme of an open destiny, and in a bold pioneering spirit.

Although Dewey's 'time' suffers impoverishment in being detached from that which lies beyond time, he still has much to convey concerning a life that is lived within time and in full acceptance of the reality of process and development. "We always live at the time we live and not at some other time,"<sup>25</sup> says Dewey, and, for him, this also means accepting the fact that our temporal moment finds its place in an ongoing process.

Unhappily, he seemed to be obsessed with the idea that belief in eternity lends itself to the survival of an attitude of antipathy to a world of changing things, and doubtless, there are facts that would seem to justify his attitude. Yet the truth of the matter is that Christianity effected a radical transformation in the very structure of human consci-

ousness in creating a fruitful interplay between spiritual life and historical activity. But, obviously, such a transformation does not run its course in one generation or in a hundred generations, and even now we are feeling its effects more than at any other time in the past.

At any rate, we can applaud Dewey's statement that an "Eternity that is permitted to become a refuge from the time in which human life goes on may provide a certain kind of consolation. But emotion and comfort should not be identified with understanding and insight, nor with the direction which the latter may supply."<sup>26</sup> Again, we can approve of Dewey's conception of a religious faith, which in attaching itself to the possibilities of nature would be manifesting "piety toward the actual,"<sup>27</sup> a piety which, let us add, would engender an attitude which elsewhere he describes as "an imaginative insight into the possibilities of what is going on so assuredly although so blindly and crudely."

## II

### A REAL FUTURE

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL GAP between our own attitude to time and a much older mentality which barely tolerated time is very great. In fact, the gap is more like a yawning abyss, and, until we become intensely aware of it, we are hardly in a position to do full justice to Dewey's philosophy. Let us, then, consider for a moment this difference of attitudes.

If we take archaic man first, it would seem that he hardly lived in real time at all, for real events were stripped of their time-character by being relocated within a mythological framework. From start to finish, his life was a sequence of repetitions, based on the archetypal actions and gestures which formed the

substance of his myths. In short, he lived his life within a fixed pattern of behavior which nullified real time-experience.<sup>1</sup>

But even in the great cultures of East and West, the reality of time was brought into question through the device of the infinitely recurring cycle. The example of Aristotle is particularly instructive here, for, despite his profound concern to preserve intact the reality of change, his account of the universe is lacking in historic significance. And the cyclic mentality is evident in his statement "that the same opinions recur in rotation among men, not once or twice or occasionally, but infinitely often."<sup>2</sup> While some notion of a linear progressive evolution was present in the Graeco-Roman world, it was associated with a rather bleak outlook. Besides it made hardly a dent in the ancient way of life. The cyclic view predominated, testifying as it does to a steadfast refusal on the part of man to accept himself as a historical being.

Christianity changed all this. And it is to St. Augustine that we turn, for it was he who asserted the temporalism of creation, while laying the foundation for a metaphysics of contingency and process. As to the ancient cyclic theory, he declares that if it could not be refuted by reason, "faith would still smile at these argumentations."<sup>3</sup> Without showing how effectively St. Augustine broke the ancient cyclic mentality, it is enough to say that in him we clearly discern the figure of the new man arising, the new man for whom the course of events in time is characterized by the appearance of genuine novelty.

Naturally it took time for the new structure of consciousness to become operative in life. Habits persisting through eons of time are not easily broken. And even though the sense of history was installed at the apex of the Christian

soul, it had yet to permeate the whole of man's being and even his feelings. Actually, it was not until the modern age that man began to feel at home in time, and to think in terms of a linear and progressive conception of history. Continuous time has become fully real, even when periodicities within social and cultural phenomena are recognized. Moreover, men are learning to look at history as developing according to internal principles. That is to say, they are now able to conceive the reality of an immanent process, even if, in the religious view, there can be no truly immanent process without a creative transcendent principle.

A great figure in the American pragmatist movement, George H. Mead, expresses an attitude which is diametrically opposed to that of the ancients: "This present [that is, every actual present] is the scene of that emergence which gives always new heavens and a new earth. . . ."<sup>4</sup> The Biblical note struck by the phrase "new heavens and a new earth" is revealing, for it shows how thoroughly Christianity has molded our very language in transforming our vision of history. Mead himself recognized the part played by Christianity in destroying the timeless universe of the ancients, for as he says, "St. Paul and Augustine ushered in the history of the world. . . ."<sup>5</sup>

But what we should note particularly is that with Mead, as with the great pragmatic thinkers, there was an earnest attempt to remain close to experience. As Dewey says, "Mead's thinking springs from intimate experiences, from things merely thought out by him. . . ." And, Dewey adds: "He *felt* within himself both the emergence of the new and the inevitable continuity of the new with the old."<sup>6</sup> Thus, Mead's use of the phrase "new heavens and a new earth" was inspired by an attitude

toward history which permeated his whole being.

The contrast between our own situation and that of the ancients is spectacular. In his *Meditations*, Marcus Aurelius writes that the soul comprehends that "those who come after us will see nothing new...."<sup>7</sup> But Whitehead has this to say: "I wish I could convey this sense I have of the infinity of possibilities that confront humanity—the limitless variations of choice, the possibility of novel and untried combinations, the happy turns of experiment, the endless horizons opening out."<sup>8</sup>

There is no doubt that we gain much-needed perspective in projecting the pragmatist movement against the background of our cultural and spiritual heritage. But we should not overlook the role of America in bringing to a head what is implicit in our religious heritage. In discussing the development of American pragmatism, Dewey makes the point that "the progressive and unstable character of American life and civilization has facilitated the birth of a philosophy which regards the world as being in continuous formation, where there is still place for indeterminism, for the new, and for a real future." "But," he adds, "this idea is not exclusively American, although the conditions of American life have aided this idea in becoming self-conscious."<sup>9</sup> Elsewhere, in quoting another author, Dewey calls attention to the fact that the American people had to do "'with the unprecedented, the hazardous, the unpredictable...'" He has no hesitation, then, in pointing to the similarity between the personal private experience of William James whereby his thought was nurtured by "'the free responses of the American people to the American scene.'"<sup>10</sup>

In America, as nowhere else, the notion of an unfinished world was indeli-

bly fixed in the mind by everyday experiences, and an experimental temper was given free rein in an atmosphere formed by the belief in a wide open future. Here at last was formed a mentality which in important respects represents the maturation of Christian consciousness. Certainly it is as different from the mentality of pre-Christian man as anything can be. How natural it was, therefore, that philosophers should appear who were resolved to take at full value what has been called the gift of Christianity, namely, the notion of a universe "opening out onto an irresistible adventure."<sup>11</sup>

Today, what Dewey calls the "universe of experience" as the precondition of the universe of discourse has expanded into a very striking pattern. The settled boundaries of an older world have melted into an infinite horizon, and the historical drama exerts an irresistible fascination on man. Man is on the very threshold of a full acceptance of time and history, and his attitude is well expressed in the characteristically modern statement that history is "that in the 'direction' of which we have necessarily 'to be' under pain of not being at all."<sup>12</sup>

"The future rather than the past dominates the imagination,"<sup>13</sup> says Dewey. And because, in a truly temporal world, the mind must ever face forward, he hails the pragmatic intelligence as the intelligence which is alone adequate to change, transformation and novelty. Moreover, in asserting that "a pragmatic intelligence is a creative intelligence, not a routine mechanic,"<sup>14</sup> he is expressing the modern feeling for creativity in the face of an infinity of unrealized possibilities.

Given historical perspective and a sense of the unfolding human drama, one cannot resist the thought that thinkers like Peirce, James, Dewey and Mead



were responding to a powerful trend within the depth of history itself. At least their thinking was well within the stream of history, and like all truly historical thinking that bears the stamp of genius, it faces forward to a future whose possibilities we cannot foresee.

In order to grasp to the full the inner motivation of the pragmatist movement, let us consider for a brief moment this new sense of an open future as it expresses itself within the world of the writer and the painter. A Catholic scholar, comparing Renaissance writers with modern writers has this to say: "what was lacking to the Renaissance, from the twentieth-century point of view, was a sense of literature as exploratory, as facing into the unknown. A Gertrude Stein or a James Joyce, tinkering with the very structure of language to see what new and unexpected beauties it could be made to yield, would be almost unthinkable to the age of Colet and More, or even to that of Donne and Herbert. The notion that literature had before it indefinitely expanding horizons, and the related notion that the business of the writer was a kind of 'sincerity,' an objectivity in reporting which could lead to the discernment of issues previously unattended to or occluded, was hardly present."<sup>15</sup>

The writer of these lines is fully aware that the Renaissance developed a sense of history, although "this sense was largely a feeling for perspective regarding the past," for, as he says, "There was little sense of the forward movement of history, of the present as a point on a trajectory traveling off into a future whose precise shape we do not know." Fr. Ong knows, of course, that already in the 17th century we find the beginning of linear and progressive views of history. But he is concerned with literature, and not with the development of

such views. He continues: "There is a feeling for what literature was or had been, not for what it might become or was becoming." Then he draws the conclusion: "The feeling for the future was defective, for the old pre-Christian cyclic view of history had never been effectively exorcised from men's minds."<sup>16</sup>

In our own day we find writers experimenting with word arrangements freed from associations derived from habitual and conventional ways of looking at things. They are experimenting with language so that it may become a better vehicle of expression, and indeed they are offering us subtle perceptions of reality quite new to man, opening new vistas of literary and poetic achievement.

Painters, too, are experimenting imaginatively and boldly with their medium, seeking new and more self-sustaining aesthetic experiences, fired with the conviction that in the arts there are no closed frontiers.

### III

#### AN ALL-EMBRACING DRAMA

DEWEY WAS CONCERNED to give a larger meaning to whatever appears within the world's process, for, as he saw it, everything has its cosmic status. Having naturalized Hegel, this was the best he could do. But just the same, the Hegelian vision of history had left its mark on him. Hence his powerful conviction of a great processual scheme, a cosmic drama, in which each individual, far from being a mere 'point' closed within himself, is part of a vast and all-inclusive process, a process which is directed to "consequences yet indeterminate."

Although Dewey's own premises do not leave room for the notion of the universe as an ethical drama, the no-

tion, nonetheless, seems to hover in the background of his thinking. This sense of an ethical drama cosmic in scope, was not at all foreign to the pragmatist movement. Peirce most certainly had it, and could give it free reign because of a metaphysics which takes us through Hegel right back to Christian traditions of thought. Thus he was able to view the entire cosmic process as an unfolding of God's purpose, and could even insist on linking up living thought with a self-effacing love for the world.<sup>1</sup>

Dewey had little patience with such notions as universal progress or the inherent rationality of the universe. No one, it is true, could be more insistent than he on the fragmentary character of the world, its precariousness and its limitations. Yet it would seem that he himself was moved by a profound conviction of purpose at the heart of things that went beyond what his own philosophical premises would allow. Otherwise how account for his view that the Golden Age lies ahead<sup>2</sup> of us and not behind us, and what meaning are we to assign to the following: "When we have used our thought to its utmost and have thrown into the moving unbalanced balance of things our puny strength, we know that though the universe slay us still we may trust, for our lot is one with whatever is good in existence."<sup>3</sup> Here, too, as in Mead's words, cited above, we find a Scriptural echo, even if 'naturalized.'

Dewey, it would appear, was constrained to think about the world and its process in terms reminiscent of a religious tradition. His naturalism has elements which, far from closing the door on religious feelings, can quite easily stir them up. After all, terms like 'faith' and 'piety' sprang readily to Dewey's lips, bearing witness to the persistence of a spiritual influence. And is it not likely that Dewey's feeling of being an

active participant in a cosmic drama was the flowering of an irrepressible Biblical attitude in a mind which made a tremendous effort to take time seriously?

In placing Dewey's doctrine of experience in its proper context, it is necessary to hold before the mind the larger scheme in which the individual is rooted, and which, of course, must always be looked at as dynamic and progressive. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that Dewey was taken up with totality as well as with individuals, and with wholes as well as with parts and elements. In fact, his philosophy represents a form of consciousness which seeks actively to include within itself the whole universe. And, as we shall see, the very development of human experience is made possible by man's power to see events and objects within relational contexts which can expand to infinity.

Dewey's concern with the totality in which we live and have our being is evident when he calls attention to the fact that we sense "an enveloping and undefined whole"<sup>4</sup> which, in his view, springs from the feeling-part of man's nature and is nurtured by the imagination. This totality, or infinite whole, has been described by one of Dewey's commentators as the "all-embracing drama of life in its totality."<sup>5</sup> The same writer is also communicating Dewey's outlook when he describes one's sense of inclusion in the universal drama as "a feeling of the wholeness of existence, as a 'history,' of the all conceived as a drama in which the individual has a part to play."<sup>6</sup>

"We are never wholly free," says Dewey, "from the sense of something that lies beyond."<sup>7</sup> "We are, as it were, introduced into a world beyond this world which is nevertheless the deeper reality of the world in which we live our ordinary experiences. We are carried out

beyond ourselves to find ourselves."<sup>8</sup> Again he writes: "We are citizens of a vast world beyond ourselves and any intense realization of its presence with and in us brings a peculiar satisfying sense of unity in itself and with ourselves."<sup>9</sup>

Dewey saw a work of art as playing a key role in raising this sense of an enveloping whole to clarity. Since he seemed to regard an integrative immediacy as the aim of all-developing experience, it was natural for him to emphasize the aesthetic experience. Actually, he considered it to be the "most direct and complete manifestation of experience as experience,"<sup>10</sup> inasmuch as "esthetic experience is experience in its integrity. . . . For it is experience freed from the forces that impede and confuse its development as experience; freed, that is, from factors that subordinate an experience as it is directly had to something beyond itself." Hence the conclusion: "To esthetic experience, then, the philosopher must go to understand what experience is."<sup>11</sup>

If "the sense of an extensive and underlying whole is the context of every experience . . ." <sup>12</sup> we can see why Dewey regarded integral and integrating experiences as indispensable, above all, to the thinker. For a person untouched by the imaginatively engendered idea of "a thoroughgoing and deep-seated harmonizing of the self with the Universe (as the name for the totality of conditions with which the self is connected) . . ." <sup>13</sup> would hardly be in a position to think relevantly or vitally about anything. If the thinker plies his occupation it is because "he is lured and rewarded by total integral experiences that are intrinsically worth while."<sup>14</sup> Indeed, were he deprived of such experiences, he would not even know what it is to think, and would be at a loss in trying to distinguish between real thinking and

its imitation. It would seem, then, that from first to last, the thinker who is truly integrated in the universe is sustained by this primordial experience of the wholeness of existence. Or as Dewey puts it, "through the phases of perturbation and conflict, there abides the deep-seated memory of an underlying harmony, the sense of which haunts life like the sense of being founded on a rock."<sup>15</sup>

In this connection, it is interesting to note that Justice Holmes read Dewey's *Experience and Nature* and was impressed by the author's cosmic sense for it seemed to him "to feel the universe more inwardly and profoundly than any book I know, at least any book in philosophy."<sup>16</sup> Coming from Holmes, this was high praise, since he too had a robust sense of the cosmic position of things, the law included. And in a tribute to him, Dewey took care to single out a passage of Holmes's which amply bears this out.<sup>17</sup>

#### IV

##### MAN LIVES FORWARD—EXPERIENCE IS A TEMPORAL PROCESS

IN THE UNIVERSE of Dewey, it is impossible to look upon man as an inert static being. If the whole of nature is in process of development, why should man be exempt, either in his thought or in his experience? Consequently, knowledge cannot be regarded as sundered from the process of man, the process by which his life is sustained and evolved in history. Nor can experience itself be thought of as having boundaries definitely ascertained and fixed once and for all. We realize at once the truth of these contentions when we consider the mighty convulsions within experience which have rocked history. It was Dewey's highly developed awareness

of an expanding experience within history which explains why he could look upon the history of philosophy as "a chapter in the development of civilization and culture," while advocating that the story of philosophy be studied in connection with anthropology, primitive life, the history of religion, literature and social institutions.<sup>1</sup>

The preoccupation with process and development on the part of the pragmatists threw into sharp relief the reality of an expanding experience, and, in addition, brought the realm of thought closer to the experiential concrete. As James says: "The *full* facts of cognition, whatever be the way in which we talk about them, even when we talk most abstractly, stand inalterably given in the actualities and possibilities of the experience-continuum."<sup>2</sup> Manifestly, James spoke as one who saw the world freshly, and who was fully aware that henceforth thought must be viewed in its organic relation to the living, growing tissue of experience.

Although the emphasis on concrete experience was entirely congenial to James and Dewey, it was of course a broadly cultural phenomenon. Justice Holmes expressed this new feeling for the concrete, when he affirmed that "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience."<sup>3</sup> And today most of us look at things in pretty much the same way, as, for example, in our preference for a deeply experiential rather than a merely abstract treatment of various matters. Thus a study of the Greek mind or the Medieval mind does not appeal to us nearly so much as the more revealing account of the Greek experience or the Medieval experience. Even with respect to doctrines like materialism or atheistic humanism, we feel we have failed to gain depth in evaluating them until we come up against the actual experiences with which his-

torically they are bound. A merely abstract confrontation leaves us cold.

While both James and Dewey raised their voices on behalf of the rights of experience, James was much more thorough-going inasmuch as he opened himself to a realm of experience beyond the bounds of the visible world. Hence his observation that "our natural experience . . . may be only a fragment of real human experience."<sup>4</sup> However, on the horizontal plane, Dewey was most assuredly a pioneer of the first order in opening wide the perceptive aperture on aspects of experience which had been ignored.

"Faith in the possibilities of experience"<sup>5</sup> is a leading motif of Dewey's philosophy. And here he is in complete accord with James, whose attitude is stated by Perry when he says, "Whereas according to the traditional view experience *has* spoken, according to James, experience *has yet to speak*. . . ."<sup>6</sup> Dewey could also speak with dedicated seriousness of "intellectual piety toward experience" as a "precondition of the direction of life and of tolerant and generous cooperation among men."<sup>7</sup> Again, the same feeling for experience is expressed in the following passage: "If what is written in these pages has no other result than creating and promoting a respect for concrete human experience and its potentialities, I shall be content."<sup>8</sup>

Despite important differences in their approach to experience, James and Dewey throw a good deal of light on each other. So that when we set out to study Dewey, we should also apply ourselves to the study of James. Thus, something of the spirit of Dewey comes through to us when we see how supremely alert James was to the possibilities of experience. Or when we learn from James that experience does not come to us merely through the five senses but

through "the total push and pressure of the cosmos," and in the white heat of moral action. Or when James insists that experience makes demands on us that we must fulfil if we are to remain on the path of our own experiential development. In short, James can deepen our appreciation of Dewey's desire to promote a respect for concrete human experience, and particularly for experience in its fresh and novel features. For no one was more open than he to the "effervescence of novelties" which "form the authentic stuff" of every person's biography, and no one was more ready to lend an ear, as Santayana says, to all sorts of persons, even cranks, quacks and impostors.<sup>9</sup>

James and Dewey certainly supplement each other with respect to experience taken as a process. "According to my view," says James, "experience as a whole is a process in time. . . ." <sup>10</sup> Or as he says elsewhere, "Our fields of experience have no more definite boundaries than have our fields of view. Both are fringed forever by a *more* that continuously develops, and that continuously supersedes them as life proceeds."<sup>11</sup> Dewey writes in a similar vein: "Experience as an active process occupies time and its later period completes its earlier portion; it brings to light connections involved but hitherto unperceived."<sup>12</sup> And a writer on Dewey tells us that for Dewey "an experience however unique in its own quality must be seen as containing 'something that points to other experiences.' "<sup>13</sup>

When we read James as well as Dewey it becomes impossible to overlook the tremendous sense of direction within experience itself which came to life in the pragmatist movement. James had a keen awareness of experience as a continuum, which explains his astonishment at the view apparently held by some critics of Pragmatism that experience is lacking

in genuine continuity and therefore in direction. Hence his rejoinder: "Such a shallow sense of the conditions under which men's thinking actually goes on seems to me most surprising. These critics appear to suppose that, if left to itself, the rudderless raft of our experience must be ready to drift anywhere or nowhere. Even tho [*sic*] there were compasses on board, they seem to say, there would be no pole for them to point to. There must be absolute sailing-directions, they insist, decreed from outside, and an independent chart of the voyage added to the 'mere' voyage itself, if we are ever to make a port."<sup>14</sup>

Dominated as both thinkers were by so pronounced a sense of direction within experience itself, we can see how truly they expressed the pragmatist feeling of involvement in a great temporal process. And we can see, too, the extent to which Dewey was mastered by the need to carry on within the stream of history. In him there was not the slightest sign of mere cerebralism in his view of reality as a living process, or in his insistence on a full commitment to life as against a loosely wrought and irresponsible relation.

Consider too how the whole processive outlook of James sharpened his awareness of the flow of experience: "We live, as it were, upon the front edge of an advancing wave-crest, and our sense of a determinate direction in falling forward is all we cover of the future of our path."<sup>15</sup> Or take this: "Life is in the transitions as much as in the terms connected; often, indeed, it seems to be there more emphatically, as if our spurts and sallies forward were the real firing-line of the battle. . . ." <sup>16</sup>

Dewey was also highly sensitive to the forward-direction within the depth of experience itself, for "man lives forward" and "experience is a future implicated in a present."<sup>17</sup> An accommoda-



tion on the part of consciousness to what is new and fresh is written into its very nature—a fact, obviously, which would never have forced itself on the attention of man save within the newly envisaged universe. If nature were finished, says Dewey, “the flickering candle of consciousness would go out.”<sup>18</sup> Elsewhere he makes the same point, but in asserting that “sleep and waking would not be distinguished.”<sup>19</sup>

Regarding the experiential process, Dewey states the matter simply when he says that knowing is not initiated from “innocent sensory data, or from pure logical principles or from both together, but involves received and asserted meanings which are deposits of prior experiences, both personal and communal.”<sup>20</sup> Consequently it follows that we cannot move forward experientially without remaining in continuity with what has been accomplished in the past. As Dewey himself asserts, present experience “can expand into the future only as it is enlarged to take in the past.”<sup>21</sup>

Dewey insists that departure from the past solves no problems, for contact with the past is utterly essential. Nevertheless, when we establish connections with the past, we must do so, not outside the body of present experiences, but in and through it. If Dewey castigates the method of making the past the main material of education, it is because this method severs the vital connection of the present with the past, while tending to make the present nothing but a futile imitation.

Dewey, therefore, is compelled by the logic of his own position to play up our dependence upon the stream of culture, a dependence which “is an essential factor in original vision and creative impression.”<sup>22</sup> Speaking of the artist, he says that even if original in temperament, his work may be relatively thin

and tend to the bizarre, when it is not informed with “a wide and varied experience of the traditions of the art in which the artist operates.”<sup>23</sup> And, this is because “each great tradition is itself an organized habit of vision and of methods of ordering and conveying material.”<sup>24</sup> Philosophers too are within the movement of history, for though “they may perhaps be creators in some measure of its future” they are also “creatures of its past.”<sup>25</sup>

Unfortunately, Dewey was singularly lacking in the power of penetration into the past. Given his doctrine of experience as process and of the habit of vision engendered within a tradition, this is quite surprising. Speaking of the deficiency of the historic imagination in America, Dewey claimed that Americans idealize the past egregiously, setting up “little toys to stand as symbols for long centuries and the complicated lives of countless individuals.”<sup>26</sup> Dewey himself cannot be convicted of idealizing the past, but he surely indulged in generalizations which absolutely violated his own more empirical method of approach. And, in all frankness, it must be said that a good deal of what he says about the past seems hardly more than the little toys he himself held up to ridicule. Dewey's shortcomings however should not obscure his deeper insights and the contributions he himself made toward a better and more comprehensive understanding of the past.

## V

### EXPERIENCE AS PARTICIPATION: INTERACTION

IN THE OPEN, incomplete, temporal world of the pragmatists, there is a marked gain in visibility with respect to the true setting of human experience. Given a world that is still in the

making, and in which nature is gropingly and experimentally pushing forward, it would seem that, of necessity, a being capable of thought must play a more active part in the cosmic story. "We are not utter foreigners in the world," says Peirce. And, indeed, so truly do we belong within nature, that as rational beings, our role can be nothing less than efficient and codetermining, if only through our capacity to remake our own lives and to adapt our environment to the immensities of the human spirit.

Such an outlook knocks the props out from under the spectator's point of view. Moreover, if man is indeed capable of intervening freely and creatively within his life-process, his very experience must be seen as grounded, not in a merely passive recording of impressions, but in an active involvement and participation.

The pragmatist's process on this primary dimension of experience, that of the interplay between beings and between the self and its environment, found its fullest expression in Dewey. Interaction is at the very forefront of his thinking, an interaction which at the human level and within the community is transformed into participation and communication. Dewey really took seriously the fact that apart from a specific concrete environment, the individual is a sheer abstraction. And by environment, Dewey does not mean only what lies immediately before us. For, as he explains it, the environment may consist of very different things; for example, persons or subjects discussed, or even toys or an experiment one is performing, or it may be just the book one is reading in which the environmental context is a certain country or an imaginary region.<sup>1</sup>

The changes in the self which follow upon its interactions with the environment are regarded by Dewey as only an

aspect of a universal process in which all things undergo change and development through their countless transactions with one another. Every new relation or connection carries with it new possibilities of development, and since there can be an indefinite number of new relations, nature is seen to be full of processes whose possibilities are beyond reckoning.<sup>2</sup> It would seem, then, that for Dewey the very notice of 'being' implies the potentiality to establish relations with other things, since it is only through actual connections that each individual discovers, so to speak, its own form and possibilities.

In a doctrine like Dewey's, experience is clearly aligned with the actual processes of life, and is located in a specific life-situation in which the self is actively engaged. And it is only within this kind of situation that the self confronts a world full of meaningful and relevant beings. Thus through concrete, living relationships the world enters into man's life in a more intimate and internal way: "The world we have experienced becomes an integral part of the self that acts and is acted upon in further experience."<sup>3</sup> Finally, what had seemed remote and alien becomes "a home and the home is part of our every experience."<sup>4</sup>

There is, then, no inert static relation between the mind and the things confronting it, but rather a relation grounded in interaction.

In its most mature form, this vital commerce with other beings leads to a "complete interpenetration of the self and the world of objects and events."<sup>5</sup> Or to put it another way, through the range and quality of its relations with the world, the self is drawn into the great community of life and to a conscious realization of its role as "a co-operative part of a larger whole."

Nor can we forget for one moment

that with which man's experiential growth is closely bound up, namely, a sense of the whole conceived as a 'history.' It would appear that our sense of the whole conceived as a 'history' underlies that ineffable consummatory experience which Dewey refers to as "that delightful perception of the world."<sup>6</sup> Clearly this perception has the finality of a value experience, and has, besides, and in a supreme way, that aesthetic quality which every experience has when had for its own sake. For this "delightful perception" is not to be identified with mere pleasure, inasmuch as it brings a fulfilment that reaches to the depth of our being, as "an adjustment of our whole being with the conditions of existence."<sup>7</sup>

Manifestly, a full, concrete encounter with the world is at the very center of Dewey's philosophy. Therefore, he concentrates all his thoughts and energies on a conception of things which will dispel the illusion that man stands on the sidelines as a mere onlooker. In a world mechanistically conceived, man is easily induced into taking a false position in relation to nature. But not in the world of Dewey and the pragmatists. Man is truly a functioning part of nature, and his experiences enjoy a genuine status in the universe. Thus, even if he finds himself frustrated by nature, the fact remains that he is also supported by nature.<sup>8</sup> Hence his ideals have an anchorage in the existing world, despite the fact that a particular ideal may be an illusion.<sup>9</sup> Similarly, the imaginative processes have an existential reference inasmuch as they are not arbitrarily injected into the world by man.<sup>10</sup> And the same is true of thought, for it too is most assuredly within nature and enjoys a cosmic standing.<sup>11</sup>

Dewey's view of experience as grounded in interaction implies a relational structure of being, but of a sort which

leaves room for the individual seen as the ultimate source of what is unpredictable. Like James, Dewey holds that relations must be taken as seriously as things themselves, and, again, like James, he holds that relations as well as things are matters of direct experience.

James is most emphatic in his insistence that we experience relations: "There is not a conjunction or a preposition, and hardly an adverbial phrase, syntactic form, or inflection of voice, in human speech, that does not express some shading or other of relation which we at some moment actually feel to exist between the larger objects of our thought."<sup>12</sup>

Dewey owed to James his awareness of the fact that we experience relations, and in acknowledging his debt, he states that his own doctrinal position "is but a generalization" of what is involved in that fact.<sup>13</sup>

The desire to uphold both individuality and relations is an interesting aspect of pragmatist thinking. Dewey is a particularly good example of this twofold desire, for he not only makes the most of relations, but he also highlights the importance of the individual as "the carrier of creative thought" as well as "the author of action and of its application."<sup>14</sup> Consider, also, the following: "The mystery of time is thus the mystery of the existence of real individuals. It is a mystery because it is a mystery that anything which exists is just what it is. . . . We can account for a change by relating it to other changes, but existences we have to accept for just what they are. Given a butterfly or an earthquake as an event, as a change, we can at least in theory find out and state its connection with other changes. But the individual butterfly or earthquake remains just the unique existence that it is."<sup>15</sup>

Nothing can be more vexatious, philosophically, than the attempt to take full account of both individuality and relations. Thus, although in modern philosophy the category of relation has come into its own, it has done so, more often than not, at the expense of individuality. Dewey, at least, was bent on achieving a balance between individuality and relation, even if, metaphysically, his doctrine of the individual, especially at the human level, is far from adequate.

However, what especially interests us here is that Dewey's double emphasis is a distinct echo of the Christian intellectual tradition as it took shape in Augustinian and Pseudo-Dionysian currents. Contrary to Aristotelianism, the trend in these currents was toward a primary accent on relations. Alerted by the relational structure of the Trinity, Christian thinkers were naturally disposed to take a closer look at the category of relation, and especially in dealing with personality. Accordingly it came about that religious faith and deep religious feeling were instrumental in inducing the habit of relational thinking.

Taken in a relational scheme, the Christian doctrine of man as image of God threw into bold relief the fact that an actual concrete relationship of the human person to God is crucial in the very formation of selfhood. The contact with God was taken as intrinsic to the being and life of each individual person. As we may easily imagine, such an attitude invited the more general position that the entire process of experience and knowledge belongs integrally within the pattern of actual living relationships.

Considering Dewey's fidelity to both individuality and relations, it would appear that his thought here is indeed an offshoot of that "organized habit of vision" formed through centuries of Chris-

tian experience and Christian thinking. Furthermore, Dewey was advancing, at a new level, the ancient Christian habit of viewing experience and knowledge within a concrete relational scheme, despite the ultimate restrictiveness of his naturalistic framework. And his awareness of the fact that the face-to-face relationship is intrinsic to the life of thought most assuredly has its roots in the Christian heritage. "Logic in its fulfillment," says Dewey, "recurs to the primitive sense of the word: dialogue. Ideas which are not communicated, shared, and reborn in expression are but soliloquy, and soliloquy is but broken and imperfect thought."<sup>16</sup>

Obviously, Dewey's doctrine of interaction implies an emphasis of the individual as such, as against relation. But the individual, as envisaged by him, is a focal point of spontaneity and initiative. Consequently even if he cannot offer us a satisfactory portrait of human personality, he has still provided us with new dimensions in which to view the human subject in a more concrete and dynamic fashion.

As we have seen, Dewey's individual is very much a participant in an incomplete world. For each individual self acts as well as undergoes,<sup>17</sup> and what he undergoes is not stamped upon him as though he were inert wax. Both undergoing and doing are essential aspects of one balanced life, and, while inseparable, each depends for its quality on the way in which it is related to the other.

Experience, then, for Dewey, is a patterned structure in which undergoing and doing occur not in mere alternation, but in a far more integral way. For that reason, experience can be limited by all the causes which interfere with one's perception of the relations that bind undergoing and doing together.<sup>18</sup> There may be interferences be-

cause of an excess either on the side of undergoing or on the side of doing. That is why, as Dewey says, "zest for doing, lust for action, leaves many a person, especially in this hurried and impatient environment in which we live, with experiences of an almost incredible paucity, all on the surface."<sup>19</sup> The individual never allows an experience to complete itself, for he is forever hurrying off on a new line of action, with the result that he develops a preference, conscious or unconscious, for just those situations in which the most can be done in the shortest time.<sup>20</sup>

That Dewey felt his own approach to the human subject was far more realistic than that of traditional education can be seen in his attack on the older system of education on the ground that it pays little attention to the internal factors in the individual's relation to the subject-matter of education.<sup>21</sup> Unquestionably, he contributed much to a more realistic conception of the human subject, notwithstanding the ultimate inadequacy of his conception of personality.

Dewey's realism with regard to the human subject stands out still more vividly when placed within the context of the larger pragmatist movement. Take, for example, Mead's philosophy of the social self. Here we have an ego-alter relation which exhibits what has been called a "strange parallelism" to Martin Buber's reflections upon the I-Thou relation.<sup>22</sup> Thus, in Mead, we discover once again the fact that the pragmatist movement has accomplished a great deal in the sphere of the human subject.

Consider also what Perry says of James: "To read James is to recover the natural unities of the human mind, as a being that perceives, attends, reasons, wills, imagines, has sensations, forms habits, feels emotions, and acquires self-consciousness; and as an in-

dividual being in which these several modes of activity act and react on one another."<sup>23</sup>

In the final analysis, if Dewey stresses inward as well as outward factors in man's relations to his world, it is because they are both found in an unanalyzed totality in life and history. On one hand, life signifies a comprehensive activity which embraces at once organism and environment; on the other, history not only has to do with deeds enacted and tragedies undergone, but it also takes in rivers, mountains, laws and institutions. In the concrete of life and history, we have, then, a totality of experience which defies every dualistic interpretation of man's relations to his world.<sup>24</sup>

Insisting as strenuously as he does on life-experience, Dewey refuses to grant a monopoly to knowledge. Knowledge, as we shall see, plays its role in the improving and developing of primary experiences, that is to say, of experiences that occur chiefly in modes of action and undergoing. But it must not be glorified as the exclusive avenue to the real world. "For things are objects to be treated, used, acted upon and with, enjoyed and endured, even more than things to be known. They are things *had* before they are things *cognized*."<sup>25</sup>

The philosopher must be sensitive to the need for experience, and while recognizing no 'fatal chasms' in experience, he should never forget that knowing cannot be taken as primary without cutting the cord that binds experience and nature together.<sup>26</sup> From first to last, the knowing process is grounded in a real world, where experience signifies not simply observation but active participation. For experience includes "*what* men do and suffer, *what* they strive for, love, believe and endure, and *how* men act and are acted upon, the ways in which they do and suffer, desire and



enjoy, see, believe, imagine."<sup>27</sup> And all phenomena must be respected, whether they have to do with magic, myth, politics, painting or penitentiaries.<sup>28</sup>

Religion, too, is revelatory of existence.<sup>29</sup> And the affections can claim a place long denied them, for "Our affections, when they are enlightened by understanding, are organs by which we enter into the meaning of the natural world as genuinely as by knowing, and with greater fullness and intimacy. . . ."<sup>30</sup>

## VI

### THE EMANCIPATION AND ENLARGEMENT OF EXPERIENCE

**I**N RELOCATING EXPERIENCE within a nature which is not denied a truly temporal character, Dewey has raised the requirements of concreteness in the handling of experience. Unfortunately, he remained impervious to certain inner experiences which yield intelligible necessities with respect to truth and value. They, too, have their place within experience conceived as "a moving whole of interacting parts,"<sup>31</sup> and by their very nature, occupy a privileged position.

The fact remains, however, that despite the deficiencies of his philosophy, Dewey was able to gather in a good many insights which no one can afford to ignore. Moreover, he widened our conception of empirical method, while throwing open new vistas of experience. Then, again, he did more than his share in showing the futility of treating man as though he were segregated from history and process and as though he were incapable of exercising a truly creative function in his own process. And here, of course, he can help us orient our thinking in a world in which things exist in some genuinely temporal sense. Perhaps, too, he can even help us form a more realistic attitude toward those

intelligible necessities which are a part of the given of experience, even if unacknowledged by him. For, despite their transcendent character, or rather because of it, they, too, are in time, manifesting themselves and unfolding their implications within a definite course of events. The reality and efficacy of truth and value in terms of a temporal process need to be given more serious philosophical consideration. But here too we have much to learn from that other great figure in the pragmatist movement, Charles S. Peirce, who like Dewey was determined to take growth and development seriously, and who could also declare that the "ideas of 'justice' and 'truth' are, notwithstanding the iniquity of the world, the mightiest of the forces that move it."<sup>32</sup>

In drawing this study to a close, we shall consider briefly man's creative role in the world, and, of course, in experiential terms. For nothing emerges so clearly from a study of Dewey's thought as the singlemindedness with which he drove home the fact that man can shape the experiential foundations of his own life.

In this connection, let us recall that, in accepting a relational system, Dewey also upholds the reality of the individual. Dewey is referring to this kind of scheme when he says that "Only if elements are more than just elements in a whole, only if they have something qualitatively their own, can a relational system be prevented from complete collapse."<sup>33</sup> Thus, without the infinitely plural and irreducible qualities found in nature, the relations which are the subject-matter of knowledge "would be algebraic ghosts, relations that do not relate."<sup>34</sup>

These immediate qualities form the basis for what Dewey calls a "having" experience as against a "knowing" experience. In the "having" experience,

we come up against the immediacy of existent things, and since they are indescribable and undefinable we have to accept them as they are. "Empirically, things are poignant, tragic, beautiful, humorous, settled, disturbed, comfortable, annoying, barren, harsh, consoling, splendid, fearful; are such immediately and in their own right and behalf."<sup>5</sup> The unique and ineffable character of these data are such that they must be taken as absolute rather than comparative. Moreover, such experiences include not only things, events and persons, but also situations, inasmuch as they, too, have an immediate, final or self-enclosed quality.

As to the "knowing" experience, this is made possible because things are not isolated from one another, for they are involved in a continuity of interactions and changes which render them a potent means of new experiences. For Dewey, knowing "always proceeds by taking things out of their isolation and seeing them as related parts in some larger whole."<sup>6</sup> Or, as he says, philosophy "has only to note that bare occurrence in the way of having, being, or undergoing is the provocation and invitation to thought-seeking and finding unapparent connections."<sup>7</sup>

Through the agency of knowing, that which James refers to as "the advancing front of experience" brings with it the widening of experiential coherence and unity. This movement toward concrete unification is the story of our process, even if that unification is always meager and partial. And the story has its source in the infinite relationships already existing between men and their fellows and between men and things. Yet "the enduring and comprehending whole" touches our consciousness insofar as we sense "these encompassing continuities with their infinite reach." Moreover, "This meaning even now attaches to

*present activities* because they are set in a whole to which they belong and which belongs to them."<sup>8</sup> (my emphasis)

Knowledge, then, has to do with the process by which we bring things into a larger pattern of relationships. For each thing or event takes on stable meanings through its reference to something extrinsic, but connected. The result is a "knowing" experience, "the product of deliberate subject matter." And, Dewey insists, the "connections are as much experienced as are the qualitatively diverse and irreducible objects of original natural experience."<sup>9</sup> Putting the matter in experiential terms, "An experience is a knowledge, if in its quality there is an experienced distinction and connection of two elements of the following sort: *one means or intends the presence of the other in the same fashion in which itself is already present, while the other is that which, while not present in the same fashion, must become so present if the meaning or intention of its companion or yoke-fellow is to be fulfilled through the operation it sets up.*"<sup>10</sup>

With respect to the immediate objects of existence, our knowledge of "sequences, coexistences, relations constitutes a memorandum of conditions of their appearance."<sup>11</sup> In other words, by acquiring such a "memorandum" we can procure by "intentionally performed operations" the kind of experience we consider desirable. That is to say, we can procure the finalities required, in regulating the date, place and manner of their emergence.

Knowing is itself a way of interaction by which we bring under control other interactions. Thanks to a directed activity, we can so modify the empirical situation that objects are differently related to one another. Knowing is, therefore, experimental inasmuch as it is intrinsically bound up with overt doing, or the making of changes in the environ-

ment or in our relation to it. Ideas are entirely indispensable. Nevertheless, they are regarded by Dewey as worthless unless they are indivisibly one with overt actions which "rearrange and reconstruct in some way, be it little or large, the world in which we live."<sup>12</sup>

According to Dewey, "the function of intelligence is . . . not that of copying the objects of the environment, but rather of taking account of the way in which more effective and more profitable relations with these objects may be established in the future."<sup>13</sup> Unquestionably, in a processual scheme where there is real growth and development, ideas must be viewed dynamically and as means of leading us deeper into reality in some sort of teleological way. Dewey tells us that "The identification in modern thought of ends with ends-in-view, with deliberate purpose and planning . . . is in effect a recognition that the teleology of nature is achieved and exhibited by nature in thinking, not apart from it."<sup>14</sup> If this implication has often escaped modern theories, says Dewey, if modern thought has been content to deny all teleology, "the reason is adventitious; it is found in the gratuitous breach of continuity between nature, life, and man."<sup>15</sup>

The purpose of the concept is to redirect us back into experience, so that through our constructive control of the environment, experience is modified or developed. Thus there is a real process of experience because reason is able to make the world other than it would have been without it. Reason's function is directive with respect to the course of experience, and, accordingly, the meaning of the concept is tied in with its applicability to a world of existing things. Hence, the concept always faces forward, since, in making possible a creative handling of relations, it is oriented to the expansion of experience.

In his approach to knowledge, Dewey was generalizing at a philosophical level the mode of thinking that experimental science brought to life. That experimental thinking has a good deal to say with respect to the integral life of thought is beyond question. And, like Peirce, Dewey understood this and was attempting to open up a new frontier in philosophy. But concerned, as he was, with the immediacy of existence and the finalities grounded in such immediacy, Dewey also paid heed to "experience in the form of art." As we already know, he insists that the philosopher must go to aesthetic experience in order to understand what experience is. And among the things to be learned from "experience in the form of art" is the falsity of any division between "overt and executive activity on one side and thought and feeling on the other." "In creative production," he says, "the external and physical world is more than a mere means or external condition of perceptions, ideas and emotions; it is subject-matter and sustainer of conscious activity; and thereby exists, so that he who runs may read, the fact that consciousness is not a separate realm of being, but is the manifest quality of existence when nature is most free and most active."<sup>16</sup>

Although Dewey has much to say regarding knowledge as a means of gaining control in a troubled situation, nonetheless, it is with the modification and development of experience itself that he is, above all, concerned. Knowing is primarily for the sake of a consummatory experience, for we know in order more satisfactorily to have. If our thinking is inviscerated in a real world of objects and events, it provides us with an experience of that phase of objects which is constituted by their connections with one another. Reflective thought is, in fact, transitional. That

is to say, it stands in an intermediate and mediating position within experience, in carrying us from a relatively casual and accidental experience of existence to one relatively settled and defined.

Dewey is tireless in his insistence that the course of experience can be directed, and that we should have faith in "the varied possibilities of diversified experience."<sup>17</sup> To him nothing could be more certain than that man has reached a new stage in his development precisely through his power to enter boldly into the world of concrete experience, instead of fleeing from it in the mistaken notion that it represents mere flux and confusion. Consequently, he raised his voice against those non-empirical philosophies which have cast aspersions upon the things of everyday experience, and have helped to solidify an attitude whose very essence is deviation from concrete experience. As he says, "The serious matter is that philosophies have denied that common experience is capable of developing from within itself methods which will secure direction for itself and will create inherent standards of judgment and value."<sup>18</sup> Here, Dewey would have been on firmer ground if he had but recognized a deeper level of experience, of which we have already made mention, where we come face to face with realities apart from which we should be hopelessly adrift in an absolute relativism.

As we have seen, in Dewey's doctrine, thinking always begins and ends in experience, but, in the process, experience itself is transformed. "Development," he says, "does not mean just getting something out of the mind. It is a development out of experience and into experience that is really wanted."<sup>19</sup> Therefore, we can deliberately set about making experience our teacher, through our power to qualify its course and to turn

it in the direction of a specific goal. As Dewey declares, "at every level there is an expanding development of experience if experience is educative in effect. Consequently, whatever the level of experience, we have no choice but either to operate in accord with the pattern it provides or else to neglect the place of intelligence in the development and control of a living and moving experience."<sup>20</sup>

Discussing Dewey's contribution to the notion that experience itself is educative or pedagogical, a writer has this to say: "It is experience that is directive, it is experience that teaches and while the entire American tradition is characterized by the acceptance of experience as pedagogical, it is nowhere more explicitly stated than in the following passage from John Dewey's *Reconstruction in philosophy*: 'Now, old experience is used to suggest aims and methods for developing a new and improved experience. Consequently experience becomes in so far constructively self-regulative. What Shakespeare so pregnantly said of nature, it is "made better by no mean, but nature makes that mean," becomes true of experience. We do not merely have to respect the past, or wait for accidents to force change upon us. We use our past experiences to construct new and better ones in the future. The very fact of experience thus includes the process by which it directs itself in its own betterment.'"<sup>21</sup>

Dewey's penetrating insight into the way in which man plays a creative role in relation to his own experience explains, of course, his constant preoccupation with the field of education. For the whole process of education can be made to exemplify in a highly conscious way the truth that experience itself is pedagogical. Since "the business of education might be defined as an emanci-

pation and enlargement of experience,"<sup>22</sup> it was quite natural for Dewey to view his educational theories as a handle to his entire philosophy.<sup>23</sup> It is not surprising, then, to find Dewey fully prepared to grant a pre-eminent role to the philosophy of education: "The philosophy of education is one phase of all philosophy in general. It may be seriously questioned whether it is not the most important phase of general philosophy . . . the whole philosophic problem of the origin, nature, and function of knowledge is a live issue in education, not just a problem for exercise in intellectual dialectic gymnastics."<sup>24</sup>

Again we must emphasize that Dewey's philosophy was motivated by an intense desire to take seriously the fact that knowing is inside, not outside, the life-process, and to follow through with the implications. His highly disciplined thinking with regard to experience as pedagogical cannot for a moment be separated from his view that man is deeply involved in a great processual scheme. Like James, he looked on experience as a continuum, and not at all as a "rudderless raft." As he saw it, man does not live his life amidst events which are indifferently neutral to him, for these events are taken up into an integrated scheme which forms a more or less coherent story. Dewey describes this temporal process as an integrated series of episodes whose wholeness imparts to each episode a meaning it would not have if it were part of another story. Hence human consciousness has a dramatic quality which cannot be ignored when we view man in the full concreteness of life and history.<sup>25</sup>

Man is actively engaged within a growing process involving the whole world, and through his active participation, the story unfolds. And meaning itself takes shape within the unfolding

story, and each moment contributes to a "continuum of meaning" which is in process of formation.<sup>26</sup>

It is clear, then, that Dewey's conception of thought as instrumental is in line with his desire to maintain the closest ties between the life of thought and the developing story. And, as we have seen, this unification is possible because of man's power to reshape the whole of his existence in order to liberate and develop his experience. The dynamism of man's life is found in this very effort to expand his experience, for, as Dewey says, "Nothing but the best, the richest and fullest experience possible, is good enough for man. The attainment of such an experience is not to be conceived as the specific problem of 'reformers' but as the common purpose of men."<sup>27</sup>

Because we are able to reconstruct our environment continuously, we can make our experience abound in meaning and value. Thus Dewey has given us insight into the fact that we are indeed participating in the unfolding drama of the onmoving world. Moreover, he has made us see the need for establishing an intimate and even creative connection between the life of thought and the world, inasmuch as experience is capable of endless development. Action is given new dignity in its more intrinsic relation to thought. And everything that adds to man's power to shape his environment takes on an enlarged significance. Consequently Dewey can say: "Every discovery of concrete dependence of life and mind upon physical events is therefore an addition to our resources."<sup>28</sup>

The growth of experience is a communal affair, even if the person plays a primary role. It implies, therefore, the joint activity of individuals as well as the indissoluble unity of thought and deed. In building up his social life,



man is at the same time giving more amplitude to the world of his experience. And even his body plays an indispensable role in making meaning and value triumph over the instability of events. Obviously, then, creative activity with respect to the environment has implications far beyond the merely practical.

Given such an outlook, nothing could be more repugnant to Dewey than the view that institutions, as such, are the enemy of freedom and that all conventions are but slaveries. But everything in his outlook also made him react strongly against any form of society which failed to keep pace with the human process. As he insisted, social institutions have for their purpose the liberation and development of the individual's capacities. But the individual that Dewey had in mind is the real individual of history who is in process of growth, and who is discovering the whole world of inner experience<sup>29</sup> and is even now entering into "the new age of human relationships."<sup>30</sup>

Man is always in process of growth, and the developments in our own time clearly call for a fresh reconstruction of the social world, in order to strengthen the bonds which hold persons together in the "immediate community of experience," that is to say, in the face-to-face relationships of the local community.<sup>31</sup> For the human spirit will not return "to seek calm and order within itself" save "in the vital, steady, and deep relationships which are present only in an immediate community."<sup>32</sup>

Inspired by the conception of a universe which is still "in the process of becoming," Dewey built his philosophy around the notion of thought as creative and constructive, and as oriented to the task of making the world more reasonable in actual fact. Through the experimental reshaping of his world,

man is able to achieve a "securer, freer and more widely shared embodiment of values in experience. . . ."<sup>33</sup> Because he has the power to develop and organize his experience, man is capable of filling his world with meaning and value, and consequently, of bringing it into accord with his ideals. And today, more than ever before, man must make full use of this power. For as Dewey says, "Never have the 'real' and the 'ideal' been so clamorous, so self-assertive, as at the present time. And never in the history of the world have they been so far apart."<sup>34</sup>

This doctrine which lays so much emphasis on the "embodiment of values in experience" also finds expression in Peirce in his doctrine of the ultimate good as the furtherance of concrete reasonableness. Dewey cites Peirce's own words concerning this doctrine, when, in referring to this view that generals [universals] are real, he writes, that for Peirce, "the pragmatist [Peirce's own version of pragmatism] does not make the *summum bonum* to consist in action, but makes it to consist in that process of evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those generals. . . ."<sup>35</sup>

In his account of the thought of James Marsh, early American philosopher, Dewey brings out a conception of Marsh's, which, in spirit at least, is not unlike the pragmatist view under consideration. Dewey is showing how Marsh was under Christian influence in developing a conception of reason and its relation to the world which was far from that of Aristotle. ". . . Aristotle," says Dewey, "held that reason could be actualized in contemplative knowledge apart from any effort to change the world of nature and social institutions into its own likeness and embodiment. Following the spirit of Christian teaching, Marsh denied any such possibility.

He held that reason can actualize itself and be truly aware or conscious of its own intrinsic nature only as it operates to make over the world, whether physical or social, into an embodiment of its own principles. Marsh constantly condemns what he calls speculation and the speculative tendency, by which he means a separation of knowledge and the intellect from action and the will. By its own nature, reason terminates in action and that action is the transformation of the spiritual potentialities found in the natural world, physical and institutional, into spiritual realities."<sup>88</sup>

If Dewey had had a first hand acquaintance with the traditions of Christian thought, his own cast of mind would have brought to focus doctrines which, like Marsh's, clearly show the influence of Christianity in their emphasis on action. Nor would he have missed the new love for the concrete among Christian thinkers, as well as a strong desire to stay close to experience. Above all, he would have learned that the incarnational mentality, fostered by Christianity, made it finally inevitable that men should strive to bring truth and value down to earth. In short, he would have discovered how truly these Christian traditions brought forth an "organized habit of vision" whose influence has been felt in philosophy right down to the present, and even in Pragmatism itself.

## FOOTNOTES

### I

1 Philip P. Wiener, *Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism*. (Harvard University Press, 1949). p. viii.

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3 Alexander Koyré, *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe*. (The John Hopkins Press, 1957).

4 George Santayana, *Winds of Doctrine*. (Harper, 1957). p. 208.

5 *Experience and Nature*. (Open Court, 1929). p. 47.

6 *Reconstruction in Philosophy*. (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1920). pp. 66-67.

7 Marjorie Hope Nicolson, *The Breaking of the Circle*. (Northwestern University Press, 1950) p. 139.

8 *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 61.

9 *Pragmatism*. (Longmans, Green, 1907). p. 246.

10 John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 24.

11 Nicolson, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

12 *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 58.

13 *Ibid.*

14 "Time and Individuality," *Time and Its Mysteries*, Series II. (New York University Press, 1940). p. 87.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 89.

16 *Characters and Events*, Joseph Ratner, ed. (Henry Holt, 1929). Two volumes. Vol. II, p. 440.

17 *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 116-7.

18 *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 439.

19 Ralph Barton Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James*, (Little, Brown, 1936). Vol. II, p. 700.

20 John Dewey, "Does Reality Possess Practical Character?" *Essays in Honor of William James*, (Longmans, Green, 1908). p. 63.

21 Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, (Macmillan, 1930). p. vii.

22 John Dewey, "Time and Individuality," *op. cit.*, p. 106.

23 John Dewey, "Does Reality Possess Practical Character?" *op. cit.*, p. 56.

24 Emmanuel Mounier, *Be Not Afraid*, (Harper, 1954). p. 19.

25 *Experience and Education*, (Macmillan, 1938). p. 51.

26 *Problems of Men*, p. 12.

27 *The Quest for Certainty*, (Minton, Balch, 1929). p. 306.

28 *Characters and Events*, Vol. II, p. 499.

### II

1 Cf. Mircea Eliade, *The Myth of the Eternal Return*, (Pantheon, 1954).

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<sup>7</sup> XI, 1, *The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers*, (Edited and with an introduction by Whitney J. Oates, Random House, 1940), p. 571.

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<sup>10</sup> *Characters and Events*, Vol. I, p. 119.

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<sup>12</sup> Rougement, Denis de, *Man's Western Quest*, (R. N. Anshen, ed., Harper, 1957). p. 95.

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<sup>3</sup> *Experience and Nature*, p. 420.

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<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 195.

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<sup>13</sup> *A Common Faith*, (Yale University Press, 1934). p. 19.

<sup>14</sup> *Art as Experience*, p. 37.

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<sup>2</sup> *The Meaning of Truth*, (Longmans, Green, 1914). pp. 151-2.

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<sup>7</sup> *Experience and Nature*, (W. W. Norton, 1925). p. 39.

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<sup>17</sup> "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy," *op. cit.*, p. 12.

<sup>18</sup> *Experience and Nature*, p. 349.

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<sup>20</sup> *Experience and Nature*, p. 428.

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<sup>22</sup> *Art as Experience*, p. 265.

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<sup>25</sup> *Philosophy and Civilization*, p. 4.

<sup>26</sup> *Characters and Events*, Vol. II, p. 515.

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<sup>3</sup> *Art as Experience*, p. 104.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

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<sup>8</sup> *Experience and Nature*, p. 421.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 421.

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<sup>12</sup> *Psychology*, Briefer Course. (Introduction by Ralph Barton Perry, World Publishing Co., 1948). p. 162.

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# JOHN DEWEY'S EMPIRICISM AND THE CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE

RALPH W. SLEEPER

THE OCCASION of John Dewey's Centenary year has already provided a number of interesting and significant attempts to put the contribution of this major philosopher into some kind of perspective. Books, periodicals, conventions of philosophers and educators, conferences and colloquia of all sorts have proposed the appraisal and re-appraisal of the place of this controversial and most typical American thinker in the history of philosophy, and yet, so far, little has been done except what emphasizes the "promissory and futuristic" character of his thought.<sup>1</sup> In pursuing that emphasis stress is laid on the twin motifs of Dewey's revolution in social thought and his transformation of the character of public education. The range of images which result seems better designed to ensure the memory of Dewey the controversialist than to remind us of Dewey's deep roots in the great tradition of Western thought and of the unique relationship of his philosophy to the Christian foundations of the American historical experience. It is not my purpose, then, to enter the controversy which continues to rage over Dewey's social and pedagogical doctrines: however the winds of doctrine

may blow, they leave the bed-rock of Dewey's major achievement unchanged.

That achievement is, I believe, to be found in his contribution to the philosophy of radical empiricism. In the development of that philosophy, which had been a dominant tradition in America from Emerson and Josiah Royce to Charles Peirce and William James, Dewey worked out a metaphysics of experience capable of serving that philosophy as a durable foundation or, to use his own figure, as the "ground-map of the province of criticism."<sup>2</sup> That both his social and pedagogical thought was guided by reference to this metaphysical "ground-map" is a fact which has all too frequently been neglected, though to do so is to ignore the perspective on his work which he was himself at great pains to supply. Just why this neglect of Dewey's metaphysics should occur is not difficult to understand in light of the low repute into which all metaphysics has recently fallen in so many places; but it is indeed unfortunate that those responsible, admirers and critics alike, should, by their neglect of his metaphysics, have chosen to place him in the camp of his enemies.<sup>3</sup> If Dewey were still alive he would not have the pretentiousness to say it, but he belongs instead to the camp of those thinkers who, since Greek antiquity, have insisted upon grounding the values of social and educational criticism upon metaphysical principles of the deepest integrity. It is not the purpose of this paper to show the relevance of Dewey's thought to the traditional themes of Greek metaphysics,<sup>4</sup> but to show the specific congruity of

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Dewey's analysis of experience with the distinctively Christian view of the historical dimensions of human existence. In stressing this relation, we are inevitably led to an examination of the contribution of St. Augustine.

RATIONALISM AND EMPIRICISM  
IN ST. AUGUSTINE

ST. AUGUSTINE relived the whole drama of the struggle between Plato and the Sophists, between Aristotle's empiricism and Neoplatonic rationalism, between the mystery religions and rational theology, and in the end he became Christianity's greatest thinker. The fact that he experienced these dramas as a struggle within his own soul makes him, like St. Paul, a charismatic personality first, and only then a philosopher of such great intellectual power that he could fuse together these rich and divergent strains of his experience in a theology which makes it intelligible. "Augustine was an empiricist who tested all things in the fire of his own burning experience, a rationalist with a Platonic vision of Truth all naked and alone, and an institutionalist who fully realized the human craving for social authority."<sup>5</sup> To him, Christianity came as the transformation of history. No philosopher of the West had taken the problem of historical time so seriously; no philosopher had ever before attempted a metaphysics of historical experience. But, with the Incarnation, historical experience had become the very center of meaning and value. No longer could pure formless matter be regarded as the principle of evil. Had not God created matter? No longer could pure matterless form be the principle of good. Had not God become Man, the Logos been made flesh? Augustine was forced to rethink the whole problem of the relation of form to matter, of reason to experi-

ence. Man had a nature which could be transformed: a metaphysics of fixed natural essences, so plausible to the Greeks, could no longer be maintained. Augustine had to work out a new metaphysical perspective which would be true to the evident re-creative power of the New Being.

The conception of the natural universe which Augustine developed is remarkable on two counts. First, it was able to account for the real powers of human intelligence without assuming a thoroughly rational universe, and, second, it suggests the viability of an experimental method as the alternative to rationalistic natural science. Nature is recognized as precarious and changing, but with an element of stability and order; it can be made intelligible, but not *perfectly* intelligible. The world is not simple, as is all that is eternal; though multiformity is the characteristic generic trait of the temporal universe it is, after all, still a universe.<sup>6</sup> We must learn to judge each thing after its own nature; everything has its measure, its form within time, and a certain relative harmony of its own.<sup>7</sup> Values and meanings are found, in the experience of nature, to be subject to the very contingency which lies at the heart of all things created. Sustained by the temporal structures of nature they grow and flourish though they cannot achieve permanence in time; every being, as such, is good. Evil is the falling away from being, from growth, from creativity, from love.<sup>8</sup> Even matter is good; its excellence consists in its plasticity, its instrumental fitness in support of growth and creative action.<sup>9</sup> The body is no longer the "prison house" of the soul.

Thus, despite his overwhelming concern with man's ultimate end in God and his skepticism of reason's ability to ensure the attainment of that end,

Augustine managed to retain an explicit confidence in the instrumentality of empirical knowledge in the improvement of man's historical condition. This practical trust in the creative character of human experience, the connection between *caritas* and the senses, is made clear in the famous essay on the Trinity where he says: "Far be it from us to doubt the truth of what we have learned by the bodily senses; since by them we have learned to know the heaven and the earth..."<sup>10</sup> And again in the *De Magistro* as in *Contra Academicos* Augustine maintains that whatever is experienced through the senses may be believed, though these beliefs must be checked against the facts, and in *no case* is an absolute science of nature possible.<sup>11</sup> This view is also made manifest in the *Confessions* where it is the temporality of natural things, their "time-bound" contingency, that requires natural science to abjure rationalistic methods and to approach its subject-matter with hypotheses to be checked and verified empirically and inductively.<sup>12</sup>

#### THE IMPLICIT MODERNITY OF AUGUSTINE'S VIEW OF NATURE

ALTHOUGH this "experimentalist" strain of Augustine's thought was neglected in the centuries that followed, except for those few thinkers who were willing to buck the rising tide of rationalism in the middle ages, it has, in very recent years undergone a most interesting revival. This revival is the result of the fact that modern science, through the work of such physicists as Willard Gibbs, Emile Borel, Werner Heisenberg, Max Planck and Henri Lebesgue, has gradually come to abandon the rigidly deterministic and rationalistic Newtonian view of the universe. The rationalist claim to certainty has been

rejected in favor of a more realistic claim to empirically grounded probability. The admission of "chance," not merely as a tool for physics, but as part of its "warp and weft"<sup>13</sup> has dealt a serious blow to rationalistic method. Equally damaging is the admission of entropy, the principle of which means that all closed systems in the universe (perhaps the universe itself) tend towards ever increasing disorganization. This recognition of incompleteness, even randomness, in the very texture of the world of nature is what has brought men to recognize the modernity of Augustine's metaphysical perspective. As Norbert Weiner puts it:<sup>14</sup>

The view that nature reveals an entropic tendency is Augustinian, not Manichaean (or rationalistic). Its inability to undertake an aggressive policy, deliberately to defeat the scientist, means that its evil doing is the result of a weakness in *his* nature rather than of a specifically evil power that it may have, equal or inferior to the principles of order in the universe which, local and temporary as they may be, still are probably not too unlike what the religious man means by God.

That Augustine was just such a religious man is nowhere more obvious than in the fact that the metaphysical presuppositions which both he and modern science share are sharply in conflict with those of both Scholastic and Cartesian-Newtonian rationalism.

In the background of 17th century science was the uniform belief, deposited by the medieval Schoolmen, that it is unthinkable that nature should not embody a single, uniform, rationally intelligible scheme. But since several alternative schemes were available, it was also believed that the decision as to which one of these alternatives is the truth must be left to experiment and empirical investigation.<sup>15</sup> Galilean ex-

perimentalism supposed no element of contingency or "chance" at the heart of its subject-matter. As a result, therefore, once it had discovered a mathematically intelligible law that organized observed fact in an economical manner, it proceeded to apply that law universally and without exception. The rigidly deterministic conception of the universe which resulted was one in which the whole future depends upon the whole past. The consequences of the adoption of this deterministic metaphysics is a matter of historical record; a record that is as interesting as it is full of needless compromise. As contemporary science develops, the presuppositions of this mechanistic determinism become less tenable; certainly the dualism of thought and extension, mind and body, which that determinism forced upon its believers can now be recognized, in Gilbert Ryle's perceptive phrase, as a "category mistake."<sup>16</sup>

The new experimentalism, of which we may now recognize Augustine as the metaphysical progenitor, accepts, as the rationalists could not, the restriction of natural science to the realm of experience. To be sure, the pure mathematician and the formal logician may escape for a time into "another world" of their own imaginative construction, but they must return inevitably to the precarious and imperfect world of experience and nature or their formal constructions can never bear practical fruits. We may return, therefore, to the Augustinian perspective in which an absolute and rationalistic science of nature is forever impossible, but which nevertheless supports confidence in an empirical and corrigible science of nature as an instrument in the service of those transformations of nature and history which are envisioned in the *City of God*.

#### AMERICAN SOURCES OF DEWEY'S EMPIRICISM

THE METAPHYSICS which supported the Newtonian view of the universe was fundamentally rationalistic and deductive. Dewey's metaphysics, which supports the new experimentalism, is fundamentally empirical and inductive. The reasons for Dewey's rejection of rationalistic and deductive methods in metaphysics, despite his early attraction to the Hegelian vogue among American university professors, were uniformly practical. In agreement with the American tradition of abandoning European political, social and economic schemes as inadequate representations of the facts of life as they were being discovered in the experience of the inhabitants of the new world, Dewey, following Emerson, Royce, Peirce and James, found the European philosophies to be inaccurate tools for the understanding of American life. It was necessary to rethink the very nature of philosophy itself before a new beginning could be made. The process of this rethinking of philosophy, which had the inevitable result of momentarily isolating the American thinker from his European counterpart, constitutes the movement which I referred to earlier as "radical empiricism." In understanding this movement, the most important step would seem to be an appreciation of the way in which American philosophers reinterpreted the meaning of the term "experience" in contrast to the prevailing European interpretations in the 18th century.

Both Continental Rationalism and British Empiricism, the dominant philosophies of that period in Europe, had in common a view of man as essentially a rational animal. As rational, man can understand the natural universe. As animal, he is restricted to that aspect of the universe which an animal can ex-

perience through the senses. This view is essentially congruent with that of Aristotle, but beyond Aristotle's view is a further element, added by St. Thomas, of confidence in the power of human reason to grasp the immaterial structures of reality. This latter element was derived by Thomas from the tradition of Christian Platonism which held that nature must possess a logical structure accessible to the human intellect. Here "experience" is the starting point of knowledge, but reason must go beyond experience in order to grasp the structure of a universe not accessible to the senses at all. As De Wulf has put it:<sup>17</sup> "If any given thing is real, all other things, without which the reality of that fact would be inexplicable and unintelligible, must be no less real."<sup>18</sup> That this principle is based on the notion that the field of sense experience is a very limited portion of the whole real universe is as obvious as the fact that experience as such is limited to *sense* experience and that reason is implicitly identified with the non-sensory or immaterial world. The result is what Whitehead has called a "bifurcated universe" which is split right down the middle and which cannot be mended even by such ingenious devices as Kant's *a priori* forms of intuition and Hegel's "absolute" logic.

American philosophy began with the outright rejection of the underlying cause of world bifurcation. It threw out the division between mind and body which is presupposed in every philosophy which makes a radical distinction between reason and sense experience from Thomas, Descartes and Locke through to Hegel and Marx. It substituted a view of integral experience in which man and nature are both viewed in the same light. Nature is experienced by man as a cooperative process in which rational, sensible and moral qualities are combined; it is in this context

that the experience of salvation (*not* a "sense experience") is worked out. There are many expressions of this, but none seems more delightfully to capture the spirit in which the American philosophy was coming to terms with an un-bifurcated universe than Emerson's. It is contained in his magnificent essay called *Nature*, and was published in 1836, only a year after his second marriage had taken place (his first wife, Ellen Tucker, died in 1831 after only two years of marriage). Ends, in the American experience, are endings, and endings are but beginnings of new ventures. Writes Emerson:<sup>19</sup>

The exercise of the Will, or the lesson of power, is taught in every event. From the child's successive possession of his several senses up to the hour when he saith, 'Thy will be done!' he is learning the secret that he can reduce under his will not only particular events but great classes, nay, the whole series of events, and so conform all facts to his character. Nature is thoroughly mediate. It is made to serve. It receives the dominion of man as meekly as the ass on which the Saviour rode. It offers all its kingdoms to man as the raw material which he may mold into what is useful. Man is never wearied of working it up... Sensible objects conform to the premonitions of Reason and reflect the conscience. All things are moral; and in their boundless changes have an unceasing reference to spiritual nature. Therefore is nature glorious with form, color, motion; that every globe in the remotest heaven, every chemical change from the rudest crystal up to the laws of life, every change of vegetation from the first principle of growth in the eye of a leaf, to the tropical forest and the ante-diluvian coal mine, every animal function from the sponge up to Hercules, shall hint or thunder to man the laws of right and wrong, and echo the Ten Commandments. Therefore is Nature ever the ally of Religion; lends all her pomp and riches to the religious sentiment.

Prophet and priest, David, Isaiah, Jesus, have drawn deeply from this source. This ethical character so penetrates the bone and marrow of nature, as to seem the end for which it was made, whatever private purpose is answered by any member or part, this is its public and universal function, and is never omitted. Nothing in nature is exhausted in its first use. When a thing has served its end to the uttermost, it is wholly new for an ulterior service. In God every end is converted into a new means.

No more robust Christian naturalism can be found outside the Catholic humanists of the Renaissance; the Augustinian view of nature was emerging once more in, of all places, Boston! There is no Puritanical fear of the flesh here; no premonition of the coming struggle of Platonic Christianity with Darwin's evolutionary ideas of man's progress up from the apes. No dark skepticism of the senses; no shining faith in *pure* reason either. Emerson had expanded the notion of experience so that imagination and religious vision go hand in hand with natural science; they are but dimensions of the same integral, dynamic and growing experience. Identifying this with the Christian experience at large he lashed out at the narrowness of the institutionalized experiences of the established Churches; his own burning religious experience could brook no authoritarian rigidity, no petty-fogging bounds on the integrity of his own spiritual joy. The radical continuity of experience across the vast dimensions of nature held for him no bifurcations of mind and matter, reason and sense, value and fact; all were unified in the cooperative processes of historical transformation and the reconstruction of civilization. Such was Emerson's vision of the City of God; such were the sources of John Dewey's reconstruction in philosophy of empirical metaphysics.

#### THE SHAPE OF DEWEY'S METAPHYSICS

DEWEY CONCEIVES of metaphysics as the analysis of the generic traits of all existences encountered in the processes of experience. Experience itself, the encounter with beings, is active engagement in which *interactions* and *transactions* take place.<sup>20</sup> Dewey, with Emerson, rejects the classic dualism of being and change because he holds the experience of being *to be* the effecting of changes.<sup>21</sup> In rethinking the object of metaphysics he is forced to the position that being as we experience it is never "being itself," "being in itself" or "being *qua* being": what is actually encountered is contingent being, being which is capable of change and remaking. But were change, precariousness and instability the sole generic traits of existences there would be no real experience. For experience depends upon *cumulative* change; to have an experience is to be involved in a series of cumulative changes marked by a beginning and an ending. For this an element of stability is required which is as generic a condition of existence as precariousness and change. In discussing the requirements of esthetic experience Dewey makes use of both of these categories, i.e., precariousness and stability, in such a way that we may be sure that they are the conditions of all meaningful experience:<sup>22</sup>

There are two sorts of possible worlds in which esthetic experience would not occur. In a world of mere flux, change would not be cumulative; it would not move toward a close. Equally it is true, however, that a world that is finished, ended, would have no traits of suspense and crisis, and would offer no opportunity for resolution....

I shall interrupt the reader here only to remind him to bear in mind the view of nature which Augustine derived from



his Christian experience; now, back to Dewey.

Where everything is already complete, there is no fulfillment. We envisage with pleasure Nirvana and a uniform heavenly bliss only because they are projected upon the background of our present world of stress and conflict. Because the actual world in which we live, is a combination of movement and culmination, of breaks and reunions, the experience of a living creature is capable of esthetic quality. The live being recurrently loses and re-establishes equilibrium with his surroundings. The moment of passage from disturbance to harmony is that of the intensest life. In a finished world, sleep and waking could not be distinguished. In one wholly perturbed, conditions could not even be struggled with. In a world made after the pattern of ours, moments of fulfillment punctuate experience with rhythmically enjoyed intervals.

Dewey is not, of course, discussing the rhythmic renewal of the Divine Liturgy; he is stating the generic conditions which make esthetic, and, as we shall see, cognitive and moral experience possible. Yet there is something liturgical in this metaphysics which stresses "breaks and reunions," the "passage from disturbance to harmony" and "moments of fulfillment."

Dewey had already formulated the main outlines of his metaphysics of experience before the turn of the century, but it was not until the publication of his *Essays in Experimental Logic* in 1916 that his conception of integral relationship of the object of his metaphysics and the methods of experimental inquiry were made clear. In that work he distinguished between the casual encounter with beings, which is called "immediate experience" or "having experience," and the cognitive encounter, which results in that activity called "knowing" and is "critical experi-

ence." The latter differs from the former chiefly in its educative character; something is learned, problems are solved. Merely to "have" an experience is not necessarily to learn anything; changes may and do occur in casual experience, but goals are not reached, change is not cumulative. In order for experience to become "pedagogical," it is essential that ends and means come together in active and productive relation. In such a relation the changes in experience become meaningful and invested with value; problems are solved, fulfillments are reached. This process of reconstructing involves the "subject" and the "object" of experience in a mutual transaction; the "passive" observer is a myth, the "correspondence" theory of truth an illusion. Only on the presuppositions of rationalism and the "correspondence" theory does it seem shocking that inquiry should make changes in both the observer and the observed; only then is it necessary that the object of inquiry remain fixed while the mind somehow conforms to it.

#### METAPHYSICS AND MORALS

PERHAPS DEWEY's preference for looking at inquiry as the remaking of reality derives from his habit of regarding investigation, experiment, thinking itself, as work to be done. When work is done, whether by artist or artisan, changes are made in both worker and that worked on. Blocks of marble are re-created into statues, trees into lumber, soil and seed into crops and eggs into omelettes. If the work is done intelligently the results are satisfying, problems are solved, experience is enriched; sculptors become skilled in the techniques of modeling, lumbermen learn forest and soil conservation, farmers are made into scientific agronomists and cooks into master chefs. Industry

and intelligence combine in the achievement of creative purposes; ends are reached only to be superseded by other and more universal ones. Goals, when realized, become the means of attaining wider and more inclusive purposes. Dewey, in the tradition of the metaphysics of Aristotle and Augustine, holds values to be the functions of a dynamic reality which is continually being remade on a more secure and satisfying basis. Human goods are grounded in a natural context, but nature is not always kind and generous; support is withdrawn at crucial moments, values collapse. Intelligent inquiry begins at these moments in order to secure values, to instate them in a more stable context through cognitive control and reconstruction of the situations in which they occur and are discovered to be desirable. Thus Dewey connects the Adamic fall with intelligent reconstruction; both are phases of the same integral human experience:<sup>23</sup>

Possession and enjoyment of goods passes insensibly and inevitably into appraisal. First an immature experience is content simply to enjoy. But a brief course in experience enforces reflection; it requires but a brief time to teach that some things sweet in the having are bitter in the after-taste and in what they lead to. Primitive innocence does not last.

Immediate enjoyments, likings, desires and all such *casual* experiences may or may not become values in the moral sense depending upon whether they stand up under continued examination and become grounded in *cognitive* reconstructions. To say that something is of moral worth, it is not always necessary that it be immediately desired or enjoyed; not all goods have immediate appeal, not every pill has a sugar coating. It may nevertheless be a genuine good if it is cognitively anticipated as *to be* desired when it is rooted in cu-

mulative experience and has been approved by reflective judgment.<sup>24</sup>

It is on the basis of this metaphysics of experience that Dewey formulates an ethics which carries far beyond the immediacy of the "present moment" and avoids the reduction of morals to the relativistic confusion of "mere" expediency. His doctrine of objective relativism is grounded in much the same way as Aristotle's famous doctrine of the mean and reveals the same good sense as we find in the Stagyrite's observation that "...each man judges well the things that he knows, and of these he is a good judge."<sup>25</sup> As the *Nichomachean Ethics* steered a patient middle course between the subjectivism of the hedonists and Sophists and the rationalistic rigidity of the Neoplatonists and Stoics, so Dewey's ethics establishes a *via media* between the modern subjectivists who have descended from Hume and the rationalists of Cartesian and Kantian persuasion. Dewey finds agreement with Kant only in regarding the doctrine of *a priori* values of rationalism as "dogmatic" and "remote" from the problems of men; where Kant, however, found it possible to treat humanity as an "end-in-itself," Dewey rejects even this concept as transcendently ambiguous, the survival of a rationalistic metaphysic of morals. If nature and essences are in process, if they change and are changed, the laws of nature and the values of essences must also change; there are no immutable laws in nature, no absolute values in the order of time and history.<sup>26</sup> Accordingly, the criterion of intelligibility and value cannot be the immutability or changelessness of Being and Reason; it must be the cumulative experience of time and change. It is the traditional preoccupation of philosophers with certainty, Dewey argues, which leads them to

ignore the reality of change and the unreality of *absolute* permanence. The human desire for security is translated by the philosophers into a quest for the Absolute, which cannot be satisfied in this world; men are led to a Utopian neglect of the possibilities which actually exist for making their *real* world more secure.

The stable and the precarious are not to be understood by separating them into "higher" and "lower" realms of being and becoming. They must be grasped in their natural unity:<sup>27</sup>

The union of the hazardous and the stable, of the incomplete and the recurrent, is the condition of all experienced satisfaction as truly as of our predicaments and problems... While the precarious nature of existence is indeed the source of all trouble, it is also the indispensable condition of ideality, becoming a sufficient condition when conjoined with the regular and assured.

Values, ideals, ends, and fulfillments are all events in nature; all events in nature are somewhere between complete stability and complete precariousness. This condition of all goods, as Dewey conceives it, seems almost exactly the condition experienced by St. Augustine, who reports in his *Confessions*:<sup>28</sup>

And it became clear to me that corruptible things are good: if they were supremely good they could not be corrupted, but also if they were not good at all they could not be corrupted: if they were supremely good they would be incorruptible, if they were in no way good there would be nothing in them that might be corrupted. For corruption damages; and unless it diminished goodness, it would not damage.

#### METAPHYSICS, MORALS AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD

**P**ERHAPS THE MOST daring contribution of Dewey's rethinking of the relationship between metaphysics and mor-

als stems from his conception of metaphysics as an empirical and corrigible science which should employ a genuinely experimental method. Many critics, despite their sympathy with the use of experimental methods in science, have felt that science and morals are two quite unconnected subject-matters. They have rejected the application of experimental technique to morals because they have feared the reduction of ethics to random and haphazard trial and error. In Dewey's case, however, the danger of haphazard, subjectivistic morality is avoided; the same experimental approach which is applicable to the problems of natural science is brought to bear in both ethics and metaphysics. Experience shows the continuity of facts and values; they are not assigned to different ontological realms. Dewey's sharp distinction between immediate and casual experience on the one hand, and cognitive experience on the other, is less an ontological dualism than a description of two temporally connected phases of experience. Unless casual experience gives way to controlled reconstructions it is of little moral significance; the content of such experience either serves in the process of intelligent moral regeneration or it is irrelevant. Casual experience does, in those cases where problems are solved and fulfillments are achieved, evolve through controlled and directed action into knowledge. This process of directed evolution, is called "intelligence" and is equated by Dewey with the methods of experiment which have proven themselves so powerful in the history of science.

In this manner Dewey has worked out the lines along which metaphysics, ethics and natural science may be restored to meaningful relationship with each other. Since all deal ultimately with the same open and unfinished universe,

since all deal with existences of which both precariousness and stability are generic traits, the same method of inquiry is applicable. Each is a *stage* of inquiry, ultimately of the *same* inquiry, rather than an isolated and discrete discipline. Metaphysics passes almost insensibly into natural science, natural science into ethics, politics and religion; there are no radical discontinuities of subject-matter which would require sharply different methods as the inquirer moves from problem to problem. Because of the continuity between all the subject-matters which may turn up in experience, the same general method is used throughout. This fact has been deplored by some critics who find it to be merely a "streamlined" form of rationalism,<sup>29</sup> and who find Dewey's descriptions of scientific method to be vague and inauthentic. His insistence upon calling the method of inquiry which he employs throughout "scientific" has only compounded the criticism with which it has been met. Philosophers of science object to the looseness of the method, its imprecision and lack of mathematical rigor. Logicians protest that logic is not an experimental method at all since it begins and ends with formal analytic procedures. But these criticisms and objections all imply the possibility of either a logic-free ontology, or an ontology-free logic; Dewey's ontology, or, to use the more traditional term that he preferred, metaphysics, and his logic are inseparable. The absence of concern with the problems of formal logic and pure mathematics which has been commonly noted as a fault in Dewey, however, should not be taken to mean that he denied their possible fruitfulness. He simply was insistent upon relating to the problems of men; his vision of natural science in the service of moral reconstruction of his-

tory and civilization was one with Emerson's.

#### DEWEY'S EMPIRICISM, THE CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED CHRISTIANITY

IT SHOULD be apparent from what has been said above that Dewey's analysis of experience bears more than an accidental resemblance to the Christian view of the historical dimensions of human experience. The natural context of that experience contains within it precisely that element of contingency and precariousness recognized in Dewey's metaphysics; and with it the element of the regular and assured which makes both history and science meaningful. That Dewey was aware of this congruence may be doubted by some; did he not lash out against "supernaturalism" and "authoritarian" religions? Yet it was Dewey himself who introduced the chapter on "Charity" in his *Ethics* with the proclamation of St. Paul: "I will show you a still more excellent way." It was Dewey who advocated a return from religious rationalism to a deepened sense of the "religious quality" which it is possible to attain in *all* experience; "Such a piety," he argued, "is an inherent constituent of a just perspective in life."<sup>30</sup> In his early psychological writings, he followed William James in viewing religious "feeling" and "faith" as very closely joined; in *A Common Faith* he wrote of faith as practical and moral inspiration rather than as assent to the doctrines of an authoritarian institution.<sup>31</sup>

All endeavor for the better is moved by faith and what is possible, not by inference to the actual. Nor does this faith depend for its moving power upon intellectual assurance or belief that the things worked for must surely prevail and come into embodied existence.

Again, it was Dewey who said:<sup>32</sup>

It is the intuition of God as perfectly realized intelligence that forms the cognitive side of religious consciousness.

And it was Dewey who had the theological sense to say:<sup>33</sup>

We are in the presence neither of ideals completely embodied in existence nor yet of ideals that are mere rootless ideals, fantasies, utopias. For there are forces in nature and society that generate and support the ideals. They are further unified by the action that gives them coherence and solidity. It is this *active* relation between ideal and actual to which I give the name 'God.' I would not insist that the name must be given.

With such a profound sense of the Real Presence the name is, indeed, of little ultimate importance.

Experimentalism, as a method of inquiry, is restricted to the contingent world of nature and is conditioned by the mutability of the mind. For Dewey, this means that the ideals which nature can support, the highest values that man can actually embrace, are at best conditional and limited. Assertion that values are more than that is to estrange them from reality and experience in such a way as to make them arbitrary and capricious. That Dewey regards the doctrine of transcendent "absolutes" as a removal of values from existential relation to the actual problems of men accounts for his mistrust of all instituted and institutional finalities and his polemic against "super-naturalism."<sup>34</sup> But hasty criticism of Dewey for his failure to see that the God of the Christian experience is not only transcendent, but also immanent and active in the practical functions of loving judgment should not be indulged at the expense of a failure to appreciate the clear light which Dewey's philosophy sheds upon that experience.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> I shall take space to cite only three examples: George R. Geiger, *John Dewey in Perspective*, Oxford University Press, N.Y., 1959, "John Dewey in Perspective," a special issue of the *Antioch Review*, Fall, 1959 (Vol. XIX, No. 3). The John Dewey Centennial Program, held at Columbia University, October 20, 1959.

<sup>2</sup> John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, Open Court, Chicago, 1925 (and 1951), p. 54-5.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. the view of White that Dewey is close to the "ethical emotivists" in: M. G. White, "Value and Obligation in Dewey and Lewis," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. LVIII, 1949, pp. 321-9. White repeats his theory in *Social Thought in America*, Viking, N.Y., 1949.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. John Herman Randall, Jr., *Nature and Historical Experience*, Columbia Univ. Press, 1958.

<sup>5</sup> Randall, *The Role of Knowledge in Western Religion*, Beacon, Boston, 1958.

<sup>6</sup> *De Ord.*, I, 3; *De Civ. Dei*, XV, 5.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, XV, 4, seq.

<sup>8</sup> *De Vera Rel.*, 21.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 36.

<sup>10</sup> *De Trin.*, 15, 12, 21.

<sup>11</sup> *De Mag.*, 11, 38 & 12, 40.

<sup>12</sup> *Conf.*, 11, 14-30.

<sup>13</sup> Norbert Weiner, *The Human Use of Human Beings*, Doubleday Anchor, N.Y., 1956, p. 11.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 190.

<sup>15</sup> This point is well made by Michael Foster of Oxford: *vide*, *Mind*, Vol. XLV, 1936, p. 24.

<sup>16</sup> Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, Barnes & Noble, N.Y., 1949, p. 18 seq.

<sup>17</sup> Maurice De Wulf, *Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages*, p. 215.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. also Gilson's discussion of "essence" in St. Thomas Aquinas. Gilson regards the notion of fixed essences as the necessary presupposition of "scientific knowledge, properly so-called." The rationalistic temper is also evident in Gilson's remark that "... all essence, taken in itself, is indifferent to all considerations of time." Whether St. Thomas was as much of a rationalist as his followers have made him out to be is, of course, another question, *Vide*, Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, Random House, N.Y., 1955, pp. 374 & 378-9.

<sup>19</sup> Reprinted in Muelder and Sears, *The Development of American Philosophy*, Houghton Mifflin, N.Y., pp. 142-3.

<sup>20</sup> *Experience and Nature*, Preface to 2nd ed. p. iii & pp. 3a & 4a.



21 John Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Putnam Capricorn, N.Y., 1958, pp. 16-17.

22 *Ibid*, loc. cit.

23 *Experience and Nature*, p. 398.

24 Cf. *Quest for Certainty*, Minton, Balch & Co., N.Y., p. 263. Also, *Theory of Valuation*, Chicago U., Chicago, 1939, p. 51ff.

25 *Nichomachean Ethics*, Bk. I, 1094a.

26 *Experience and Nature*, p. 54ff. Cf. also *Quest for Certainty*, *passim*.

27 *Experience and Nature*, p. 54. Cf. also p. 413.

28 *Confessions*, 7, 12.

29 G. R. Geiger, "Dewey's Social and Political Philosophy," *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, ed. P. A. Schilpp, Tudor, N.Y., 1939 & 1951,

p. 366 seq. *Vide* Dewey's reply to his critics at the close of this volume.

30 John Dewey, *A Common Faith*, Yale, New Haven, p. 25.

31 *Ibid*, p. 23.

32 John Dewey, *Psychology*, N.Y., 1887, p. 244. In this very early work Dewey clearly anticipates the view which he later comes to hold in *Common Faith*. He says, "The true self-related must be the organic unity of the self and the world, of the ideal and the real, and this is what we know as God." (p. 244.)

33 *Experience and Nature*, p. 50.

34 Cf. John Dewey, "Antinaturalism in Extremis," *Naturalism and the Human Spirit*, ed. Y. H. Krikorian, Columbia U., N.Y., 1944, p. 1 seq.

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# BLESSED ARE THE POOR

JEAN DANIÉLOU

**P**OVERTY IS, with charity and truth, one of the essential traits of the evangelical spirit. And the evangelical spirit is the map of Christian existence. Not to be faithful to it is to betray the Gospel in its essence.

Today, many Christians have the uneasy sense of massive infidelity to the Gospel on the score of poverty. It exists among the middle class, many of whom question themselves concerning the compatibility of the Gospel with wealth: they ask what sacrifices are expected of them. But it exists among the working class as well; militants worry over the legitimacy for them of access to a higher level of life on which they fear they will be cut off from their less privileged comrades.<sup>1</sup>

But when it is a question of stating precisely what this demand of evangelical poverty involves, we find ourselves in the midst of uncertainty. Does it consist in lowering one's standard of living,

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*The affluent society in which we are fortunate enough to live challenges directly the Christian ideal of poverty. But, if we misunderstand the ideal, we will inescapably misunderstand the challenge. Father Daniélou does not, of course, offer a handy guide to spiritual success under the circumstances. He does, however, bring us back to the biblical essence, the anaw, the poor man of God. With this as our starting point, we can evaluate the possibilities offered by our society to each individual for realization of what is both an ideal and a vocation. The article first appeared in ÉTUDES (March 1956). Father Daniélou's most recent book in English is THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS AND PRIMITIVE CHRISTIANITY (Helicon).*

eliminating all that is superfluous? Does it call for detachment in regard to all possessions and common ownership of goods? Does it, more radically, demand a break with the middle-class world and participation in the workers' fight? Or, quite the reverse, is it a question of a purely interior attitude, which can be accommodated to luxury and comfort? All these solutions have been proposed, and have been tried by restricted groups. But they still leave everyone uneasy.

And so we find ourselves in a paradoxical situation: poverty is a substantial part of the Gospel, but the point at which we should apply it is difficult to determine. It is therefore needful to try to throw a little light on a question that is simultaneously obscure and vital. That is what I hope to do here.

The question is primarily one of disclosing the ambiguities of the term *poverty*: it has different meanings in the Gospel itself; and the exaltation of poverty as one aspect of the royal dignity of the Christian must not be confused with the obligation to charity which directs the Christian to the poor in order that he may rescue them from their poverty. We can ask ourselves what is essential to poverty according to the Gospel. And this will allow us to decide how to resolve some practical problems.

**W**HEN WE ASK what Christ meant by numbering the poor among the blessed, two extremes leap to mind. The first underlines the fact that it is a question of the "poor in spirit." One would then say that evangelical poverty is before all else an interior attitude of detachment in regard to material goods, but that this is perfectly compatible with possession of those goods.

This solution, which doubtless contains a great deal of truth, seems nevertheless a bit convenient. It can furnish facile, Pharisaic excuses. And it is difficult to have a good conscience while calmly using the goods of this world at the same time that others are in misery. We would come close, there, to the abuses of what has been called the ethic of intention.

Moreover the Gospel itself makes difficult the purely interior interpretation. In fact, it seems that, in the version of St. Luke, at least, the problem of wealth as such was envisaged. To the blessing given the poor corresponds in effect the woe put upon the rich. Thus it has seemed to me from the outset that it is impossible to hold a simplistic solution. A poverty that did not involve effective renunciation would be a mystification. But it would be equally false to raise up privation of material goods as an absolute and supreme value. This deviation is also quite common today in certain circles. That is why I shall put special emphasis on it.

Let us recall the distinction that Péguy made between destitution (*misère*) and poverty. An initial error in interpretation would be to identify "the poor" of the beatitude with the destitute. It is necessary to understand here by "poor" or "destitute" those who do not have the minimum necessary for realizing a truly human life. Certainly, these poor have a major place in the Christian perspective. It is of the essence of Christianity to go toward him who is abandoned or lost. This continues the gesture of Christ himself, who did not keep his equality with God like an ace in the hole, but took the form of a slave. In a sense the Christian ought to be with the poor, with all the disinherited of this world. But he is with them in order to lift them from their misery. This does not imply any special

value in destitution, nor indeed any complicity with it. Mounier put it well: "The Christian tradition is no more one of pauperism than it is one of dolorism."<sup>2</sup>

It is possible in the sense Mouroux gives the term to have a completely ambiguous exaltation of degradation; this is at odds with the Christian attitude. Christ has a horror of misery, as he has a horror of sickness and death. Nothing could be falser to his character than to attribute to him complicity with the forces of destruction. He does not descend into misery only to pull mankind in after him. He does not love destitution but the man who is destitute. Any exaltation of misery which is a revulsion against values similar to that of which Nietzsche accused Christianity is a pure perversion of the Gospel.

But the exaltation of "pauperism" has a more modern form. A controversy at a recent congress of the *Confédération Générale du Travail* permitted French economists to refute the thesis, which the Communist Party holds, of the absolute pauperization of the laboring class under the capitalist system. Increased production, together with social legislation, tends to raise the general level of life. May this not reduce the militancy of the laboring class? Given the existence of an exploited and miserable proletariat is not revolution a necessary resort? Does not the reduction of pauperism risk reinforcing the capitalist system? We have heard certain Christians utter these doubts. But there is no need to say that, if they would resolve these doubts by employing this otherwise inadmissible political tactic, they do not share the outlook of the Gospel spirit. Evangelical poverty is not the revolutionary means of class war.<sup>3</sup>

This leads us to a second and equally sociological conception of the poor of the Gospel: it identifies the poor not

with those who do not have the necessities, but with those who have only the necessities. Here, it is no longer a question of the destitute, of the proletariat, but of the people, the mass of rural and urban semi-skilled and skilled workers. It is noted that Christ was a worker, and this brings forth certain shades of meaning. In the interpretation of the working classes, we recall the statement: "I have come to preach the Gospel to the poor." It is suggested that there is a kind of affinity between the Church and the people and, in contrast, an incompatibility between Christ and the middle class.

There is no denying that confusions of this type have existed throughout the history of Christianity. It is therefore useful to recall that it is false to restrict Christianity to one social class, whatever that class may be. Christianity is not a prerogative of the middle class, but it is not a prerogative of the working class either. There is no need to be a worker in order to be a Christian. Belonging to the middle class is not an original sin. If there are among the working class natural virtues of generosity, solidarity, and simplicity which dispose it to the Gospel, these are not yet Evangelical virtues. It is dangerous to identify the Gospel with the working class. In addition, there exist among the middle class other virtues which, though not those of the Gospel, are also a preparation for the Gospel.

This position, no longer "pauperism" but "workerism," tends to put the question of evangelical poverty in false perspective. It identifies evangelical poverty with a certain way of life. And then, because there is danger of becoming bourgeois, we experience disquiet over improvement in living standards. This fear appears in the statement of the militant Christian worker whom I have cited in *Masses ouvrières*: "The great

question posed to militants is that of poverty. They seek a more human life, for more material comfort in their homes. And this is normal under modern conditions. But there is disquiet, nevertheless."<sup>4</sup> Mounier has quite rightly denounced the confusion that is at the bottom of this disquiet. Evangelical poverty does not consist in what he calls "the little life."<sup>5</sup> Quite the contrary, it is a question of raising the general level of life. It is an error to identify poverty with the middle level of the worker's life. A militant notes: "Poverty is not a gimmick for remaining in the labor movement; no more is it an end in itself."<sup>6</sup> St. Thomas' formula is the same: "*Non enim paupertas secundum se bona est.*"<sup>7</sup>

The workerist conception locates poverty on the level of the standard of living. The "collectivist" locates poverty on the level of private property. The first is on the plane of use, the second on the plane of possession. The two are not necessarily joined. Indeed they can be dissociated. A man can possess great wealth and live frugally, whether through avarice or through ideals. The latter case provides admirable examples of men who possess many goods yet live in poverty, disposing of what they have to others. And reciprocally, within a system where there is no property, whether it is a question of a religious community or a collectivist society, the use of goods can be more or less developed.

The confusion here would be the identification of evangelical poverty with the common sharing of goods. We might recall the passages in the *Acts of the Apostles* where it said that the first Christians held all in common. Among them, being a property owner was considered incompatible with the spirit of the Gospel. We might then be led to deem intrinsically evil all systems based

on private property, and we might be scandalized to see that the Church has not radically condemned them. We might deem this infidelity to the Gospel. Reciprocally, we might feel that there is a natural affinity between Christianity and communism. And we might be astonished that the Church has condemned that system, not only in its metaphysical presuppositions, but indeed by reason of its rejection of the right of private property.

Here again it is clear that the question is complex. It is perfectly true that the common sharing of goods was practiced in the primitive community and is always practiced in the religious communities, in which common sharing is made the object of the vow of poverty. There is, then, a relation between community of goods and evangelical poverty. The error would lie in wishing to make an end that which is only a means and to see in community of goods the essence of evangelical poverty, with the result that where community of goods did not exist evangelical poverty could not be found.

The example of the first Christian community is not at all convincing as it is used in this argument. In fact, far from being a specifically Christian phenomenon, the common sharing of goods seems to be one of the features that were quite certainly received from outside. The Dead Sea Scrolls have shown us that in fact the system was current in fervent Jewish circles of the epoch. And it is found in many other religions. It appears in Christianity as a means of perfection that helps in the practice of, but does not constitute, evangelical poverty.

If we look at the common sharing of goods on the sociological level, this is even more evident. Purely and simply to identify collectivism and Christianity, and to oppose them to proper-

ty ownership, is gross confusion. In reality, in this sphere, community and property ownership are two equally necessary poles of the economic life; each ought to safeguard the other. The Constitution of '89 was right in making the right of property one of the rights of the human person and in defending it as a legitimate freedom; its only error lay in putting forth an incomplete and partially false notion. And socialism was right to recall that the community has a certain right over the mass of goods produced and cannot permit concentration in the hands of a few what is destined for all. Moreover, the Church has always stressed this double aspect. But this does not in any way resolve the problem of evangelical poverty.

I HAVE TRIED so far to disengage evangelical poverty from a certain number of confusions which obscure its real meaning. We have seen that it is impossible to identify evangelical poverty with any one form of actual poverty, and that at the same time evangelical poverty is not a pure, interior disposition that implies no effective realization. We must now get to the heart of the question and in a positive way ask ourselves in what evangelical poverty consists. The error lay in wishing to explain evangelical poverty with human perspective as our starting point. If we want to understand it, we must return to Scripture and ask ourselves what the word *poor* means there. As is the case with other notions—justice, for example—the sense in the Bible differs from current usage. If we are not acquainted with the true meanings of the terms, it is hardly surprising that Christians make mistakes in applying them.

Here, as in most instances, if we want to understand the New Testament, we must take as our starting point the Old, especially in the Psalms, where the poor,



the *anawim*, are often mentioned. The description given us is initially shocking.

In the first place, the poor man appears as oppressed. He is the object of persecutions by the powerful. He is at once pursued by their calumnies, despoiled of his goods, caught in a web of misfortune. Material poverty is only one aspect of his trials. And it is by no means considered a value. The poor man, on the contrary, hopes for deliverance. But he waits on God alone. He is sure throughout that one day he will see Him.

These texts have been interpreted many times as the expression of the social conflicts that divided the people of Israel. The prophets and the psalmists expressed the protest of the little people against the exactions of the powerful, the rich property owners, and the high-level functionaries. And certainly at least part of the text that concerns the poor alludes to sociological facts: "Victims of social injustices, of provocations by the insolent rich, of mistreatment by unjust judges, the psalmists recount their oppression."<sup>8</sup> But nothing would be falsier than to see in the prophets and psalmists champions of class warfare looking for a way to free the proletariat from exploitation by the rich. André Neher has admirably shown that this would have been foreign to their outlook.<sup>9</sup>

Besides, oppression is only a secondary characteristic. In the Bible, the poor are before anything else "the pious," "the just." They are the men faithful to the Law of God. This gives the term *poverty* a fundamental meaning. Poverty is defined essentially in its relation to God and not primarily in relation to material goods or to other men. And this is enough to mark the specific character of biblical poverty. It belongs to a world of thought in which the relation

with God is primary, and commands all the rest. The poor man is one who observes God's law, who suffers from not seeing God's law observed in the world. Hunger and thirst for justice consume him; that is, in the Biblical sense, hunger and thirst for the accomplishment of the will of God.

As a result, the poor man is inevitably put in conflict with the powers of this world. These are not those who possess material goods or hold high station. Rather they represent the men who, instead of obeying God's law even at cost to their own interests, serve only their own interests even at the expense of God's law. Conflict between these two cities is inevitable. For "the rich," "the poor" are a living reproach. Their efforts to bring about the reign of God's law oblige them to war against the selfish interests of others. And from then on they are necessarily wedded to their sarcasm, their service, their persecution. Poverty introduces us, at the very heart of the Bible, to what constitutes its structure: the interior of the conflict between two cities.

We see how far this carries biblical poverty. On the one hand it is not defined by any sociological context whatsoever, but by a relation to God. The poor man is one who puts the will of God above all because he understands that God is preferable to all. We are within the religious perspective that permeates the Bible. But at the same time this fidelity to God will inevitably carry with it certain material consequences. Anyone who takes God seriously will necessarily be led to compromise his reputation, to sacrifice his interests, to lose his tranquility. It is not a question of putting together a little poverty, which will satisfy the conscience at slight cost and provide a shelter under which one can live without difficulty. Evangelical poverty accepts the immense risks

that fidelity to the law of God will always bring. There is no need to look for them. They will come of their own accord—and sooner than we might wish. He who takes God seriously may be sure that he will be a poor man.

This conception of poverty, which is that of the Old Testament, is also that of the New. In his recent book devoted to the beatitudes, Dom Jacques Dupont remarks at the outset that their nucleus seems to be made up of the first and last blessings of Christ, those that bear on poverty and on persecution.<sup>10</sup> This happens to confirm in a remarkable way what we noted in the Old Testament. The poor man will necessarily be a persecuted man. And reciprocally it will be disquieting for a Christian to receive too warm a welcome from the world. He may well ask himself whether he owes this excessive benevolence to secret compromises.

In addition, Dom Dupont also remarks, these two beatitudes give us the key to all the others. In reality, they all describe the same attitude. Whether it be a question of "justice," of "kingdom," of "earth," in every case it involves thirst for the accomplishment of God's will. And this is not only on the individual plane, but on the collective as well. It is so primarily on the spiritual plane of the realization of God's design, which is the growth of the Mystical Body; but it is also so on the temporal plane, where fidelity to God demands that the law which rules human societies be made to respect Him. Thus the poor man will be led to wage war on social injustice not by solidarity with a class but by obedience to God.

This attitude, the New Testament repeats after the Old, necessarily leads the poor man to compromise his interests. Said Christ: "You must serve God or money. You cannot serve both" (*Luke 16:13*). From the point of view

of the world, the serious follower of Christ will surely lose himself. We cannot simultaneously look for personal success and for success for the work of God: "The man who tries to save his life shall lose it; it is the man who loses his life for my sake that will secure it" (*Mt. 17:25*). The man who follows Christ is necessarily lost—his reputation, lost; his peace and quiet, lost; his fortune, lost.<sup>11</sup> For the servant cannot be greater than the Master. He, the leader, wished to lose all. He is the Poor Man. Whoever follows him will necessarily be a poor man.

We see the changed perspective that the *données* of Scripture introduce to the consideration of poverty. They substitute for all particular ends the single rule of God's will. For we can, in fact, become attached to poverty if we make it an end. Pascal said that truth can be made an idol. So, too, can poverty be made an idol. It, too, can become a piece of property. That is precisely what we find in the diverse errors I mentioned earlier. They identify poverty with a certain standard of life, with a certain sociological milieu, with a certain method of distributing goods.

Instead, evangelical poverty is free, even in regard to poverty. It consists in being free in regard to everything save the will of God. Privation will be good, when it is willed with God; so will prosperity, when it is willed with God. We attach too much importance to earthly goods when we become attached to their privation. Christ formulated the evangelical law, when he said: "Do not fret over your life, how to support it with food, over your body, how to keep it clothed" (*Luke 12:22*). Non-use is not more perfect than use. Rather, use is good, if it is willed with God; so is non-use, if it is willed with God.

Such was the conduct of Christ during the greater part of his life. He was

not an ascetic; like John the Baptist. He himself said to the Jews: "When John came, he would neither eat nor drink, and they say of him that he is possessed. When the Son of Man came, he ate and drank with them, and of him they say, Here is a glutton; he loves wine" (*Mt.* 19:19). Christ led the ordinary life. He formulated no dietary prohibitions. He did not attract notice through any ascetic oddness. He saw in the goods of the earth the gifts of his Father. And he made use of them with thanksgiving. But he also knew well that these things pass, when it is the will of his Father. He thirsted at the well of the Samaritan woman. He had not a rock on which to rest his head.

That is evangelical poverty. It does not consist in attachment to deprivation as such, but in readiness to accept deprivation, if God asks it. St. Paul expressed it in a lapidary phrase: "I am capable of living in plenty and I am capable of living in want." That is, what matters is neither want nor abundance, but the service of the kingdom of God and His justice, "now honored, now slighted, now traduced, now flattered. They call us deceivers, and we tell the truth; unknown, and we are fully acknowledged; dying men, and see, we live; punished, yes, but not doomed to die; sad men, that rejoice continually; beggars, that bring riches to many; disinherited, and the world is ours" (*2 Cor.* 6:7-10).

Thus evangelical poverty appears as the disposition of a heart occupied solely with the interests of the kingdom of God and free in regard to earthly goods. It is the expression of the dignity of the Son of God. When we are called to share in the Banquet with the Son, it is lacking in dignity to linger over the crumbs that fall from the table; they are for the lap dogs. This is so not because the crumbs are nothing, but because they are not what matters: "Look

for your glory where it is," says St. John of the Cross. "Do not linger over the crumbs that fall from the table of your Father. Then you will find what your heart ambitions." We sin against evangelical poverty when attachment to our leisure, our reputation, our interests, prevents us from accomplishing the will of God. The sin against poverty is preoccupation: "Nothing must make you anxious," says St. Paul (*Phil.* 4:6). And Tauler shows us Christ, "living without any preoccupations, but receiving at each moment all things from the hands of his Father."

I have tried to isolate the essence of evangelical poverty according to what makes up its originality. We have seen that it refers essentially to God, as do all the other Christian dispositions of soul—charity, obedience, humility. It is in working for the primacy of God and His Kingdom that evangelical poverty appears to be a way of choosing and behaving in regard to earthly goods. The primacy of God implies radical liberty in regard to all created things, not that they should be depreciated or rejected, but that their use should always be subordinated to the demands of the divine will. And in fact these demands always imply effective sacrifices. They will make the Christian, as I have said, a man who is lost: lost to himself, lost to the world; freed from the world, freed from himself. That is, a man who is saved.

But this radical disposition must still be realized in concrete fashion. We have seen that evangelical poverty can be identified neither with destitution and the lack of necessities, nor with poverty and the simple life, nor with collectivism and the common sharing of goods. Nevertheless, it remains true that these different realizations of poverty in fact are far from valueless in the eyes of evangelical poverty. If it is not identified

with them, it can be brought to make use of them as means. And that is what is left for us to see.

We have said that evangelical poverty consists in being free in regard to earthly goods, capable of using or of not using them. But, concretely, men are not free in regard to these things; they are naturally attached to them. There is, then, a risk that on the day God's will demands a sacrifice, we will not be ready to make it. This liberty—we must take it by storm. To conquer it, it will be necessary to go against man's natural inclination to be attached to his comfort, his reputation, his enjoyments, his money, his ambition. Effective privation of these things will become a necessary ascetic discipline. We have said that this is not a value in itself, nor should it be sought for its own sake. Such a seeking, which is asceticism, in so far as it is only a human technique, is not evangelical poverty. Moreover, it exists in primitive religions everywhere, among the holy men of India and the wise men of Greece. But the Christian will be led to practice this asceticism as necessary discipline for keeping free.

I must add that neither the use of pleasures nor the management of riches is ever without danger. The use of pleasures will always provoke development of the instinctive life which, to repeat, is never bad in itself, but inevitably overgrows the field of the individual's psychology. You cannot simultaneously develop all your senses. Gide was wrong in thinking he could simultaneously cultivate his sensuality and his spirituality. St. Augustine has put it admirably: "If you wish to expand the space of love, you must contract the space of the flesh." Effective poverty, a frugal diet, a simple life, all create a climate favorable to the spiritual life. "Nothing disposes us better to prayer," says

Psichari, "than living on a handful of dates and some clear water."

The same is true of wealth. Wealth is a source of countless temptations because of the resources it furnishes. It is also a source of preoccupation, which leaves little time for a man to devote himself to the service of God. That is why, as we have seen, next to the beatitude of Matthew, which considers poverty solely as a spiritual attitude, we meet, in Luke, an interpretation that underlines the advantages of effective poverty and puts us on guard against the dangers of wealth. The woe put upon riches is not in the least a condemnation of wealth as such, but a warning against the obstacle wealth constitutes to the practice of evangelical poverty. It is the snare of which Satan avails himself to enlist us in his ranks.

Thus it is not wealth that is evil. And for certain men it may be the will of God that they have many goods at their disposal. Rather, it is we who are evil. And because we are evil, creatures are dangerous for us. It is not more perfect to have one eye than to have two. Nevertheless it would be better to have one eye and to enter into the Kingdom than to fail to enter while keeping two eyes. "And if thy eye is an occasion for falling to thee, pluck it out and cast it away from thee" (*Mt. 18:9*). There can be cases where wealth would be such a danger that it would be best to renounce it in order to save one's soul. This has been the origin of many monastic vocations. And in every case there is a constant obligation to guard against the dangers of wealth, and in using it, to practice effective renunciation, without which wealth turns into slavery, destroying spiritual liberty, evangelical poverty.

The same thing can be shown of the common sharing of goods and the renunciation of property. We have said

that evangelical poverty does not condemn private property, which is a sociological reality grounded in the nature of man. Yet it poses many problems. Property is in fact essentially bound to responsibility. The problems posed by property are those posed by any assumption of temporal responsibilities. They do not differ substantially from those of the company president, high official, large stockholder, statesman.

Indeed, far from there being an incompatibility for men of this type between their responsibilities and evangelical poverty, I think that their greatest mistake would be not to look for evangelical poverty in their responsibilities. This is precisely what I want to say. We might have instead a somewhat imaginative and poetic conception of evangelical poverty: "the duty to lack foresight." We might term the evangelical spirit a kind of irresponsibility, thus bringing it into the sphere of spiritual infantilism. The outcome is that life is broken into two parts. There is temporal life—professional, social—which is amenable only to selfish cares. And against it is played off a private life scented with evangelism. One might toy with poverty—but only to turn from it with derision.

Evangelical poverty should reach to the heart of our existence. It is no more opposed to the assumption of monetary responsibilities than to any others. A full Christian life is, on the contrary, a life shot through with responsibilities, laden with work. Poverty consists in carrying responsibilities with liberty of spirit, in taking on occupations without preoccupation. Evangelical poverty does not, then, consist in renouncing private property, but in assuming it as a responsibility. Thus evangelical poverty will be placed in service of the common good. It is not private property as an institution that is opposed to evangelical

poverty, but the spirit of acquisitiveness, which uses goods solely for the satisfaction of selfish pleasure and ambition, and shuns the duties ownership involves.

From this point of view, evangelical poverty manifests itself primarily as a disposition not to keep goods for oneself but to share them with others. This does not in the least imply that personal acquisition is to be repressed but that greed and the spirit of possessiveness are to be destroyed. The ideal here is an order of things in which persons share what they have, the community is built through the exchange of gifts, and goods are considered common not through the absence of private property but through the free sharing by each of what he has with others. Herein is the ideal of the Christian community, which is an image of the community of the Divine Persons in which each person communicates Himself entirely to the others. One present application of this spirit would rest in the duty of hospitality, and in the wish to cut down on expenses for luxury in order to help those in misery.

There remain cases in which evangelical poverty will involve the common sharing of goods and the renunciation of private property. But this is only a way of managing and does not constitute the essence of poverty. Such is the case of religious orders. Their renunciation of private property is justified by the fact that private property, though exercised in the spirit of poverty, implies an ordinary occupation with earthly cares. God calls certain men to be disengaged from this responsibility in order that they may consecrate themselves totally and exclusively to spiritual goods and to the service of the Kingdom of God. If it is an essential aspect of evangelical poverty that the Kingdom of God be primary, this liberation from



earthly cares will appear to be a high form of evangelical poverty. But it is only a high form.

We have delayed until now discussion of that poverty that includes suffering. We said that it is not a constitutive element of evangelical poverty, but it does not follow that suffering poverty is foreign to evangelical poverty. Nevertheless, the reasons why evangelical poverty includes suffering poverty are not practical, as they were in the case of the two preceding forms of evangelical poverty. From the viewpoint of wisdom, suffering poverty is absolutely unjustifiable. It will seem like madness, but a madness supremely desirable to the Christian. For it was from the first embraced by Christ.

Here we enter the mystery of the Cross itself. The Word of God, coming into the world, did not choose as his lot honor, wealth, prosperity. He did not condemn them. But he did not choose them. He picked shame, humiliation, privation. This choice he alone had the right to make. And no one else can make it on his own account. Yet we recognize that across the centuries friends of Christ have desired to share the lot that was his in order to conform more closely to him. Thus Francis of Assisi wed Lady Poverty; thus Ignatius Loyola demanded in the *Spiritual Exercises* imitation of Christ in bearing all injuries and scorn, all poverty, actual as well as spiritual.

Certainly, as I have said, evangelical poverty can be accomplished through a good as well as through a bad reputation, through abundance and through privation. Above all, it is liberty in regard to the one or the other. The abjectness of Jesus Christ could itself become an idol. The only proper attitude is holy indifference. But even within

this indifference, which is evangelical poverty, a preference is allowed. The friends of Christ will tend to prefer poverty and abjectness, because such was the lot of their Master. Pure indifference would be the law of a world without sin. But in a world immersed in enjoyment and ambition, the madness of the cross must redeem the madness of the world.

**P**OVERTY IS INDEED at the heart of Christian existence. And Christians have reason to know it. The error lies in wishing to establish its role by identifying it with some particular realization. These realizations are not foreign to evangelical poverty. But they are valid only to the extent that they express a deeper attitude. And this attitude, in so far as it takes seriously the kingdom of God and his justice, is Christianity itself. Any attempt to establish poverty outside this perspective falsifies its meaning. In this perspective, on the contrary, all forms of poverty take on their true significance. They are the particular realizations, according to personal vocations, of the universal vocation of all Christians to poverty.

Translated by WILLIAM BIRMINGHAM

<sup>1</sup> See "Les béatitudes dans la vie d'un militant ouvrier," *Masses ouvrières*, (November 1955), pp. 42-43.

<sup>2</sup> Emmanuel Mounier, *De la propriété capitaliste à la propriété humaine*, p. 88.

<sup>3</sup> Thus it is represented in Jean Massin's *Le festin chez Lévi*, p. 161.

<sup>4</sup> *Masses ouvrières*, op. cit., p. 42.

<sup>5</sup> Mounier, op. cit., p. 89.

<sup>6</sup> *Masses ouvrières*, op. cit., p. 43.

<sup>7</sup> *Contra Gentiles*, III, 134.

<sup>8</sup> A. Gelin, *Les pauvres de la hweh*, p. 54.

<sup>9</sup> Amos, p. 136. See Sainteté et action temporelle, p. 44.

<sup>10</sup> *Les Béatitudes*, pp. 15-26.

<sup>11</sup> See my book, *The Lord of History* (Regnery, 1958), pp. 283-296.

# AN ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

EUSEBIUS A. STEPHANOU

THE QUESTION of religious and metaphysical language immediately raises two fundamental problems which shall engage our attention at the outset: how do religious and metaphysical terms get their meaning and in what sense are religious statements true or false? Since both philosophy and religion involve one in the metaphysical realm of existence, the terms "religion" and "religious," in this discussion will be understood as including generally metaphysical articulation, as well as religious statements in the narrow sense.

As in any meaning situation, so in the case of religious symbolism there are three constituents to be considered: sign, interpreter, and referent. The sign here for our present purpose will be thought of as being verbal, that is to say, as language which serves primarily to communicate the reality of the supernatural realm of existence. Its other functions we shall consider further on. It is not the medium used by the Divine being in its transcendent existence, but the method that one man uses to communicate to the other his own grasp of the Divine reality. It is through man alone that religious language assumes meaning, since it is used by man for man. God Who is the center and source of Divine activity lies beyond the sphere of human contingency. Though religious language directly involves the divine, yet the Divine largely remains the referent in the meaning situation. This,

of course, does not necessarily imply that God does not communicate with man and man with God. We shall have occasion to discuss this point later.

Wheelwright holds that the assertion "God exists" is the most fundamental and comprehensive statement in the religious context of language. There hardly can be any disagreement on this score, since it is the reality of God that accounts for the meaning of all statements concerning God or His relations with man. But it is questionable that the declarative element present implies a conception of the universe in the sense that it seems to be maintained by Wheelwright.<sup>1</sup> Religion does not involve an I-thou relationship with the universe, unless the universe be identified with God; and yet even if this be the case, it is not toward the universe as the infinite expanse of creation that the religious soul rises in its ascent, but rather toward a focal point of unity in the universe. "God exists" is a statement which implies rather that the visible world is not self-contained and self-sufficient and that ultimate reality lies beyond the empirically perceived domain of existence.

In approaching the question of religious language, it would be well perhaps to begin with such a simple and basic statement as "God exists." Here we will come face to face with the problem that arises in the analysis of the semantic status of religious assertions: how do we determine the reality of the referent if it is not empirically observable? In what sense are religious statements true or false? In what sense can an expressive statement be judged true

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<sup>1</sup> Philip E. Wheelwright, *The Burning Fountain*, (Indiana, 1954), p. 298.

or false? These are basic questions which must be considered in our present inquiry. First we must answer the question of what is the criterion whereby we are to determine the truth or falsity of a statement. The positivist appeals to the criterion of correspondence. A belief or statement is true when it corresponds to reality, and reality in turn is to be determined by sense perception. The verifiability theory of the positivists suggests that evidence from sight is the final determinant of what does or does not exist. This is essentially the position of the logical positivists who assent only to such statements as are verifiable by methods of controlled experiment. They have assailed the position of metaphysics on the grounds that philosophy cannot attain ultimate reality. For them logic and semantics constitute the discipline of philosophy.

But it appears that there are metaphysical presuppositions hidden in the theories of the logical positivists. Are they not assuming certain metaphysical principles by ruling out religious propositions from meaningful language? Presumably they are not concerned with ultimate reality, since they contend that metaphysics is illegitimate, and thus are, so to speak, metaphysically neutral. Yet, it seems that by claiming that all the entities contained in the subject matter of knowledge are in the last analysis physical, they are committing themselves to metaphysical premises. They are virtually making a metaphysical assertion, that is, they are defining the ultimate constituents of the universe. Professor William Alston aptly observes in this regard that "an assertion of the adequacy of a physicalist language for science really involves an assertion that ultimately physical nature for everything that is (assuming that the scientific sub-

ject matter is only subject matter)."<sup>2</sup> The logical positivists really have a metaphysics. They cannot do without one. Now their claim that reality is everything knowable through sensory experience is highly questionable. I think it is only obvious that the metaphysical question must be faced boldly and answered if the analysis of the meaning of religious language is to rest on safe grounds.

All philosophical standpoints that are founded on materialistic premises do violence to man's true nature. They fail to understand that the reality of the spiritual world is not supernatural, but represents another dimension of reality constantly there but ordinarily ignored. Man is degraded by being reduced to an animal-like organism of senses detached from the creative forces of life. It is the refusal to recognize the true fabric of human existence that has led philosophers to naturalistic and positivistic conclusions. They are blind to the tremendous possibilities inherent in the human capacity for intuition and for spiritual vision. They will not see that the experience of spiritual life is equally legitimate as a source of knowledge, as is the experience of the physical world by means of the senses. It is part of the structure of human existence, but too often suppressed and stifled. All men have the power of inner vision, and it remains dormant in many people because of the neglect to arouse and cultivate it. It is not supernatural in the sense that it is not part of the ordinary normal equipment of human nature, but that it represents another dimension of human experience, unquestionably real but ordinarily buried beneath preconceived notions and attitudes about what is knowable and what is not.

<sup>2</sup> "Are Positivists Metaphysicians?," *Philosophical Review*, p. 49, vol. lxiii, no. 1, January 1954.

It is interesting to note Professor Hodges' observation that with recent trends in philosophical inquiry there may dawn some hope that such attitudes may become altered and that man will soon be viewed as he should in his existential setting. Philosophy is turning, he says, from its search for ultimate reality to the closer examination of man himself. But the ascendancy of logic, epistemology, and semantics will probably bring back to fundamental importance the ancient maxim "know thyself." What is really being studied is human behavior and the triumph of critical philosophy really means the substitution of a doctrine of man for the doctrine of being as the heart and center of philosophy. By discovering, however, the true nature of man, philosophy will probably find its way back to its original objective, namely, the principle of ultimate reality.<sup>3</sup>

RETURNING TO OUR original question, I think that Wheelwright is correct in holding that the proposition "God exists" is true "when experienced as a depth-statement." The acquiescence which the interpreter gives to the reality that God exists follows the depth experience of that reality and thus equals the assent given to the statement as a declarative articulation of that reality. To declare a religious statement true is to imply the affirmation of the reality of inner experience. The appeal to the criterion of correspondence is legitimate here just as it is in the case of assertions about the physical world. Truth in a spiritual dimension should be explained in terms of correspondence: the correspondence of our vision with the content of a religious statement. In other words, the correspondence is between the inner vision of the Divine on

the part of the believer and the conception of the Divine given in revelation. Conversely, the revelation itself is to be appraised in terms of correspondence, and when done so becomes known in its fulness and unity as being the perfect Image, or Idea of the Absolute Being, namely, the Logos of God in Whose "image and likeness" man is created.

The questions of the evaluation of revelation must be solved in terms of spiritual vision, not because there we find the grounds for determining the truth or falsity of revelation, but because there we will discover and meet the basic needs which revelation comes to remedy. Revelation in the last analysis rests not on any external authority, but on its fittingness in responding and corresponding to the innermost needs of human nature. Its authority lies within man himself, not with any outwardly imposed authority. What appears to be an outward authority in the Christian Faith is really a clear articulation of the conscience.

The implication of a religious proposition is that thought has done its work, since language in this case serves to give verbal expression to thought. We think about our spiritual vision and language comes to articulate our thinking; but the canons of literal thought have application, as Langer observes, only where experience is already presented. Thus religious language becomes meaningful as the natural consequence of inner perception or religious experience and reflexion. "Mythic vision finds symbolical expression" is Langer's way of putting it. The crux of the whole matter is that spiritual vision, technically known as *faith*, sustains and affirms the meaningfulness of verbal expressions concerning supernatural reality. Without faith, religious language remains meaningless verbalism.

The expression of religious experi-

<sup>3</sup> H. A. Hodges, *Languages, Standpoints, and Attitudes*, 1952, "The Socratic," p. 7.

ence rises within a social framework. The mystic of the solitary life needs no language. It is the social need of communicating one's religious experience to another that language primarily comes to serve. Ideas formed in religious experience call for clear and intelligible articulation, and, until they are expressed, persist in vague forms. Though they satisfy the inner depths of human nature, yet they come up to the literal surface with considerable difficulty, not because of the uncertainty or vagueness of the experience, but because of the inadequacy of language. The findings of spiritual vision remain known only to the individual who has experienced such a vision or inner perception, until language has performed its task. Langer, referring to this fact, states that "ideas first adumbrated in fantastic form became real intellectual property only when discursive language rises to their expression. That is why myth is the indispensable forerunner of metaphysics. . . . Only language has the power to effect such an analysis of experience, such a rationalization of knowledge."<sup>4</sup>

I think, however, that the author is committing an error when she contends that "religion rests on a young and provisional form of thought to which philosophy of nature (and science) must succeed if thinking is to go on." This is to suggest that the intellectual presentation of religious truth can never be intellectually adequate and can never satisfy the demands of thought. A mere glance at history indicates convincingly enough that the human intellect has attained impressive heights at times when its main job was reflection upon religious truth. It is not the task of science to succeed religious thinking. Science and religion must pursue each its own purpose in parallel course. While reli-

gious thought is concerned with religious experience, scientific thought deals with the experience of the empirically observable world. Both can go hand-in-hand without any pretense on the part of the one to succeed or replace the other. Just as much thinking is possible on religious grounds, as on scientific, and perhaps even more on religious grounds, since religion is related to man in his existential situation which opens entire vistas of thought and possibilities for creative thinking.

Langer asserts that natural religion can be superseded by "a discursive and more literal form of thought, namely philosophy." But such a view is open to serious objection, because religion is not thought, as such, to be succeeded by a more literal form of thought. It is not a stage in thought, but rather a living experience that provides thought with new ideas. Philosophy does not serve to do a better job for thought than religion. It would be more correct to say that religion supplies the necessary spiritual experience for attaining to philosophical knowledge. Religious experience does not represent some sort of primitive stage in the progress of human thought, as Langer appears to intimate; to think so is to lose sight of the impetus that religion has given to thought in the past. Religion really does not rest on any form of thought at all; rather it provides inspiration and insight for thought.

It has been pointed out that religious language fulfills a cognitive function, because it not only describes or records an experience, but serves to communicate that experience to others. "God exists" is a declarative statement intended to convey to another person a depth-experience of the reality of God. At the same time, however, it may function as a persuasive statement if it is intended to produce belief and

<sup>4</sup> Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key*, (Harvard, 1951), p. 164.



conception in the other person. There is a further function that religious language serves and which can be best treated by considering at this juncture Stace's view. Stace maintains that the sole purpose of religious language is to evoke the experience in the hearer or reader. There is nothing common between scientific and religious language. The one is descriptive, while the other is evocative. We can understand this when we take into account Stace's interpretation of verbal symbolism in this connection. The symbol never aims to convey meaning, but only evocation. "Words evoke in us a measure of the same experience which the author of them had."<sup>5</sup> This is similar to the view expressed above that for a word to have meaning, the interpreter must have shared in the experience of the producer of the symbol. But Stace would never say that his experience is communicated. Religious experience, as such, can never be expressed, let alone communicated. This does not necessarily rule out the possibility of attaining religious truth. The answer lies in the experience itself, and not in the grasp of a concept, since experience can never properly speaking be conceptualized. "The proof of the pudding is the eating." The inference to be drawn from Stace's view is that religious experience does not actually provide philosophy with ideas for creative thinking. He would disagree with Langer that there is a passing from religion to thought.

There is much to be said for Stace's emphasis on the importance of experience in the understanding of religious language. But it does not seem wholly acceptable to hold that religious language performs no cognitive function at all. To say that words are never entirely fitted to express the divine does

not necessarily mean that the cognitive element has no part in religious language. Of course, Stace's definition of religion in terms of extreme mysticism must naturally lead to this contention. All religion is mystical, it is true, but this does not imply that the difference between subject and object disappears in religious experience. In an act of faith (which is mysticism in essence) there are distinctions which the mind interprets and represents in a process of rationalization. It is not in itself sufficient apart from the intellect and reason.

With special reference to the Christian Faith, it would be correct to say that religious truth is essentially ineffable, but this is not tantamount to excluding the cognitive function of religious language. Indeed it is impossible to conceive of the Christian Faith when the informative and presentational function of language is missing. It must be remembered that Christianity rests on certain events which occurred in history: the Son of God assumed human nature and appeared upon earth as a man in time; He performed certain mighty acts; He died upon the Cross and three days after arose, thus confirming His divine origin and authority. God broke into history and performed marvellous acts for man's salvation out of His infinite love for him. The historical character of Christianity is final guarantee of the cognitive purpose that religious language serves in the Christian Faith. The presentation of certain facts and events must precede the revelation of the mystery to which they point. Or rather, to put it in another way, the mysterious truths of Christianity can be accepted only as embodied primarily in the events of the Incarnation, Crucifixion, and Resurrection.

It is historical language simply to narrate these occurrences, but it becomes

<sup>5</sup> W. T. Stace, *Time and Eternity*, (Princeton, 1952), p. 91.

religious language when one accepts them on the basis of the testimony given by eye-witnesses and when one accepts the Crucified and Risen Christ, as a present, living reality, not only in a transcendent existence, but as an immanent power indwelling both in the community of believers and in the individual believer. It is through faith or spiritual vision that one believes that Christ is an ever-present reality, as well as an historical person, and becomes increasingly confirmed in his faith by experiencing the joy and happiness that have resulted from such faith. I think Evelyn Underhill speaks effectively of this in stating that "since Christ is Divine Life itself, it follows that His active spirit is to be discerned, not symbolically, but in the most veritable sense, in the ecstatic and abounding life of the world."<sup>6</sup>

Thus there can be no question that religious language seeks to communicate concepts and to describe what is without. However, this does not mean that religion can be reduced to or completely analyzed into concepts by discursive reason. Here is where we come to the question of the inadequacy of language which Stace goes to great pains in elaborating. I know "God exists" and the fact of His existence I am capable of expressing adequately, but to express the essence of Divine reality, I cannot expect to find the fitting language, because it is essentially ineffable. I know that "God became man in Christ" by faith, but as to how full divinity and full humanity can be united in one person lies beyond the powers of rational conceptualization, not to speak of verbal articulation.

When we speak of the Son as *homoousios* or "co-essential" to the Father, we are obviously involved in symbolic, and

not literal, language.<sup>7</sup> It is language which expresses a truth to which one can commit himself only when he has experienced the inner vision of Christ as personal Savior in His full divinity and humanity. This means that it is faith or mystical experience which makes statements of dogma meaningful and acceptable. Along with the spiritual experience, however, there is the need for comprehending the conventional rule of using the word, e.g., *ousia* or essence, if "co-essential" is to be a meaningful term. This understanding of the conventional usage of the word, coupled with mystical experience (or faith), accounts for the legitimacy of giving convictions linguistic expression and dogmatic formulation. But dogmatic definitions do not propose to serve as barriers to free and creative thinking, as is the erroneous contention even among those in liberal quarters within Christianity, but are signposts guiding the thinking mind of the believer away from the pitfalls of arbitrary beliefs and the limitations and weaknesses of the mystical intuition and into the way of objective truth. In the words of Underhill, they are a "chart and pilot book of the Christian mystic's voyages and adventures."<sup>8</sup>

Stace is right by and large in holding to the view that religious language is symbolical. This holds true particularly in the realm of the mystery. Though words are never entirely adequate to express the inner life of the divine, yet there is some analogy and resemblance between the natural and the numinous, e.g., grace and love become symbols for the supernatural char-

<sup>7</sup> In the sense that "the metaphysical titles are drawn from the world of sense and applied to the nature of God according to the expression of Pseudo-Dionysius, *Mystical Theology*, III.

<sup>8</sup> *Mysticism*, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

<sup>6</sup> *Mysticism*, (Dutton, 1930), p. 138.

acter which they describe only in a metaphorical manner. "The answer to all theological problems is either silence or metaphors."<sup>9</sup> Stace is saying in effect what St. Thomas Aquinas argues when he says that "univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures."<sup>10</sup> Being, for example, has no univocal meaning. That God has being does not have the same meaning when we say that man has being. There is only analogy between the two attributes. The truth lies in the mean between pure equivocation and univocation, namely, analogy.<sup>11</sup> It is only by analogy that we are able to talk about God, in spite of the danger to which it is exposed. Religious language has no other alternative. It must take the risk which analogy involves if assertions about God are to be made at all. If man is the "image of God," then his conception of God must take rise out of the knowledge of his own world. Terms attributed to man can legitimately be attributed to God in analogy, if man is really a God-like being or a reflection of the divine nature. God possesses the attributes of man to an infinitely higher degree.

Nicholas Berdyaev, likewise, holds that "dogmas, as theological doctrine formulates them, are symbolic in character. The mysterious side of revelation cannot be expressed in intellectual terms. Intellectual expression is always conditional."<sup>12</sup> In other words, to believe in certain propositions about God is not the same as to believe in God in terms of identity. Believing, in the sense of having faith, does not involve merely intellectual assent, but rather the mystical communion with God. God can be known only in the intuitive moment it-

self and not in trying to understand dogmatic propositions about God. Consequently, religious language consists of metaphors which will always be untrue—in the sense of not being identified with the referent itself. To experience a religious truth and to read or hear about it are two different things. There is much truth to Langer's statement that "language, in its literal capacity, is a stiff and conventional medium, unadapted to the expression of genuinely new ideas, which usually have to break in upon the mind through some great and bewildering metaphor."<sup>13</sup>

COMING BACK to the function of religious language, it should be pointed out that evocative and emotive aims are relevant. It is almost impossible to have these functions without the cognitive function. It may be said that the ultimate purpose of religious language is really evocative and directive, but it finds its fulfillment by means of the communication and description of happenings or of the experience of others. Let us consider the statement: "Christ died for our sins and will come again to judge the quick and the dead." This assertion seeks not only to provide information, but especially to incite the hearer to action, namely, to faith, repentance, and amendment of life. "The Kingdom of Heaven is at hand!" is another utterance of a similar kind, which not only implies, but expressly evokes action: "Repent." Religious language, therefore, plainly serves a two-fold purpose: cognitive and evocative or directive. Evocative language always involves ideational content. It is through ideas that evocation is really effected.

Of course, we must also take into consideration the expressive function of religious language especially found in

<sup>9</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 85.

<sup>10</sup> *Summa Theologica*, 13. 5.

<sup>11</sup> Cajetan, *The Analogy of Names*, p. 30.

<sup>12</sup> *Truth and Revelation*, (Harper, 1953), p. 58.

<sup>13</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 119.

devotional literature. "My soul doth magnify the Lord" is a statement that does not seek to inform or to evoke, but merely to express one's own feelings of adoration. When one has experienced the divine in spiritual vision, he is instinctively urged to manifest, not so much the ideational content of his revelation, as his feelings of love and praise for God, as a result of his experience. "Hallowed be Thy Name," for example, is a medium of expressing one's worship for God which usually follows one's experience of the reality of God in the vision of faith. "Hosanna" and "Alleluia" are further examples of this function of religious language. "From the overflowing of the heart doth the mouth speak."

It ought to be noted that the fact that the importance of experience is occasionally lost sight of is no reason that religious language should be dismissed as being nonsense. Let the language expressive of religious truth remain and there will always be those whose experience will come in time to give meaning to it. William James fails to appreciate the function of the language of doctrine when he says that "we must bid a definitive good-by to dogmatic theology. In all sincerity our faith must do without that warrant."<sup>14</sup> He forgets that dogma is the result of genuine religious experience. Mystical vision is at bottom the affirmation of all dogmas which the Church defined from the very beginning. It is not to the discredit of the term "co-essential to the Father," for example, if certain individuals detach it from its mystical context in which it was drawn up by the Church Fathers. Dogmas were never defined with the intention of being taken as discursive language. We should remember that the Fathers dealt with the faith of the

Church, not with the frigid intellectualism of professors, but with the glowing earnestness of a worshipping and obedient soul. St. Athanasius, for instance, was of the overmastering conviction that only a divine person, a full God, could be a redeemer of his soul, and not a demi-god and an Arian Christ. He was not quibbling over words or indulging his academic scholarship. "Co-essential" was the most adequate symbol taken from the conventional language of the time to express the identity of Christ's nature with that of God's, and all those whom St. Athanasius' belief represented by and large came to see it as the most adequate expression to safeguard the truth of the equality of the Persons of the Trinity.

Thus "co-essential," to take only one example, stands for the truth of a fully divine redeemer. It expresses the infinite love of the Creator Who condescended to humble Himself for man's sake. No inferior creature or agent could be used to satisfy God's love for man. Now if the term has no meaning for certain individuals, it is not because of the inadequacy of the term. It is the interpretant that is lacking. The interpreter must needs share the feelings and experience of those who originally drew up the dogmatic term. Herein lies the paradox and mystery of the Christian Church. Past, present, and future share in a common experience: the life of the Spirit. Tradition is not obsolete accumulation from the past, but the living experience of the Church transcending the limits of time and place and safeguarding the historical continuity and identity of the community of Christian believers.

The Holy Fathers of the early Church were not aiming at a "theology of concepts" when they treated the Christian Faith in their writings. They were free and liberal in their use of philosophical

<sup>14</sup> *Varieties of Religious Experience*, (Longmans, 1958), p. 448.

terms, because they believed that Christian truth was essentially inexpressible. They avoided defining it in positive terms and adhered to a negative or apophatic approach. "Apophatism constitutes the basic character of the whole theological tradition of the early Church."<sup>15</sup> That God is "infinite" implies that He is "not finite." That God is "immutable" means that God is "non-changing." What God is not is involved in negative theology. "Negative theology is not only a theory of ecstasy properly so-called; it is an expression of the fundamental attitude which makes theology in general contemplation of the mysteries of revelation." Discursive language has been resorted to at times when the need has arisen to defend a truth which has been assailed by those using discursive language. The opponents of revealed truth had to be met on their own grounds. The definition of "co-essential" is an example of this need.

William James is sorely deceived in thinking that "in the theologians' hands metaphysical attributes are only a set of titles obtained by a mechanical manipulation of synonyms." If in some quarters "verbalism has stepped into the place of vision, professionalism into that of life," this is no reason for discarding the historical definitions of the Christian Faith. For those who live by faith, they stand as the symbols of truth against error and milestones in the Church's struggle against the intrusions of arbitrary private views. The fact that some people lack the capacity of inner vision to see the meaning of dogmas is no reason for pronouncing them "worthless inventions of the scholarly mind." That formulas can never wholly take the place of personal experience (as I have duly pointed out) does not warrant in the least their rejection as a matter

of principle. Theological language can be rightly evaluated and interpreted only within the religious context in which it is written. To the disinterested onlooker and uninitiated observer, theological language will forever remain meaningless. It is what Otto calls the "numinous basis" to religious assertions that must be apprehended. This is not possible by mere verbal phrases or by external symbols. "We must have recourse to the way all other moods and feelings are transmitted, to a penetrative imaginative sympathy with what passes in the other person's mind."<sup>16</sup> The "numinous" cannot be discerned in theory and dogma, or even in exhortation. "The mere word, even when it comes as a living voice, is powerless without the 'Spirit in the heart' of the hearer to move him to apprehension."

It is equally important to recognize that "the adequacy of religious discourse itself depends upon whether or not it appeals to a given individual in a given cultural milieu as a way in which their lives can be satisfactorily focused and directed."<sup>17</sup> But this does not necessarily mean that each new age must seek a modern doctrinal synthesis involving the change of dogmatic terms, as many believe, especially in liberal Protestant circles. To hold such a view would be tantamount to thinking that the creeds of the early Church were defined in a tentative language of the current philosophical idiom of their own age, and that each succeeding generation must needs give a new form to the old formulations in more modern philosophical categories of thought. However, such an attitude, I believe, rests on a basic misunderstanding of the work of those who defined the historic creeds. We must

<sup>16</sup> *The Idea of the Holy*, (Oxford, 1936), p. 62.

<sup>17</sup> C. W. Morris, *Signs, Language, and Behavior*, (Prentice-Hall, 1946), p. 148.

<sup>15</sup> Vladimir Lossky, *La Théologie Mystique de l'Eglise d'Orient*, p. 24.



remember that the Fathers of the Church were not borrowing from the profane philosophies of their day. In the words of Prof. George Florovsky, "the full truth about the Holy Fathers is that they have created a new philosophy, very different from both Platonism and Aristotelianism or anything else. This makes ridiculous any attempt to reinterpret the traditional doctrines in terms or categories of a new philosophy, whatever this philosophy may be. It would be unfair even from a purely historical point of view to pretend that the Fathers have expressed the Faith of the Church in a conditional language of the current philosophy of their own age which has obviously no title to be canonized."<sup>18</sup> Taking this perspective, it would be legitimate to affirm that Hellenism is canonized in the creation of the Christian Hellenism of the early Church. Professor Florovsky is correct in asserting that Hellenism is a "standing category of Christian existence and thus any theologian must pass an experience of a spiritual hellenization." This remains to this day the general feeling in the Orthodox Christian Society, while in the West it ceased after the breakdown of Scholasticism, not because Christian Hellenism proved itself inadequate, but because Scholasticism was a pseudo-morphosis of Christian Hellenism, carrying the seeds of inner tensions and of its own downfall; it was not the authentic Christian Hellenism of the East with an organic continuity with the past.

I suspect that Professor Florovsky refers not so much to the categories of Greek philosophy as he does to the mentality of the Greeks or the contemplative ethos and disposition in Greek thought, which, of course, fits in per-

fectly with the spiritual nature of the Christian Faith. A further consideration in this respect is the concept of cultural continuity which I deem of basic significance. It is not difficult to accept the permanent validity of Hellenism in Christianity when it is viewed within the cultural milieu of the Orthodox Christian Society, since it represents an embodiment of Christian Graeco-Roman traditions. In the West, Christian Hellenism fell into discredit under the aegis of Scholasticism. The history of the Orthodox Christian Society marks an uninterrupted continuity in its course beginning with the Constantinian period, when Christianity, Hellenism, and the Roman State merged to form the true, European civilization which continued in a flourishing state until 1453, and even thereafter, however dormant and in decline it became. The west broke its continuity with the east very early with the barbarian invasion of Italy and lost the organic process of Christian history and identity with the earlier culture. The continuous disruptions of subsequent times, constitute conclusive evidence of this.

IF THE THEOLOGICAL language of early Christianity fails to appeal to certain individuals today, it is because they have lost contact with the supra-temporal consciousness of the Christian community, not only in its purely spiritual manifestation, but also in its cultural aspect. This is not to suggest a surrender of legitimate progress and development in theological thinking to stagnancy. Nothing could be further from the desired course. But it should not be forgotten that though "progress is a real fact, it is always organic, never by innovation; it is a deeper or wider growth rather than a change; it is the unfolding of the implicit; a clearer ex-

<sup>18</sup> *Patristics and Modern Theology*, p. 241.

planation of views already held."<sup>19</sup> If progress is truly such an even, unbroken growth, then the lost continuity must be regained and restored.

Since Christian truth was once and for all revealed in the past, then grasping its full meaning naturally requires some degree of reversion for the under-

standing of the idiom of the age in which it was set forth. This cannot be accomplished only by scholarly and critical examination of texts, but by sharing in the *sensus communis* of the Christian community (the Orthodox Church) which has inherited in an unbroken continuity the totality of the spiritual and cultural values of the Christian past and which preserves the proper perspective of semantic evolution.

<sup>19</sup> Herbert B. Workman, *Christian Thought to the Reformation*, (Scribner's, 1941), p. 103.

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# Notes on other Publications

## STURZO: RECENT EDITIONS AND STUDIES

- 1 Sturzo, Luigi. *I discorsi politici*. Istituto Luigi Sturzo, Roma, 1951.
- 2 Sturzo, Luigi. *Chiesa e Stato: Studio Sociologico-storico*, vol. I. N. Zanichelli, Bologna, 1958. (Vol. X, First Series.)
- 3 Sturzo, Luigi. *La comunità internazionale e il diritto di guerra*. N. Zanichelli, Bologna, 1954. (This is Vol. II in the First Series of the *Opera Omnia* which are being published by the Istituto Luigi Sturzo.)
- 4 Frattallone, Mariano. *Spiritualismo Gnoseologico e metafisico*. New York, 1957.
- 5 *Scritti di Sociologia e Politica in onore di Luigi Sturzo*, 3 volumes. N. Zanichelli, Bologna, 1953.

THE RECENT DEATH of Luigi Sturzo has occasioned world-wide tribute to his political wisdom and creative scholarship. Yet the accent on his political achievement has tended to overshadow, not without reason, the speculative concern which was central in his life. The two concerns are, in fact, joint phases of one articulated vision. And when Sturzo once confessed that "sociological theory is the secret of my whole life," he revealed the animating spirit of a life concern which was inspired by Vico's claim that man comes to know truth only through doing, acting, and making, and that among ways of acting, the civic is certainly essential.

In reading through Sturzo's early political addresses, conveniently gathered in *I discorsi politici*, one is impressed by the dialectical rhythm between the general philosophical vision and the concrete political commitment, and may discern as early as 1905 the patient forging of the seminal ideas of his subse-

quently systematized *historicist sociology*. In addresses delivered to the first two Congresses of the Popular Party, Sturzo already expresses his dominant vision of political activity as a complex of decisive yet tentative resolutions of shifting temporal problems, and conceives of experience as a deepening awareness of the impossibility of grasping "the reality of life through pure mental schemes . . . for life is but a perennial succession of approximations . . . an intertwining of contrasting forces and contradictory elements which are nonetheless inspired by firm principles . . ." (p. 16) It is in the light of a wide administrative and political experience in both local and national affairs and under pressure of polemical concerns that Sturzo came to believe that "the absolute cannot be invoked in the relativity of life," and that the absolute and the relative are always found interwoven in human affairs, the absolute as guiding norm and the relative as historical achievement.

His resolution of the relationship may be described as a kind of social experimentalism lived out in the light of the absolute: "... It is well to remember that forms do not precede but rather follow life, and that life is not the effort of a single day or single year, but rather of tradition and responsibility, for human activity is greater than the forms which men impose on themselves . . . the reality of life imposes itself over and above theoretical assertions and projects operative forces with the violence of a logic which admits of neither negation nor identical solutions." (pp. 37-39) Political activity is a ceaseless and mysterious rhythm of interdependent material

forces and human will, ultimately linked in "a bond of mystical solidarity between cause and effect," a solidarity, however, which is not given but achieved by means of "an immense *élan* through which man longs for a happiness which can never be complete, for a well-being which can never be satisfied, for a peace which is never without preoccupations and snares; and since man can never exhaust his power in his act, he inescapably tends towards the infinite in order either to assimilate himself to it or be absorbed by it." (p. 218)

Unlike the major political philosophers who tend to portray the native condition of mankind in somber and dark colors so as to illuminate the more brightly their own schemes for political redemption, Sturzo never succumbs either to a fundamentalist pessimism or to a reformist euphoria. Nor is it out of political expediency but through the kind of philosophical reflection which we have indicated that Sturzo insists on an unequivocal assertion of the autonomy yet interconnection between the absolute and the relative: "It is superfluous to explain why we do not call ourselves a Catholic party. The two terms are antithetical: Catholicism is religion, universality, whereas a party is politics, division... What we seek in religion is the vivifying spirit of our individual and collective lives... We cannot transform ourselves from a political party into a Church institute, nor do we have any right to speak in the name of the Church..." (p. 13)

2—It is, then, as an active but 'disinterested' participant in political affairs that Sturzo is able to achieve a synoptic vision of history in the making. The ideas scattered throughout his political writings were first systematized in the *Essai de Sociologie* (Paris, 1935), originally conceived and written as a long introduction to *Church and State*, the

French edition of which, unlike the English, contains an introduction which is one of the most concise and lucid statements of his thought.

Disclaiming any apologetic or theological intention in his study of the socio-historical relations between Church and State, Sturzo explains the objective of his *historicist sociology* as "the study of the social facts which gave rise to the formation and development of the relations between Church and State at different periods and in different countries where Christianity became the predominant religion... the book has no apologetic intention... and does not propose to justify any specific historical structure of State or Church, or of any particular relation between them." (p. xv) With his emphasis on historicity, Sturzo insists that the animating presence of the supernatural in human affairs must be acknowledged: "...It is not the business of the sociologist to prove or deny the supernatural character of the Church; if the sociologist wishes to do the work of sociology, he will neither attenuate nor alter the facts of such as they present themselves in history. He must seek to explain how and why institutions and social activities have been influenced and modified by Christianity, and how and why other currents and activities have reacted." (p. xxiv) [The historicization of the supernatural is articulated more roundly in *The True Life*, which bears the subtitle, "Sociology of the Supernatural."] The general conception of society is advanced with admirable clarity: "Human society apprehended in its structure is sociology; viewed in its process, it is history. But history is sociological and sociology historical because no social structure exists without historical evolution nor historical process without social structure." (p. xvii) History is the matrix of hu-

man process and process is the articulation of human aspirations in their total, uncensored richness: "History is the whole of human activity in its realization; and the historical consequence can never be different from the essential nature of human action." (p. xvii) For Sturzo human nature is not a vanishing formal essence but a nature that is radically processive and operational.

With rigorous reservations, this anthropological insight joins that main current of modern thought which believes that it is more proper to speak of man as *being* a history rather than *having* a nature, a conception which is Heraclitean rather than Eleatic. Without a conscious assimilation of the past, in short "without history, we could give of society no more than a morphological description or an abstract schematization or a technical analysis . . . without history sociological speculation would be impossible." (p. xvii) The whole historical process is initiated by the human will, guided by ethical ends and concretized in a plurality of social institutions, in the unending rhythm which is life. But society is primarily an inner form of the spirit and must not be identified with any external institutional structure: "The finalistic synthesis exists within man before it is realized outside of him through action, and it is precisely the difference, the chasm between the finalistic ideal and its concrete realization that makes possible that dynamic process which we call *history*. And it is the concrete realization of both past and present that forms the structure of those relations between men which we call *society*." (p. xix)

The rhythmic drive of the historical process becomes polarized around antipodal forces which struggle for unification as the various social forms become intertwined in a persistent but unsuccessful attempt at domination.

The dualistic effort towards resolution becomes crystallized in two major forms, the religious and the political, Church and State, through which consciousness projects its ethical finalities. In their shifting relations, the two associations tend towards a *diarchy*, defined as the co-existence of two distinct powers, each limiting the other, yet each pressing for total domination. As Sturzo locates the historical process within individual-social consciousness, it is within consciousness that institutional conflicts arise, in the form of an interplay between two primordial currents, the *organizational* and the *mystical*, the one seeking diligently to conserve what the other has creatively initiated and continues to renew. The two currents are truly dialectical, as they now merge, now separate, now overlap, now are reconciled and then again alienated in the perennial renewal of ethical ends which is the dynamism of history.

3—A fine example of this process is Sturzo's treatment of the problem of war. He avoids political rhetoric and moral sermonizing as he presses his argument on strict socio-historical grounds; in substance, he sees war as an expression of civil society, sustained by determinate political and economic conditions and sanctioned by specific juridical institutions, facts which must be rigorously assimilated if any progress is to be made in bringing about a definitive institutional condemnation of war. In the preface to the first Italian edition of *The International Community and the Right of War*, Sturzo reviews the relative progress and recalcitrant obstacles in the recent history of the United Nations, and anticipates the doctrinaire opponent as he writes: "Whoever reasons in this fashion [that the United Nations are hardly united] forgets history: the crises of every political institution are more or less serious, more or



less long, but they are not mortal. Once we believe that a given institution has disappeared, we promptly see another arising, into which the former has become transformed. We may speak of a kind of institutional metempsychosis in which the communitarian spirit of mankind continues to live." (p. xxxvi)

Sturzo constantly speaks of the law of transcendence as the inner prompting of the individual-social consciousness to widen the institutional objectification of its ethical impulses in progressively more inclusive unities. In recent years this impulse has provoked an almost imperceptible movement of "the international community towards a genuine reversal of the criteria and substance of the right of war, even though traditional jurists and universities entrenched within 19th century formulas have not become aware of this, or do not consider forty years' experience in international law to be sufficient. From the moral point of view, the most alert theologians have already distinguished between the wars of the past and those of the present, but we do not believe that this distinction can be sustained outside of an international community, in which alone ethical norms can become juridically binding." (p. xxxvii) Throughout the book and in the indispensable single studies separately appended, Sturzo presses the argument to disclose a growing awareness of the political necessity and moral urgency for an organized international community. While warning of impending and recalcitrant difficulties he displays a robust confidence in the resilience of the good achieved, for "no effort directed towards a mutual understanding among people, towards a trusting co-existence, towards a balance of political and moral forces, is ever lost." (p. xxxvii)

In a conscientious criticism of "The

Scholastic doctrine of the right of war," Sturzo exposes the radically contingent historical situations out of which the doctrine was forged, and lays bare the contradictions embedded in the claim that the specific authority of a given ruler should be the controlling principle justifying a given war. The fact that competing rulers resolved the issue of justification each according to his own self-certified clear conscience simply exacerbated the difficulty, and led jurists to widen the institutional sanction of a just war from the individual conscience of the ruler to the collective administrative consciousness of the executive state. But this is hardly a solution, for it merely shifts both the source and the range of the conflicting authorities, and on shifting individual judgments of conscience it is impossible to ground any objective criteria for settling the question of a just war, for not only does the individual introduce an unpredictable variable but the socio-historical conditions of the time restrict the range of options. The Scholastics believed that "the authority for imposing a war existed in so far as a just cause could be determined," but in point of critical fact "the terms should be inverted, for a just war exists only in so far as there is an authority to proclaim it." (p. 285) As the temporal proclamation is frozen into an eternal law, the contingent persistence of war is sublimated into an absolute exigency of human nature, especially by those moralists who "suffer from the habit of converting the whole of human activity, even in its most relative historical causation, into absolute and objective reasons *sub specie aeternitatis*." (p. 271) The moment such moralists "abandon generic assertions such as 'reparations of the offense and re-establishment of order and peace,'" they stumble about in the dark and refuse to be illuminated by the fact that "what

at one time and in a given environment seemed just is no longer so today, and what seems to be just today at one time was not so considered . . ." (p. 284) The venerable doctrine receives a mortal blow as Sturzo amends it to read "wars *believed to be just*."

Once more, Sturzo joins the work of the publicist to that of the historian as he professes faith in the same ethical impulse of "the people, in whom we must recognize an element of instinctive but powerful discrimination which is indeed emotional but decisive; for it is always rulers who are inclined to war more than the people. And the whole educational campaign against war conducted by Christian and pacifist currents will act powerfully against other, nationalist and imperialist currents." (p. 278) Finally, the outlawry of war will become so entrenched in the international community that even in the presence of "all the conditions which moralists require for a just war, a given war would become illicit and immoral by the very fact that it would no longer be *inevitable*, which is to say that it would lack the element necessary for legitimizing it." In the meantime we must abandon "one of those aphorisms of practical wisdom which cannot sustain any ethical justification, the old adage, *Si vis pacem, para bellum*, for the system of the armed nation and of the balance of powers among states has simply given us long periods of peace while preparing for great wars." (p. 262)

**S**TURZO ONCE WROTE that the four major philosophers who have engaged his thought most deeply are Augustine, Vico, Leibnitz and Blondel, and has explicitly called for renewed philosophical speculation on the nature of history under the specific guidance of Vico and Blondel. Insufficiently known as both these philosophers are, Blondel has suf-

fered the worse fate. Hence some indication of the relationship between the two thinkers is in order, especially since Sturzo himself has amply acknowledged his own critical incorporation of Blondel's thought in "Maurice Blondel's *La Pensée*: the philosophy of 'l'élan spirituel,'" (*Hibbert Journal*, April 1936). For Blondel as for Sturzo reality is primarily process, life, experience, and the merely notional, formal and 'abstract' are roundly rejected as distortions of the real. For both thinkers life lived in a freely engendered unfolding of the ontological structures and moral urges of human consciousness is the matrix from which thought engenders its rationally educed discoveries. Dominated by what Blondel has called "the paradox of a science of action," Sturzo also believes that conceptual systematizations are at once absolutely necessary yet radically insufficient either for engendering or understanding action. For both thinkers, *action* plays an essentially mediating role by impressing itself on *thought* and expressing itself in *being*. The three orders are interwoven; each unfolds an analytically distinguishable phase of an ontologically (Sturzo would say historically) integral process so that action is at one and the same time implicit thought, and thought is explicit action while *being* is the matrix (Sturzo would prefer to say *history*) without which neither thought nor action could exist.

The insight is one, and traceable to a common philosophical source, Leibnitz's *vinculum substantiale*. Both thinkers assert a dialectical dynamism of ascent, through a series of necessary but insufficient finite stages, to a final and imperative commitment to the One Infinite. Blondel describes the whole range of man's actions as a perennial struggle between "the will willing" and "the will willed." "The will willing" is man's free, originative power to act, infinite in its

capacity for action and hence a *potential* infinite; "the will willed" is man's achieved action, circumscribed by the inescapably finite boundaries of time and space. In his quest for the infinite man is constantly tempted to assert his own power by forcing the infinite into the finite. It is precisely in this temptation that Blondel sees "the internal, logical contradiction of the will," for any exclusive attachment to a given finite object as if it were definitive and absolute provokes, within the intelligible structure of "the will willing" a radical disturbance, which in turn engenders those 'idols' and 'illusions' described as the attempt to arrest the inner mobility of the human spirit within finite enclosures. The attempt, although often successful, cannot be sustained for long as there soon arises a radical dissatisfaction, at once psychological and moral, because the infinity of man's power to will can never be adequately satisfied by any finite good.

Nevertheless, man does continually transcend his own limitations, by widening his attachments to progressively more comprehensive spheres of being: from his dependence, for the very preservation of life, on the manifold substances of physical nature to his radical need to participate with others in the fulfilment of his deepest moral self; from his quest for an impersonal, objective moral ideal to fulfilment of his subjective, religious need in search of the One Personal Infinite, the creative human spirit at once traverses and transcends manifold stages. Sketchy as our presentation of Don Sturzo's principal ideas has been and sketchier still our treatment of Blondel, the profound affinity between the two thinkers should be unmistakable.

4—In a brief note of acknowledgments prefaced to *The True Life*, Sturzo singles out for particular attention a man

"who, maintaining constant contact with the author through writings and letters on philosophical and mystical writings, gave him inspiration and help in composing this book." The man is Don Luigi's brother Mario, the late Bishop of Piazza Armerina (Sicily), whose inspiration would appear to have been pervasive and deep-rooted. Mario Sturzo is a philosopher of the first rank although he is insufficiently known even in Italy, and practically unknown elsewhere. His major and last work, *La filosofia dell'avvenire* (1937) is a sustained effort at a systematic reconstruction of philosophy and is conceived in that bold synthesis of philosophical vision and disciplined historical scholarship suffused with both critical sensitivity and a mystical afflatus which is so peculiar to Don Luigi. Indispensable spade-work in breaking the way for a merited hearing has been done by M. Frattallone in a book, *Spiritualismo, Gnoseologico e Metafisico* that is somewhat mistitled as it is really an exposition, based on generously quoted passages, of Mario Sturzo's philosophy.

At the very heart of his philosophy is the four-fold insistence that "the problem of mystery is the primordial problem of both philosophy and history," that "reality is essentially organic," that "the faculty of the intellect is radically deficient," and that "Christianity is process." The confrontation of reality as a whole takes place through laws which are constitutive of nature in its inmost structures and processes, and which are immanent yet transcendent, personal yet objective, as the dialectical appropriation of the laws transpires within consciousness and is projected upon nature and history. Abandonment of the concept of category, in favor of this doctrine of laws, is a profound insight which throws light on "the deep affinity between nature and knowledge."

For Mario Sturzo, as for Leibnitz, nothing in nature is inert and everything is thoroughly organic; "knowing itself is relational," for things become knowable only in so far as they are organic and in so far as they enter into that consciousness which is, in Royce's compact phrase, "just this knot of relationships." Hence any attempt to split cosmic and human nature is bound to fail because cosmic nature comes to birth, and might almost be said to come into existence only through dialectical intercourse with human consciousness. Yet "the profound affinity" is not an identity, for each thing retains its individuality the very moment it becomes "an element in the making and sustaining of all other things, as each is reciprocally internal to the other," in an internality which is not that of one individual within another but of "*phenomenal* activities which radiate from every being, affect every being and in turn are absorbed, assimilated, unassimilated and radiated once again externally in myriad ways and forms..." (pp. 51 ff.)

The whole phenomenal dynamism of relations presses towards unification through the operative presence of the Law of Synthesis, described as "the law of the dynamic and individual unity of things..." achieved through knowledge. Man has a native impulse to unify and systematize "in virtue of a principle which is decisive for philosophy, the principle of the relativity of knowledge; and it is precisely because knowledge is relative that things cannot be defined by and through themselves but only by way of differences and oppositions which are always and at the same time real and ideal, and ideal precisely because real." The effort at systematization cannot be forced into totalitarian schemes for "man is a pure temporal process and his knowledge is relative, so that no such thing as one and only one ('unica')

philosophy will ever exist." (pp. 64 ff.) The insistence on one totalitarian philosophy or on a monochromatic vision of history is due to failure to synthesize adequately, and is traceable to that entrenched "vice of analysis called 'analyticism,' which is . . . a failure to go as far as a given analysis requires; it is analysis that has stopped short at partial syntheses." (p. 78) It is the partial masquerading as the complete which is at the root of distortions in both history and philosophy.

Mario Sturzo's teaching concerning "the radical deficiency of the intellect" has nothing to do with those doctrines which condemn intellect; on the contrary, it is an expression of a very robust though tempered sense of man's rational powers, a sense that is particularly well displayed in the crucial epistemological distinction between 'knowing' ('conoscere') and 'understanding' ('comprendere') made in respect to mystery. Defined as "the Known which we are utterly incapable of understanding rather than as an unknown that we can know," mystery is inscribed in man's nature as an operative law prodding him on to self-knowledge and historical fulfilment; indeed, without "knowing the mystery which he is incapable of understanding he would not even know himself, and thus would be unable to achieve either progress or civilization." (pp. 114 ff.)

In a magnificent passage, he 'constructs' an image of building as the chief analogue for describing both philosophical and historical process, envisions "the building of philosophy as a perennial progress, even in the midst of destruction and demolition," and claims that philosophy advances particularly when under pressure for disagreement for "dissent almost always exhibits some movement whereas agreement almost invariably has something static about it. And since it is certain that man is relative,

it is equally certain that all of his conquests are relative, partial, and, at least in part, defective. Every problem resolved engenders one or more new ones... Where there is neither opposition nor negation nor any effort at transcendence, there will never be progress..." (89-90) Even this introductory account should indicate the philosophical intimacy between the two brothers.

5—A measure of Sturzo's impact on the international community of scholars is revealed by the consistently high caliber of contributors who honored him on his eightieth birthday with a massive tribute, *Scritti di sociologia e politica in onore di Luigi Sturzo*. Yet, despite the catholicity of the testimony, in some presumably informed quarters such as the *American Sociological Review*, the work of Sturzo is reduced to that of a relatively major gadfly "in the vanguard of the resurgent social studies..." ("Sociology in Italy," by V. A. Rapport, S. C. Campanari, L. W. Moss, August 1957). The least that could have been done was to mention the relationship between Sturzo's thought and political activity, or between his historicist sociology and the historicism of Hegelian and Crocean inspiration. To this end, a conscientious examination of the volumes under discussion (they are not even mentioned in the article) would have provided a sobering corrective to the myopic view advanced in the *ASR*. Such an examination would certainly confirm Sturzo's pioneering role in overcoming the obstacles in the way of granting sociology an autonomous rank as a science within a totalitarian climate of opinion which, between a monistic idealism on the one hand and a univocal positivism on the other, had sought to appropriate sociology either as an appendage of philosophy or as a continuous extension of the physical, though humane, sciences. Such an examination

would also yield a rich harvest in the vigor and originality of Sturzo's own thought as well as in the vitality of sociological studies in Italy.

The studies may be divided into three major types, with considerable overlapping: a) appreciative and critical studies of Sturzo's thought; b) independent investigations of single problems of central concern to him; c) studies which have a tangential bearing on his thought. In view of the vastness of the collective tribute, we must confine ourselves to a highly selective sampling from the first two categories.

a) A. Robert Caponigri sheds considerable light on the historical-sociological context of Sturzo's resilient polemic against the modern concept of the state which asserts itself as an absolute ethical personality with indivisible juridical rights of sovereignty, and shows how his distrust of monolithic political power is a deep-rooted function of an opposition to "a homogeneous and monochromatic organization of society in political terms..." and to all unilateral unifications. (v. I, p. 301) Caponigri pays fine attention to the irreducible pluralism, achieved through shifting historical combinations, of the major social forms of human consciousness, and shows how the ethical problem of the autonomous state can be resolved only within a societal pluralism conducted along Sturzian lines.

R. Caldera sees in the person of Sturzo, "priest, sociologist, politician," a paradigm of the "necessary inter-relation between the social, political and religious exigencies which form the essential unity of the human person, and underscores, as a major discovery of contemporary sociology and one which Sturzo fully shares "the manifold complexity of social reality and the rejection of all kinds of monism." (v. I, p. 239)



Writing about "Le teorie sociologiche di Don Luigi Sturzo" as a "positivist . . . despite many reservations," the distinguished jurist A. Groppali expresses profound admiration for Sturzo's "realistic *forma mentis* which, in the observation of social facts, brings him very close to positivism, understood as method rather than system . . ." A refreshing openness of mind and a singular tribute to Sturzo's historical sensitivity are joined in the following passage: "whatever idea a positivist such as the writer, who has read and meditated Don Sturzo's *Sociology of the Supernatural*, may have of the transcendent value of the supernatural, and even if he should be unable to extricate himself from a naturalistic conception of life and of the world, he cannot but be favorably impressed by the objective way in which the projections and effects of religion are examined and considered as a psychological and social fact, in the course of history . . ." (v. II, p. 265) Sturzo's radical realism is particularly pronounced in his treatment of the problem of "what he calls social causation, in respect to which he is equally distant from those who over-accentuate the influence of the external environment by wishing to reduce it, as he is from those who, on the other hand, over-evaluate the creative will of man, and conceive it as an arbitrary succession of miracles." (p. 268) Yet, according to Groppali, Sturzo's realistic sense of the relative autonomy of historical causation is marred by an extra-scientific and dualistic belief in an absolute transcendent principle which at the same time initiates and ultimately resolves the whole historical process. Unable to accept this 'assumption' in so far as it belongs to faith rather than science, Groppali writes "with profound respect . . . for a man who, like Spinoza, has succeeded in living his life of thought among the most bitter battles

for the triumph of truth and justice." (p. 270)

Antoni and Attisani agree in substance in their decisive criticism of the 'ideological' assumption that politics is an instrument for the resolution of conflicting partisan interests. Antoni discloses the contradictions latent in "the ideological mystique of action" in so far as its very success betrays "that vital necessity of the spirit which is the need to assume truth as the guiding principle of conduct" (v. I, pp. 36-37). Attisani writes sensitively on the relationship between passionate political interest and theoretical detachment, and argues that the two concerns are intimately intertwined "for, as Vico has rightly claimed, it is impossible to separate, in history, the *verum* from the *factum* . . ." (p. 59). But the theoretical concern must not be subordinated to the political act, for passion is simply a precipitant and not a norm for historiographical knowledge; and yet "the very will to inquire about the past is a moral will to do the truth" (p. 63). Attisani's conclusions have a direct bearing on Sturzo in so far as his whole career was a life-long dialogue between political passion and historical detachment, and a successful practice in what Attisani considers to be the specific and essential task of historical education, namely the formation of critical judgments in preparation for political action.

A key article, straddling categories a) and b), is Marchello's "La sociologia come scienza empirica e il giudizio etico." The most rigorous phenomenological explication of immediate social structures and processes as they are given in concrete history will unfold social facts suffused with ethical value in so far as "the need which provokes every social event, invariably represents some kind of ethical value" (v. II, p. 412). The crucial point is that the value ana-

lyzed by the sociologist as scientist must be restricted to empirical determinations and clearly distinguished from "analogous concepts formulated by philosophical criticism on an ethical and universal plane; the identity of language is simply a verbal parallelism which conceals a profound substantive difference, and which only an absolute positivism would attempt to deny . . ." And if we are to understand in depth the total articulation of human experience, we must resolve the problem of value. Above all we must insist that "scientific sociological judgments are *neutral* in respect to value," and that by that very fact must leave the way open for further ethical-philosophical determination. The material content which sociological inquiry furnishes for "the *formal* requirements of ethics" cannot be evaluated without reference to empirical reality, for "the two elements, the ethical-rational and the empirical, are essentially complementary in nature." And it is precisely in "an original and effective" confrontation of this crucial problem that Marchello finds in the teaching of Sturzo "an extremely efficacious example . . . of a spiritualistic sociology open to the most empirical exigencies . . ." and in full agreement with the contemporary demand for "a modification of abstract ethical formalism." (II, pp. 413 ff.)

b) Out of the many articles in the second category we select those which are concerned directly with the ideas of justice and freedom. M. Reale sums up the classical vision of freedom as "the subordination of the 'status libertatis' to the 'status civitatis'," a concept which, though relatively inadequate, "must not blind us to its fundamental importance in recognizing freedom as a juridical fact . . . for even today the essential correlation between freedom and the person cannot be said to be fully achieved because of the continuous re-

strictions on the citizen in the exercise of his political freedom." The modern vision of the person as an absolute value is absent from classical culture, and escapes even the noble Stoic-Ciceronian concept of *humanitas* for it remains "something abstract and cold until it receives concreteness and warmth from the Christian idea . . . of *pietas* which endows the principle of *humanitas* with a vital value." Freedom is still fighting for a place in the sun as we continue to "refract the other person through the prism of our own selves" rather than "transcend both *ego* and *alter* through the mediation of a higher synthesis offered by the *nos*." (v. III, pp. 295 ff.)

The ethical vitality of an open democratic pluralism is the burden of Hans Kelsen's "Was ist Gerechtigkeit?" After a challenging but somewhat one-sided critical survey of the classical, Christian, and Kantian theories of justice, the distinguished jurist finds each wanting and makes a final plea for absolute relativity: "Absolute justice is an irrational ideal," but then hastens to reassure us that his relativistic philosophy of justice is deeply rooted in the one "chief moral Principle of Tolerance which demands a benevolent understanding of the political and religious views of others, even if we do not share their views, indeed precisely because we do not share them . . . Since democracy is, in its inmost nature, freedom and freedom is tolerance, no other form of state is more favorable to knowledge than democracy. For knowledge can flourish only when it is free, and it is free not only when it is uncoerced by external political influences, but also when it is internally free, when there is complete freedom in the interplay of argument and counterargument." (v. II, pp. 319 ff.) In short, freedom is the matrix of justice.

A vigorous defense of the Principle of Tolerance in its most sensitive form

is made by Pio Fedele in a masterly treatment of religious liberty as a juridical principle. The juridical case for religious freedom is put in the strongest light as Fedele asserts, against doctrinaire objections, that atheism itself has as much right to religious freedom as any denominational creed. He utilizes A. C. Jemolo in identifying as "the primordial factor in propagating any idea whatsoever, religious or anti-religious, the natural urge that moves us to make others participate in whatever we ourselves believe to be true and good. Primordial freedom is that which does not coerce this natural tendency, itself a manifestation of love towards those akin to us; freedom no longer exists the moment we are unable to communicate to others whatever we think by means of any argument whatsoever."

"Religious freedom is a single aspect of the more comprehensive freedom of believing and asserting whatever we believe . . . even if we should choose not to believe in anything . . ." (vol. II, p. 177) There follows a superb criticism of the Fascist experience in suppressing religious freedom on the grounds that uniformity of belief is the most expedient means for securing national unity, a concept which involves, in A. C. Jemolo's words, "a return to the pagan concept of religion as the business proper to the political group rather than to the individual." In the light of some lingering malpractices inherited from the long Fascist experience in religious intolerance, Fedele castigates "those who deny freedom of religious propaganda on the grounds that they are defending the One True Catholic Faith, for such people are not arguing on exclusively religious grounds; their arguments are thoroughly political and such as will offend any sincerely religious soul who, precisely because he does believe in the truth of his own religion, will not want

it exalted and protected as an *instrumentum regni* . . ." (p. 118) Moreover, the whole doctrinal teaching of the Church explicitly condemns "forced conversions," a horrible contradiction in any case . . . since faith is obviously a supreme ethical act and, as such, is absolutely incoercible; whence the disposition of canon 1351 of the *Codex iuris canonici*: 'ad amplexendam fidem catholicam nemo invitus cogitur,' and St. Augustine's unequivocal assertion 'credere nemo potest nisi volens.' (pp. 176-177). Criticizing the contemporary violations of the explicit constitutional guarantees of religious freedom in Italy, Fedele concludes with a vigorous reminder that "religious intolerance . . . is rejected in the official teaching of the Catholic Church herself, as recently expressed by Pius XII, in the Allocution inaugurating the New Rotal Year of 1946: '... the increasingly frequent contacts and intermingling ('promiscuità') of different religions within the boundaries of one people have led civil courts to follow the principle of 'tolerance' and 'freedom of conscience' . . . indeed, there is a political, civil and social tolerance towards the followers of other denominations which in such circumstances is even a moral duty for Catholics.'" This papal pronouncement would appear to agree, in its practical political consequences, with Kelsen's Principle of Tolerance.

The collective tribute is indeed superb, worthy of Don Sturzo, "the Master of contemporary Christian sociology" (Marchello), who remains, as G. P. Gooch wrote some thirty years ago: "... the idealist who is nothing of a doctrinaire, the man of learning who is also a man of affairs, the literary craftsman whose materials are skillfully marshalled and whose arguments are forcibly expressed."

ALFRED DI LASCIA

## RECENT WORK IN CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY

**I**N *Man and Culture: An Evaluation of the Work of Malinowski* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), thirteen social scientists attempt to measure the value of Bronislaw Malinowski's contribution to anthropology. This book has considerable value for the student since it presents both a summary of Malinowski's work and a survey of developments in the field as a whole, especially in Social Anthropology, since his death in 1942.

S. F. Nadel's essay, "Malinowski on Magic and Religion," can serve as a key to the general evaluation reached in this study. On the negative side are: Malinowski's weakness for over-generalization; his rationalism (all aspects of culture have to be explained on the basis of common sense); and his biologism (all culture must be explained as responses to basic and derived needs). But his positive contributions amply compensate for these deficiencies. Aside from his widely acclaimed qualities as a field researcher and a teacher, the broad generalizations he sought and the "functional" explanations he formulated opened avenues of thought and research without which his successors probably could not have charted their ways.

It is well to note that Malinowski's deeply felt humanism enabled him to sense and make allowances for realities which his theory could not justify. For example, he cautions the rationalist and agnostic who cannot accept the truths of religion to "...at least recognize them as indispensable pragmatic figments without which civilization cannot exist." This statement also indicates Malinowski's own ambiguous relation to religion. Nadel, who is usually a sensitive and perceptive thinker, questions Malinowski's humanism here, claiming that he is dangerously close to the cynicism of Plato's noble lie. Nadel appar-

ently fails to appreciate the uniqueness of man's spiritual dynamic which operates in and through his needs and "reason"; Plato's intention in calling for the noble lie is anything but cynical, even though it is a debatable means.

*The Theory of Social Structure* (The Free Press, 1957) is the posthumous publication of S. F. Nadel's last work. Nadel's death is a distinct loss to cultural anthropology since he was one of the more subtle and refined minds in this field. His generally acclaimed fieldwork and his wide familiarity with culture research, supported by a humanistic background, enabled him to overcome the limitations of Behaviorism and a narrow scientism that have plagued culture studies in general (cf. his earlier work, *The Foundations of Social Anthropology*, The Free Press, 1951).

In this recent work Nadel undertook a critical examination of the theory of "social structure," which, he found, rested on a satisfactory theory of "roles." In the subsequent analysis of "role behavior," we find a sensitive exposition of the interactive process between society and the individual which gives ample autonomy to the individual. His analysis of conformity and deviance led him to alter Parson's theory of role. He reached the conclusion that while "roles" imply one another within a system the mutual determination is not complete.

Relating "role behavior" to "social structure," Nadel concluded that "social structure" as a conceptual tool has weaknesses that outweigh its strength. The concept cannot represent whole societies, i.e., no society can be said to exhibit an embracing, coherent structure. Cleavages and dissociations make it necessary to speak of structure in the

plural. Though structural analysis is one-sided, since it suppresses complexity in favor of an overall scheme, it still has value. This value lies in the course of its application through which one may achieve a penetrating insight into the working of society.

One of the merits of this study is that it confutes a mechanistic or narrow organicist theory of society. In the past it has been fruitful to think of society as an organism, but this is at best a metaphor. The laws or regularities of social life are quite different from biological and physical laws because they concern moral agents. Nadel has made an important contribution to the science of the interaction of moral agents.

Peter Winch (*The Idea of a Social Science*, Humanities Press, 1958), in an examination of the kind of knowledge social sciences deal with, attacks the contention that the method of the natural sciences is the ideal for social scientists. The book is well written, but on reflection one may well feel it raises problems about Winch's position more complicated than the ones he puts to rest.

Winch sees an intimate relation between sociology and philosophy. Any science, he writes, may encounter philosophical problems which must be cleared up before it can resume its independent course. But the central problem of sociology—that of giving an account of social phenomena in general—itself belongs to philosophy. Wittgenstein's theory of following a rule is the underlying support of this provocative conclusion. The analysis goes somewhat like this. The philosopher's concern with the intelligibility of reality leads him to examine the relation between thought and reality, which in turn leads to an examination of the general nature of language. "Our idea of what belongs to the realm of reality is given for us in the language that we use." There is ground

for dispute in this last nexus, but holding this aside for the moment the remaining analysis and the conclusions reached are worthy of careful consideration.

Language, or the notion of intelligibility, is systematically ambiguous. That is, language can be precisely understood only within a given context. From whence does the context derive its power to determine meaning? By following the rules set by those engaged in conversing. And to follow a rule is to act so that those with whom one is conversing can detect the *meaning* of the action and even predict, under certain conditions, future action. There is no circular reasoning here because for Winch the forms of society constitute the given.

For the scientist, Winch points out, the social context involves two separate things governed by two different sets of rules: the phenomena and the scientist's relationship with fellow scientists, e.g., professional societies, academic relationships, etc. The second is often overlooked. For the natural scientist the context in which he and his fellow scientists are related does not directly affect the context of the phenomena. The relationship between social scientists, however, is very much like the relationship between the social scientist and his data. There is a qualitative difference, Winch rightly insists, between physical regularities and social regularities. The social scientist cannot be a mere observer. He must grasp the *meaning* of a person's behavior with its own quality of predictability and with its inherent ability to be different.

While one may question Winch's theory on the intrinsic connection between reality and language as well as on the extent of the importance social relations have in determining meaning of contexts, the conclusions he reaches and the measured observations he makes on



the way reflect favorably on his theoretical orientation.

THOSE CONCERNED with philosophical studies of culture will find rewarding two essays by Max Scheler, "The Forms of Knowledge" and "Man and History," (both in *Philosophical Perspectives*, Beacon Press, 1958), which contain many seeds of Scheler's more elaborated philosophical anthropology. The main points of the latter will be presented to the English reader in *The Place of Man in the Universe*, which Beacon Press will soon publish.

In view of Scheler's spiritualistic philosophical anthropology one is immediately struck by his appreciation of evolution and animal psychology. His rule, "Learn to know animals so that you know how difficult it is to be a man," should satisfy the most extreme humanist. For Scheler, man's uniqueness is his "... capacity to act *autonomously* in the face of all psychic, vital causality (including practical intelligence governed by drives), a causality no longer analogous and parallel to the functional processes of the nervous system, but parallel and analogous to the *objective structure of objects and values in the world itself*."

From the biological viewpoint, man is a natural dead-end for Scheler, because biological evolution decreases as higher stages of development are reached. But as a potential spiritual being man is the magnificent means to escape this dead-end because he is "... the creature in which fundamental essence begins to know and grasp itself, to understand and save itself." Culture, then, is viewed by Scheler as the simultaneous process of achieving humanity from subhuman nature and the continuous attempt of "self-deification" through all superhu-

man and infinite things which exist and demand man's veneration.

A careful analysis is given the spiritual function of man underlying the cultural process. As a spiritual subject: (a) man can be determined only by the contents of the *object* before him and not by drives, needs, and organic conditions; (b) man is capable of a love free of desire; and (c) *essential* being is revealed to man as he severs his dependence on worldly drives and the impressions of this dependence. Freedom is then viewed as a negative power to control and release rather than as a positive power to produce and create.

These views on spiritual functions lead Scheler to state that cultural development means something in the development of God. God is not a mere spectator nor is culture advancing on its own terms. Man constantly renews his self-development in God, Who, without man and human history, could not realize His own "timeless development."

Spiritual reality has its own unique status. Culture or historical activity culminates in the being of man and in his collaboration in realizing God. Culture has no external useful aims, but exists for the well-formed man himself. (Scheler is not ignorant of the importance of pragmatic knowledge, but he clearly distinguishes it from "knowledge of culture" and both from "knowledge of salvation.") Culture is not the direct objective of the will. Its growth takes place behind the back of mere intent and mere will. In brief, life is daemonic. Man achieves his humanity at the same time that he loses himself to the realm of the spirit.

The second essay, "Man and History," is a description of five basic types of man's conception of himself. In effect it is an outline of a history of philosophical anthropology.

LESLIE A. WHITE employs the theory of culture he previously formulated (*The Science of Culture*, Farrar, Straus, 1949) to trace the development of human civilization from its beginnings to the Fall of Rome (*The Evolution of Culture*, McGraw Hill, 1959).

White calls the theory supporting this historical study technological determinism. Of the four categories of components which constitute culture—ideological, sociological, sentimental, and technological—the technological is basic since, in a general way at least, it determines the form and content of the other three. From this White deduces a principle to gauge cultural evolution: "... culture advances as the amount of energy harnessed per capita per year increases, or as the efficiency or economy of the means of controlling energy is increased, or both."

White now analyzes for us: the origin of primitive society and the family; The Agricultural Revolution and the inevitable delineation of society into exploiter and exploited classes; the function of the State and Church, which he hyphenates, to preserve the socio-cultural system of which they are parts; and the inevitable evolution of culture according to the concentration of energy in social systems.

It is difficult to know where to criticize this neatly closed system first, but both the partial truth it contains and the dangers it rightly points out that are inherent in a depersonalized society demand a critique.

First of all the technological development of a society does have an important role in the achievement of human values. Credit should be given to White for focusing attention on this problem. But there is no one-to-one causal relationship between technology and human values as White would have it. Nevertheless, more humanists should

make use of this approach to cultural studies, because it is both viable, and, in view of today's international situation, a most necessary one. [Two recent studies in this category are: Hans Thirring, *Energy For Man*, Indiana University Press, 1958; and Norman Lansdell, *The Atom and the Energy Revolution*, Penguin Books, Inc., 1958.]

A second emphasis found in White's study is the inherent exploitative character of institutions based solely on property interests to the exclusion of human values. That all civil societies since the Agrarian Revolution are inherently impersonal and exploitative, as White contends, must be denied. Human institutions can be moral or immoral. What must be underlined for both humanist and determinist is that while human institutions are not inherently immoral, neither are they inherently moral. Both morality and immorality are the result of concerted choices and must be constantly achieved. White's view of civil societies as necessarily involving exploitation is derived from his arbitrary assumption that culture is basically impersonal. Any appeal to human minds or personalities is for him irrelevant because culture is supra-individual; culture determines minds and is not determined by individuals. Thus, once a division of society took place along property lines all members in the respective institutions were determined to be either exploiter or exploited. White fails to see that while culture has a supra-individual character it is dependent on and may be controlled by the individuals who comprise it.

A breakthrough in White's materialistic outlook seems apparent when he states that the technological component, even though it is the basic one, may be arrested in its development by social, ideational, or emotional factors. But he

hastens to add that this is not a concession to the opponents of technological determinism. The technological component, he says, is merely subject to conditions and limitations. But if the technological forces of culture can be limited, as White observes, does not this fact point to the possibility of a valid theory of culture based on ideological or psychological grounds? It has led many anthropologists and historians to think so.

One final point. For White the church and the state became necessary for the integration of society when society underwent wide diversification under the impact of The Agricultural Revolution. Consequently, in White's opinion, the church's function is to preserve the integrity of the socio-cultural system, that

is, to support the dominance of the ruling class and induce the subordinate class to be subservient. This is as neat a bit of historical oversimplification as has ever been written. Surely within the Hebraic-Christian tradition religious institutions have had a polarizing effect on *all* classes of society. St. Paul may have exhorted slaves to be good slaves but he did not thereby approve of slavery or urge slaveowners on to greater exploitation. The moral strictures imposed on those with wealth and power are as demanding as those on the subordinate classes. History cannot be properly understood without grasping the dynamic role religious institutions had in cultural evolution.

GEORGE PEPPER

## THE POLITICAL-CULTURAL SCENE

### 1.

*Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance*, by Edgar Wind (Yale University Press, \$7.00). Artists of all times do tend, consciously or not, to fall back on iconography to sustain a weak and uncertain vision; and sometimes their failures are enough to make us feel that iconography is nothing more than a matter of a label, and that between art and iconography a dividing wall should be erected for once and for all. Common sense, fortunately, usually restrains us. Somewhat begrudgingly we acknowledge that there is no good reason why iconography should be excluded from the innumerable elements that become one in the vision of the artist.

Yet the experience of modern art, theories of pure vision, a sensible mistrust of "literary" artists, all incline us to give lip service to the artistic respectability and possibilities of iconography.

The problem is apparent in some works of the Renaissance; for example, Michelangelo's *Bacchus*, Leonardo's *Leda*, Raphael's *Marsyas*, Correggio's *Graces* and Botticelli's *Spring* and the *Birth of Venus*. It is plain that there is iconography in these works and that, given the artist and the excellence of the work, it is a plausible conjecture that iconography here is an indispensable part of the painting. The iconography, granted, is obscure, but the want of any explanation thereof does not diminish the pleasure of many viewers, some of whom actually prefer ignorance as the best means of preserving the "mystery" of the painting. The painting, it is argued, can be appreciated "per se."

It is the purpose of Prof. Wind's essays to expose the fallacy of the "per se" in the argument by restoring to the painting the plenitude of its original meaning.

The reconstruction of this original

meaning required a good deal of insight and years of research. A detailed knowledge of the pagan mysteries of the Renaissance was the first prerequisite; a knowledge, that is, of Plato as seen by the philosophers of Late Antiquity (Plotinus, Porphyry, Proclus, Plutarch). The great Renaissance antiquarians and humanists of the fifteenth century, notably Pico della Mirandola and Marsilio Ficino, interpreted their teaching as an injunction to teach and not to teach, to deliberately obscure the most profound truths under poetical guise, as the ancients before Plato had done, so as to protect them against the ignorant and the profane. (If necessary, to conceal them with humor, as was the case in the *Golden Ass* of Apuleius, even with irony). Besides, then, this intrinsic difficulty of interpretation, of deliberate mystification, Prof. Wind had to contend with the various iconographical interpretations of mysteries by individual artists. A very complicated metaphysical, artistic onion-peeling.

In order to compare a number of iconographical procedures with similar procedures in literature on subjects such as the theory of permutations, Amor as god of death or the three kinds of life, Prof. Wind found it necessary to proceed into fields not usually those of the art historian of the Renaissance, such as Elizabethan literature and classical archaeology. This extension of his study adds to the conclusiveness of his demonstration and justifies the hope that his reading public will not be limited to art historians.

The test of the excellence of his approach, of course, is in the detailed note-laden concrete analysis of the above mentioned works together with a number of others. This reader found them as convincing as they were fascinating, particularly the analysis of Botticelli's paintings. It is not a question of find-

ing the missing word of a crossword puzzle; it is a question of the full meaning. Even in a field which would appear to be pure iconography, Renaissance medals, Prof. Wind, in examining the famous *Quid Tunc* medal of Alberti, has revealed the sudden presence of an awesome religious vision.

As unexpected as some of the analyses in these essays is the light and relaxed tone, evident throughout, in dealing with a necessarily massive erudition. Is this tone a transposition of a lesson learned from some Renaissance master?

(S. H.)

## 2.

*Christians in Racial Crisis*, by Thomas F. Pettigrew and Ernest Q. Campbell. (Public Affairs Press, \$3.50). The moderately encouraging reports of peaceful, though token, integration of the Little Rock public high schools suggests that one of the darker chapters of American history may be drawing to a close. The smoldering coals of segregationist resentment and the muttered threats of diehard resistance might yet produce a new crisis; but the costly price paid for the 1957 fiasco (whether measured in terms of the economic loss resulting from the reticence of new industry to locate in an area of strife and tension or in terms of the interrupted education of high school students—or even in terms of the loss of a community's good name) will most likely operate against such a possibility, and as the issue moves toward its ultimate resolution, the occasion presents itself for an orderly and thoughtful analysis of the forces and factors involved in inciting or even permitting the shameful events to take place.

Virgil Blossom's recent volume, *It Has Happened Here* (Harpers, 1959), presents the situation as experienced and interpreted by one of the central figures

of the whole affair. As Superintendent of Little Rock schools, he prepared and attempted to implement the original plan of limited integration. His book, then, becomes a defense of his position and an "exposé" of the opposing groups who exploited the indecisiveness of federal authority and captured a politically opportunist governor. What the book lacks in objectivity it more than makes up for through its "inside view" of the controversy and its tone of firm, though sometimes overly emotional, commitment to the idea of at least partial integration. In style it attempts the documentary approach, offering a sequential day-by-day (at times hour-by-hour) resume of the events. One of the unfortunate effects of this approach is that Blossom begins to overshadow principle in the total impression; public statements and other developments begin to take on importance in terms of whether they were "anti" or "pro" Blossom and his plan. This is undoubtedly a reflection of the fact that the segregationists did exploit him as a convenient symbol of the integration devil; but its net effect is to reduce a very vital clash of conflicting ideologies to the far more restricted scope of a contest between personalities—in this case, Faubus and the first person narrator of the controversy.

The Pettigrew-Campbell contribution is something quite different in that it addresses itself to a limited focus of study, the position taken by Little Rock's churchmen. Also, it makes a distinct effort to maintain throughout a standpoint and tone of scholarly objectivity. The research extended from October 1957 through December 1958 and involved extensive personal on-the-scene interviews with the city's ministers and rabbis, including segregationists and integrationists alike. For some reason, not at all clear to this reviewer, Catholic priests did not cooperate with the study,

despite the fact that they had joined with the other religious leaders in sponsoring the city-wide day of prayer at the height of the racial troubles.

Certainly, the position taken by religious leaders in such a situation is extremely relevant; yet, strangely enough, Blossom gives it little explicit attention beyond identifying the segregationist leadership furnished by one of the city's ministers and countering this with a favorable report of the day of prayer mentioned above. It is clear that he views this latter event as a show of support for his plan, a rather heroic stand in the face of an aroused community. Pettigrew and Campbell, on the other hand, offer another interpretation, one which sees it as a final face-saving device that actually "rang down the curtain" of the halfhearted efforts on the part of the Little Rock ministry to exercise moral leadership in a setting of civic controversy.

The authors distinguish between the ministerial "innovators" (generally younger, more recently ordained ministers of small neighborhood churches), "influentials" (older, long-term ministers of large community-wide churches), and "inactives" (older but short-term ministers of medium-sized churches) and trace the role played by each type in "the protest that failed." A separate chapter is devoted to the segregationist ministers of small sects and to their intense commitment to their position and what they believed to be its firmly established religious basis. One finishes the book with a distinct impression that, except for the minority of integrationist "innovators," these segregationists were the only churchmen who really bothered to develop and maintain a position rooted in moral principle (however great a distortion of that principle their stand may have been in actuality).



A 33-page appendix contains the pro-integration statements issued by virtually all the major religious communions in America. Read by itself, it would be truly inspiring evidence of the wide area of agreement—both in general principle and specific applications—they represent. However, reading it after completing this careful review of the ineffectiveness of the Little Rock ministry (and, more serious, the rationalization developed

to cover what must be termed a tragic failure and surrender) leaves one greatly depressed and disillusioned. If Little Rock is any index to the extent to which Christians can be expected to accept and implement moral teachings in their own social behavior, this book offers faint hope indeed that today's Christians, or their leaders, will (or will even try to!) change the world.

(G. C. Z.)

## PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

### 1.

*The World To Come* (Sheed and Ward, \$3.50). Father Robert Gleason has here given the community of the faithful a thoughtful, stimulating, and encouraging body of reflections on the issues of ultimate importance. The uncomplicated style, with footnotes relegated to the end of the book, should help considerably in bringing the work to an audience far wider than the academic community. Unfailingly aware that he is exploring mysteries, the author's reflections continually invite the reader to appropriate and prolong them on his own. The complexity and difficulty of the issues treated are met with sufficient nuance, without pretence, and with untroubled freedom.

There are eight chapters: Life, Law and Love; Sin; Death; Judgment; Redemptive Suffering; Hell; Resurrection; and Heaven. The primary aim of each chapter is to focus directly upon the issues and penetrate them both in themselves and in their relations to one another. A simple and effective pattern of inquiry is adopted throughout for this purpose. In brief, it consists in moving from the Old Testament treatment of each topic, through that of the New Testament, through Christian tradition, and on to current discussions.

There occurs throughout a compactly stated, sober, and highly effective critique of what we may call the "images" through which doctrinal contents are expressed. The critique is an organic part of the effort to get to the precise and deeper significance of the doctrine. The effect of the critique is to expose the imbalance or irrelevance of certain manners of regarding and understanding the doctrine. For example, here is a sentence that is at once typical of the book's vigor and of its serenity:

Hell is an utterly serious subject and should not be treated with exaggeration, lest the contemporary listener dispense with so essential a belief because his more developed sensibilities are offended by the comic-opera approach to this reality. (p. 116)

Though the target struck by such a remark is wide indeed, it must be emphasized that the book's primary concern is to deepen understanding of the Christian mysteries, and that criticisms are wholly subordinated to this purpose.

Of the many lines of reflection that are precipitated by the book's development, perhaps no single implication emerges more pronouncedly than the immeasurable fidelity and generosity of God. The freedom with which God extends His salvation to us is here clearly

linked to its being no less than an act of divine kindness in meeting man's utterly desperate needs.

There is, however, one line of thought that cries out for further development. This is the meaning of punishment. Father Gleason has no doubt assembled the elements required for a searching scrutiny of the issue of punishment but he has handled it with an almost excessive reserve. Having admirably shown the narrowness of a predominantly ju-

ridical perspective, it would appear that a reflective, theological analysis needs also to unpack the nest of ambiguities entangling the truth that God is the supreme judge. However all this may be, the book is excellent and most welcome. Let us hope it finds the wide audience to which it has so much to say.

(R. A.)

(Initialed notes in this issue are by Serge Hughes, Gordon C. Zahn, and R. Armamentos.)

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- Association Press: *The Prophetic Voice in Modern Fiction*, by William R. Mueller (Pp. 183, \$3.50); *Jung and St. Paul*, by David Cox (Pp. 358, \$5.75).
- Aubier, Editions Montaigne: *Eglise et société économique*, by J. Y. Calvez and J. Perrin (Pp. 587, n.p.).
- Barnes & Noble, Inc.: *Stoics and Sceptics*, by Edwyn Bevan (Pp. 152, \$4.50).
- Beacon Press: *The Cruel God: Job's Search for the Meaning of Suffering*, by Margaret B. Crook (Pp. xv, 222, \$3.50); *The Idea of the University*, by Karl Jaspers (Pp. 135, \$3.75); *From Shakespeare to Existentialism: Studies in Poetry, Religion and Philosophy*, by Walter Kaufmann (Pp. 404, \$5.95); *Science and Modern Mind*, ed. by Gerald Holton (Pp. 110, \$3.95).
- Aquinas Library: *Aristotle's Sluggish Earth: The Problematics of the De Caelo* (Pp. 73, \$2.50).
- Columbia University Press: *Revelation and Reason in the Advaita Vedanta*, by K. Sat-chinanda (Pp. xix, 365, \$7.50); *Hellenistic Culture: Fusion and Diffusion*, by Moses Hadas (Pp. vi, 324, \$6).
- Harper Bros.: *The Upanishads*, newly tr. by Swami Nikhilananda, Vol. IV (Pp. 406, \$6); *The Gospel according to Thomas*, tr. by Puech, Guillaumont, Quispel, Till & 'Abd Al Masih (Pp. 62, \$2); *Issues in University Education*, ed. by Charles Frankel (Pp. 175, \$3.95); *Shall We Amend the 5th Amendment*, by Lewis Mayers (Pp. x, 341, \$5); *Science, Medicine, and Morals*, by Charles E. Raven (Pp. 189, \$3.50); *The Strength of Men and Nations*, by W. E. Hocking (Pp. 248, \$3.50); *The Idea of a College*, by Elton Trueblood (Pp. x, 207, \$4); *Whitehead's American Essays in Social Philosophy*, ed. by A. H. Johnson (Pp. xii, 206, \$4).
- Helicon Press: *Modernity of St. Augustine*, by Jean Guitton (Pp. 89, \$2.50); *Our Lady in the Liturgy*, by Dom E. Flicoteaux (Pp. 109, \$2.75); *The Heart of Ignatius*, by Paul Don-coeur, S.J. (Pp. 127, \$3).
- A. A. Knopf, Inc.: *God's Frontier* (novel), by Jose Luis Martin Descalzo (Pp. 248, \$3.95).
- Johns Hopkins Press: *Forerunners of Darwin: 1745-1859*, by Bentley Glass, O. Temkin & W. L. Straus, Jr. (\$6.50); *Reflections on Art*, ed. Susanne K. Langer (Pp. vii, 364, \$6.50).
- Longmans, Green & Co., Inc.: *History and Philosophy of Science*, by L. W. H. Hull (Pp. 360, 16 pp. plates, \$5).
- Newman Press: *Alive in Christ*, by Ralph Campbell, S.J. (Pp. 321, \$3.75).
- Oxford University Press: *Theology of Culture*, by Paul Tillich (Pp. 214, \$4); *A Mirror of the Ministry in Modern Novels*, by Horton Davies (Pp. xi, 217, \$3.75).
- Pantheon Books: *Complex, Archetype, Symbol in the Psychology of C. G. Jung*, by Jolande Jacobi (Pp. 236, \$3); *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, by C. G. Jung (Bollingen Series, XX, Pp. 462, \$7.50).
- Pennsylvania State University Press: *Philosophy and Argument*, by Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. (Pp. xi, 141, \$4).
- Philosophical Library: *Classics of Protestantism*, ed. V. Ferm (Pp. 587, \$10).
- Fred A. Praeger, Inc.: *Dialectical Materialism*, by Gustav A. Wetter (Pp. 610, \$10).
- Public Affairs Press: *Christians in Racial Crisis*, by Thomas F. Pettigrew and Ernest G. Campbell (Pp. x, 196, \$3.50).
- Princeton University Press: *Political Theory: the Foundations of 20th Century Political Thought*, by Arnold Brecht (Pp. xviii, 603, \$12); *Twelve Who Ruled*, by R. B. Palmer (Pp. 417, \$6.95); *Voltaire's Politics: The Poet as Realist*, by Peter Gay (Pp. xii, 417, \$6).
- Random House: *The Mansion* (novel), by William Faulkner (Pp. 436, \$4.75); *A Raisin in the Sun*, by Lorraine Hansberry (Pp. 142, \$2.95).
- Henry Regnery Co.: *The Sunday Sermons of the Great Fathers*, Vol. 13, tr. and ed. by M. F. Toatl (Pp. xi, 379, \$7.50).
- Saccidananda Ashram: *Swami Parama Arubi Anandam* (Fr. J. Monchanin), 1895-1957 (n.p.).
- Chas. Scribner's Sons: *The Hinge of History*, by Carl Michalson (Pp. 256, \$3.95).

(Continued on 3rd Cover)



Seraphic Press: *The Notion of Tradition in John Driedo* (Pp. 321, \$3).

Editions du Seuil: *Itineraire Spirituel de Charles de Foucauld*, by Jean-Francois Six (Pp. 458, n.p.); *Poésie de la présence*, by Albert Béguin (Pp. 262, 1200f.).

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Univ. of Washington Press: *Essays in Moral Philosophy*, ed. by I. Melden (Pp. 216, \$4.50).

John C. Winston, Co.: *God in the Space Age*, by Martin J. Heineken (Pp. 216, \$3.50).

Yale University Press: *The Vision of Tragedy*, by Richard B. Sewall (Pp. 178, \$4); *An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics*, by Wm. A. Christian (Pp. xii, 419, \$6).

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